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Executive Summary 
Background 
Female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) is recognised globally to carry risks to both the 
physical and psychological health of girls and women and is widely considered to be a violation 
of human rights. An estimated 200 million girls and women in 30 countries have undergone 
FGM/C and as many as 30 million girls younger than 15 years of age are at risk (UNICEF 2016). 
A common policy response to FGM/C is to call for the enactment and enforcement of criminal 
prohibitions on the practice. Yet, the law and society literature (Tyler 1990; Friedman 2016) 
suggests that compliance with laws is complex: it can be motivated and undercut by moral, 
social, religious, and incentive-based factors. We chose to conduct this study in two neighbouring 
countries, Burkina Faso (which has a strong FGM/C law) and Mali (which has no specific FGM/C 
law), so as to explore attitudes and tendencies towards obeying the law and continuing FGM/C 
practices while controlling for many potentially confounding variables. 
Methods 
This study uses a mixed-method design that was implemented on the basis of a border-
discontinuity. Data were collected in six pair villages along the Burkina Faso (BF)-Mali border 
and each pair village was chosen to reflect the same majority ethnic group (the Bobo in 
Faramana-BF/Koury-Mali; the Senoufo in Koloko-BF/Finkolo-Mali, and the Bwaba in Tansila-
BF/Boura-Mali). Our target population was men and women aged 18 years or older.  In the 
quantitative study, we sampled randomly, using the right-hand rule and Kish method. The 
qualitative component was composed of Key Informants Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group 
Discussions (FGDs). Key informants were purposively selected from various positions within the 
chosen communities in order to understand participants’ opinions about the moral, social, and 
legal rules in the community. The FGDs involved eliciting indirect responses to prompts on 
statutory law using FGM/C vignettes.  
Results 
Knowledge of legality of FGM/C: The vast majority of respondents think that FGM/C is illegal 
(87% of all respondents in Burkina Faso and 80% in Mali). The results in Burkina Faso were 
consistent with previous studies, but the Mali results were surprising in that Mali does not have a 
specific law that criminalises and punishes the practice of FGM/C. Radio was the main source of 
information about the law in both countries, as well as for all quantitative and qualitative 
participants, and the Mali quantitative results may be partly explained by cross-border diffusion of 
anti-FGM/C messages form Burkina Faso.  
Compliance motivations: 54% of all respondents reported a motivation to obey statutory law in 
general that flows from a sense of legal obligation and from believing others to behave similarly 
(54.4% in Burkina Faso and 53.6% in Mali). When respondents were asked what they thought 
motivated others to obey customary law in general, fear of social sanctions (ancestors, gods, 
etc.) was reported by 33% of respondents, while respect for the law was mentioned by 27%, and 
this is approximately equivalent to what motivated the respondents individually to obey 
customary law. There is no single, accepted definition of customary law. The definition by 
Stavenhagen and Iturralde (1990, p. 29) reflects the context of our study: “customary law is 
generally understood to mean a set of unwritten, uncodified traditional legal norms and practises 
which are distinct from the positive law in force in any given country.” 
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Legal disobedience: When there is a conflict between statutory law and religion/customs, only 
28% of respondents in both countries said it would be permissible to disobey the statutory law if it  
contradicts with their religion/customs, while 60% of respondents said they would disobey 
customary law if it contradicts with their religion. Respondents in both countries said it is 
permissible to disobey statutory law if it is clearly against one’s moral principles (65%), if one 
knows the law is not enforced (61%), if one does not know about the law (71%) and if one thinks 
the law is enforced unfairly (69.9%).  
Reasons for continued FGM/C practice: Many quantitative respondents believe that FGM/C,  
(the WHO type I and type II being mostly practiced) is permitted by their religion (15.8% in BF 
and 18.3% in Mali) and customs (20.7% in BF and 22.5% in Mali). The qualitative results 
generally confirmed the quantitative data in this regard, linking the continuation of FGM/C 
practice to customs and religion, as well as to a stronger emphasis on religion in Mali, as 
compared to Burkina Faso. Depending on the country, the ethnic groups and the experiences of 
the participants, a variety of reasons were invoked to justify the continuation of the practice: 
culture/tradition, social reasons (such as marriageability), health reasons, pressure from elders, 
and the regulation of women’s sexual desire. 
Continuation/discontinuation of FGM/C: In our quantitative survey, 17% of respondents stated 
that they would practise FGM/C even if everyone else in their community stopped (14% Burkina 
Faso, 21% Mali) and 18% of stated that the practice should continue (15% Burkina Faso, 21% 
Mali). The majority of respondents, however, were supportive of FGM/C abandonment, as long 
as everyone does it (83% in Burkina Faso and 77% in Mali). This same topic was covered with 
qualitative participants (KII and FGD) via vignette and results confirm support for abandonment 
despite resistance from some families and the persistence of underground cutting. Qualitative 
respondents indicated that abandonment is motivated by the health consequences of cutting. 
Continuation is motivated by a fear of social isolation or marginalisation. 
Discussion 
This study reveals important findings in terms of knowledge of FGM/C law, as well as motivations 
to obey and defy the law in general and FGM/C law in particular. There is a widespread belief 
that FGM/C is illegal in both countries, despite the fact that Mali does not have a law that 
specifically crimnalises the practice of FGM/C. Progressive attitudes and behaviours in line with 
the international agenda, motivated by health consequences and other reasons, also support a 
shift towards FGM/C abandonment. Being an uncut girl does not seem to be taboo everywhere in 
surveyed communities. The medical narratives of the health consequences seem to be working, 
as well as the impact health workers have had on convincing some parents to abandon the 
practice or at least to say that they would do so. The innovative list experiment shows that the 20 
years of efforts made by Burkina Faso’s government have produced results in the three villages 
included in the study, as the projected future prevalence rates for all villages in Burkina Faso are 
far lower than those of their counterparts in Mali. That said, some families continue to defy anti-
FGM/C laws and all related interventions undertaken to date.  
Implications for policy, programmes and/or research 
Policy implications 
Governments and nongovernmental actors looking to end the practice of FGM/C should (1) 
continue to support sensitization and awareness-raising campaigns implemented by the 
government of Burkina Faso over the last 20 years; expand such campaigns to include people 
still defending the practice; try to persuade local leaders within practising communities to join the 
abandonment movement already happening in study communities; and highlight the lack of 
negative social consequences for girls/families who decided not to cut. They should also (2) 
 ix 
 
strengthen the role of health workers as key influencers and agents of change in all interventions 
aiming to eliminate FGM/C in Burkina Faso, Mali, and beyond. Finally, they should (3) implement 
and strengthen international coordination/cooperation to eliminate cross-border FGM/C through a 
regional law targeting cross-border and in-country FGM/C and community-level implementation.  
Research implications 
Future research should (1) investigate factors that have led people in the study areas in Mali to 
think that FGM/C is illegal when there is no FGM/C law in Mali.  It should also (2) scale up cross-
border research to include other countries neighbouring Burkina Faso that have an FGM/C law 
(Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Niger) and where Burkinabe families also cross the border to have their 
daughters undergo the practice (GRIGED 2008; UNFPA 2016); replicate the list experiment to 
assess the effect of law (or its contribution) on FGM/C abandonment in order to strengthen the 
findings. Finally, future research should include a sound anthropological study, with immersion of 
researchers in individual communities, to provide an in-depth understanding of how to tackle 
those who strongly resist anti-FGM/C policies and interventions. 
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Introduction  
Background 
Female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) refers to all forms of medically unnecessary cutting of 
the female genitalia. It comprises all procedures that involve partial or total removal of the 
external female genitalia, or other injury to the female genital organs for nonmedical reasons 
(WHO/UNICEF/UNFPA 1997). The “cut, flesh removed” is the most common type of FGM/C 
practised both in Burkina Faso and Mali (28TooMany 2018). FGM/C is recognised globally to 
carry risks to both the physical and psychological health of girls and women and is widely 
considered to be a violation of human rights. 
Burkina Faso 
Burkina Faso is a landlocked country of over 18 million people, lying immediately to the 
southeast of Mali. Both countries are part of the same West African macro-culture, sharing some 
of the same ethnic groups. FGM/C prevalence has been historically high (87% among those 
aged 45–49 years as of 2015) but has been declining since 1985 (UNFPA 2018). In 2015, it was 
estimated that FGM/C prevalence was 42% in 2015, among those aged 15–19 years (UNFPA 
2018). FGM/C prevalence in Burkina Faso has traditionally been measured through 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) data, particularly the DHS surveys of 1997/1998, 2003 
and 2010. The methodology used in these surveys relies on self-reporting from women or the 
parents of younger girls. Though the latest Demographic and Heath Survey (DHS) IV 2010 and 
the multisectoral ongoing survey (Enquête Multisectorielle Continue—EMC) 2015 provide data 
on girls aged 0–14, the others focused more on women aged 15–49 (INSD 2012, 2015). 
According to a new study of the legal frameworks associated with FGM/C in West and Central 
Africa, with special attention to Burkina Faso, the country was one of the first to criminalise the 
practice and the government’s implementation is “exemplary and unique” (UNFPA 2018). Since 
its passage in 1996, the law punishes cutters as well anyone who knows of the cutting and fails 
to report it to the authorities (CNLPE 2016a, 2016b). A recent study by Crisman et al. (2016, p. 
33) explained that while there is evidence of a recent decline in the FGM/C rate in Burkina Faso, 
enforcement of the law should be done in conjunction with other strategies:  
“Our analysis demonstrates that in Burkina Faso, the passage of a law against FGM/C 
resulted in a decrease in the likelihood that the average woman or girl would be cut. We 
find that the impact of the legal change is varied across religious and ethnic subgroups 
as well as by administrative region. However, we stress again that legislation should not 
be understood to be operating in isolation, absent wider shifts in attitudes, social 
practises, and government and civil society efforts to alter each of them.” 
A US State Department Report (2009) says that recommendations to abolish FGM/C were 
discussed publicly in 1985, and many programmes of education and advocacy have been carried 
out since. In 1990, President Blaise Compaoré (President of Burkina Faso from 1987 to 2014) 
issued a decree imposing fines on those who were found to be performing FGM/C and decreed 
the formation of the CNLPE, actively supported by the First Lady, Chantal Compaoré, who was 
its honorary chair. Since its formation, the National Committee has organised a wide variety of 
activities and programmes. Among them, starting in 1990, and unique in the world, an SOS 
Excision Hotline (Diop et al. 2008).  Anyone can call the hotline, which is set up within the 
SP/CNLPE and allows the population to call free of charge and anonymously to report any case 
of practice of FGM/C or intention to practise. The hotline is managed by security forces placed at 
the disposal of the SP/CNLPE. In the event of a denunciation, the appropriate services (police, 
gendarmerie, social action, etc.) located in the village/city of the denunciation is contacted to 
intervene to stop the intention to cut or, when the cutting is already performed, to arrest the cutter 
 2 
 
and any accomplices (CNLPE 2016). Hence, enforcement of the law relies on people to report 
cases. In 1997, the CNLPE was assigned a permanent secretariat and a budget, and the 
practice of FGM/C was made subject to penal sanctions. The law imposes a prison sentence of 
six months to three years or a fine on anyone who attempts or succeeds at performing, 
requesting, inciting, or morally supporting FGM/C; if a death results, the penalty is 5–10 years. 
Maximum penalties would be imposed if the guilty party is a medical professional. Also, all those 
who know about such criminal activity will be fined if they fail to report it to authorities.  
The UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme (2015) presents Burkina Faso’s current enforcement of 
the law as a noteworthy model. Much sensitisation and training has been done in the various 
elements of the criminal justice system. Judicial hearings are not held in the capital but rather 
conducted by mobile tribunals near the community where the case originates. The prosecution 
and sentencing is public. Before taking up the case the judges discuss FGM/C and answer 
questions from the public. The courts promote discussion and dialogue on the practice and 
strengthen the connection of formal law to the local community, according to the report. Those 
found responsible are counselled by the courts, which results in some defendants becoming 
agents of change. Such methods are consistent with the ideas of restorative justice which is a 
recent approach to penal theory and ethics not frequently encountered in discussions of the 
criminalisation of FGM/C. According to Boyes-Watson (2014), restorative justice seeks to build 
partnerships to re-establish mutual responsibility for constructive responses to wrongdoing within 
our communities. Restorative programmes seek a balanced approach to the needs of the victim, 
wrongdoer, and community through processes that preserve the safety and dignity of all). This 
increases the number of cases reported, and police are trained to take cases reported by the 
SOS Excision Hotline directly to health services for treatment. Therefore, Burkina Faso 
sometimes enforces its FGM/C law in a way reminiscent of the restorative justice model.  
In 2018, the government of Burkina Faso revised its FGM/C law, which is embedded in the Penal 
Code. Now, prison sentences range from 1–10 years and fines range from 500,000 to 3 million 
francs CFA [845 to 5060 USD]. If a girl dies following the cutting, imprisonment ranges from 11–
21 years and the fine is 1 million to 5 million francs CFA [1687 to 8432 USD]. A new article (art. 
513-9) was added to discourage public support of the practice of FGM/C: “the penalty shall be 
imprisonment for a term of one to five years and a fine of two hundred fifty thousand (250 000) to 
one million (1 000 000) CFA francs [422 to 1687 USD], whoever through his public speech, 
public comments or writing, encourages female genital mutilation” (Ministry of Justice, Human 
Rights and Civil Promotion, 2018: 148). The CNLPE is also pursuing its actions to fight against 
FMG/C in Burkina Faso by judging culprits through mobile courts and other actions at the 
national and community level, according to its five-year action plan (CNLPE 2016b). This shift is 
more punitive for those who persist in contravening the law, but the approach—through 
communication and sensitisation—is maintained and reinforced. Prosecutions are judged under 
this revised law, though the CNLPE does not yet have the figures to assess the actual shift since 
the law modification was recent.   
Mali 
Mali, in West Africa, is a landlocked country of 18 million people. FGM/C prevalence is high, with 
about 91% of women aged 15–49 years reportedly cut as of 2012–2013 (INFO-Stat/Mali and ICF 
International 2014).  The type of FGM/C mostly practised is the “cut, flesh removed” (28TooMany 
2018), which represents WHO type I and type II. Unlike in Burkina Faso, there has been very 
little decline in prevalence of FGM/C in Mali since the first measures from DHS data back in 1950 
(Engelsma, Mackie, and Merrell 2018). Civil society organisations and government ministries 
have proposed laws, but the National Assembly has declined to enact them.  
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However, it should be noted that Penal Code Act No. 01-079, of 20 August 2001, contains 
certain provisions applicable to violence against persons in general and could apply to cases of 
FGM/C. Indeed, reference should be made to articles 207 et seq. of the Criminal Code in this 
regard. In addition, the National Programme to Combat FGM/C in Mali [Programme National de 
Lutte Contre l’Excision au Mali] has undertaken many actions to combat the practice. 
After an analysis of the Malian context since 1999, the Ministry of Health has also taken some 
measures to curb the practice. Through the Circular No. 0019/Msp-As-Sg, of 7 January 1999, the 
Minister of Health, the Elderly and Solidarity instructed all of the Regional Directors of Public 
Health and Directors of the Hospitals of Bamako and Kati, "to take all necessary measures to 
prevent the practice of FGC in health establishments under their moral and technical 
responsibility." It should be noted that the initiative for this instruction was based on the results of 
a survey carried out at that time, which showed a number of findings, including the following: 
• 29% of women who have undergone FGM/C have difficulties in childbirth; 
• 62% of health workers wanted a formal ban on FGM/C in health facilities; 
• 28% thought that the practice should not be encouraged; 
• 60% of the providers surveyed had already experienced the immediate complications of 
FGM/C and 68% had experienced late complications. 
 
Theoretical underpinnings  
To explain variability in the effectiveness of criminal law in combatting FGM/C, we first needed to 
understand and investigate the reasons people have for obeying the law. People are motivated 
to obey the law for the following reasons (synthesised from Friedman 2016, Hart 1961, Kahan 
1997, Mackie 2017, McAdams 2015, Tyler 1990):  
• Moral: 
o Personal agreement: following specific laws, believing they are morally right 
o Legitimacy: believing that one owes general obedience to the law 
o Procedural: believing that authorities apply the law fairly to all 
• Social:  
o Descriptive norm: Obeying/disobeying because others obey/disobey (including social 
proof and coordination) 
o Injunctive norm: Shame among peers for disobeying the law, or pride for obeying 
• Punitive:  
o Fear of government punishment  
o Or, more rarely, hope of government reward 
• Religious 
o We hypothesised that religious motivations take the form of moral agreement, or 
social approval by the religious community, or fear of punishment by the religious 
community 
It is also useful to distinguish between obedience with respect to specific laws, and general 
obedience to the law. Obedience to many specific laws converges on general obedience, and a 
disposition to general obedience results in obedience to many specific laws. In all societies there 
are laws that most people do not obey; even in societies of high general obedience. For 
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example, millions of youth pirate and exchange music files in violation of copyright law. We 
therefore study an individual’s specific or general obedience, as well as that of the collective.  
Why criminalisation? 
A common policy response to FGM/C is to call for enactment and enforcement of a criminal law 
to prohibit the practice. Why is criminalisation so often suggested as a remedy? First, FGM/C 
often involves caregivers acting on children so as to irreversibly reduce a valued human capacity 
(sexual functioning) in the absence of meaningful consent (Nussbaum 1999). If the change were 
reversible, or if it were made by a consenting adult, there would be little cause for concern. We 
know that many people value sexual experience, but the worry about FGM/C is not that women 
should pursue such experience, but rather that they should retain a free choice upon adulthood 
to do so or not (Nussbaum 1999). It is difficult for some people to understand or accept that 
those who practice FGM/C intend to help their daughters in one way or another, rather than to 
harm them. If caregivers intend to do wrong this this is a reason to apply criminal punishment.  
Criminalisation is also suggested as a remedy because many in the developed world assume the 
doctrine of legal centralism: that in most places most people obey most laws and, hence, that the 
law is usually the best way to bring about social change and to reduce social harms. Yet, the law 
is often not obeyed around the world and law is not always the best way to bring about social 
change (Griffiths 1986). It is also true that people tend to think of themselves as motivated 
intrinsically, such as by moral considerations, and of others as having extrinsic motivation such 
as by the threat of social pressure or legal punishment (summarised with respect to motivations 
to obey the law by Feldman, 2011: 29–36). For instance, in Colombia, the nongovernmental 
organisation (NGO) Corpovisionarios has found that modal response for citizens’ reasons for 
legal compliance is that “I obey the law for moral reasons, but that others obey the law to avoid 
legal penalties” (Guillot 2012). This common misperception may be why outsiders often believe 
that FGM/C practitioners would be more deterred by threats of punishment than by moral 
deliberations and social mobilisations. 
Thus far, there have been no dramatic declines in the FGM/C attributable to law/regulation. 
There is an overall association at the national level between enactment of laws and a modest 
decline in self-reporting of the practice. Attribution of causality is difficult, however, because there 
is a modest decline in self-reporting in a range of countries, independent of legal prohibitions and 
enforcement of the same. Also, Burkina Faso may be an exception: the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint 
Programme (2015) considers its past and current enforcement of the law as a noteworthy model. 
Crisman et al. (2016), in a careful and sophisticated study, estimate that the 1996 passage of a 
law in Burkina Faso, in the context of many other efforts, reduced the risk of being cut by about 
30%. This is an encouraging finding that is likely attributable to the conjunction of various actions: 
a strong political will, the translation of the law into local languages, the mobile courts, the 
hotline, the involvement of community members and leaders, etc. (CNLPE 2016; UNFPA 2018).  
Causality is also difficult to establish because enforcement is minuscule compared to the 
widespread nature of the practice: there have been 1,317 legal actions in 17 countries of focus 
from 2008–15, according to the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme (2015). Criminalisation 
appears to have had limited effect, except for reports that it supports and bolsters organised 
social change. According to UNICEF (2013),  
Debate on the efficacy of legislation banning FGM/C has been largely overtaken 
by a growing consensus that laws should be one of a set of interventions by 
governments to support a social movement towards its elimination. A UNICEF 
report on legislative reform and FGM/C notes that such reform needs to take into 
account the degree of social support for the practice….In settings where 
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segments of practising populations agree that girls and women should not 
undergo FGM/C, institutional frameworks can play an important role in supporting 
social change aimed at ending the practice….However, in communities with 
broad support for FGM/C, the challenge is to develop legislative reform strategies 
that complement efforts in the social sphere and contribute to collective 
abandonment of the practice.  
That said, there is reason to believe the law has had some positive effects, which likely depend 
on implementation and social support. It seems to be important in Burkina Faso, and maybe in 
Benin, where the latest survey data show that the practice has fallen to near zero among those 
aged 0–10 years (although there are media reports of exceptions). Benin, like Burkina Faso, has 
conducted a variety of anti-FGM/C programmes (including law), but differs in that survey data 
show a much greater reduction in the practice.  
Why might criminalisation be ineffective? 
There are five main reasons why FGM/C criminalisation may be ineffective in practising 
countries: (1) limited state capacity, (2) legal pluralism, (3) ineffective sanctions, (4) opposing 
moral and social motivations, and (5) widespread acceptance of the practice. 
First, as a colonial legacy, states in sub-Saharan Africa tend to lack the capacity to strongly 
enforce basic law, never mind challenging laws like those associated with FGM/C. Yet, there 
remains an assumption among outsiders that various states can enforce such laws. For FGM/C, 
the state’s role in fairly and effectively enacting, applying, and enforcing the law is especially 
important. Weak state capacity diminishes two of the moral reasons for complying with the law: 
the legitimacy of state commands and its procedural fairness in enforcing same.  
Second, in the developed world, societies tend towards legal monism (a single legal authority) 
and in the developing world, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, they tend towards legal pluralism 
(multiple legal authorities). Under legal pluralism, it is quite common for statutory law to exist 
alongside customary law.  
What makes this pluralism noteworthy is not merely the fact that there are 
multiple uncoordinated, coexisting or overlapping bodies of law, but that there is 
diversity amongst them. They may make competing claims of authority; they may 
impose conflicting demands or norms; they may have different styles and 
orientations. This potential conflict can generate uncertainty or jeopardy for 
individuals and groups in society, who cannot be sure in advance which legal 
regime will be applied to their situation (Tamanaha 2008).  
As European states centralised power and built state capacity, formal law over time came to 
displace previous reliance on custom. As these same states pursued imperial conquest, they 
imposed an alien formal law on their colonies, often relying on indirect rule that recognised the 
customary laws of indigenous peoples. The dual legalism naturally persisted after colonies 
gained independence. The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) 
estimates that in many developing countries, 80% of cases are settled within traditional or 
customary legal systems, which Tamanaha et al. (2012) calls an understatement. Legal pluralism 
does not imply a lack of legal authority, but multiple, conflicting authorities. To navigate in such a 
landscape, change agents must recognise the fact of legal pluralism where it exists and that 
customary and statutory law can harm both women’s rights and interests. Harmonisation of 
authorities on morally justified ends is the appropriate response.  
Third, the threat of punishment does not necessitate compliance. Indeed, Sherman (1993) 
suggests that “legal punishment either reduces, increases, or has no effect on future crimes, 
 6 
 
depending on the type of offenders, offenses, social settings, and levels of analysis.” The same 
is true in the international arena. Political scientists have found that countries’ ratification of 
human rights treaties does not necessarily improve respect for human rights (Neumayer 2005; 
Hathaway 2007). Worse, Hafner-Burton, Victor, and Lupu (2012, p. 80), in a nuanced review of 
the literature, observe that, “there is a troubling and recurrent finding that participation in some 
treaties correlates with worse human rights behaviour.” Given such findings, it is not clear 
whether enactment of anti-FGM/C laws in practising countries predicts significant progress in 
abandonment of the practice.  
Indeed, Shell-Duncan et al. (2013, p. 1), who studied criminalisation of FGM/C in Senegal, found 
that,  
Among supporters of FGC [female genital circumcision], legal norms ran counter 
to social norms, and did little to deter the practise, and in some instances incited 
reactance or drove the practise underground. Conversely, where FGC was being 
contested, legislation served to strengthen the stance of those contemplating or 
favouring abandonment. We conclude that legislation can complement other 
reform strategies by creating an “enabling environment” that supports those who 
have or wish to abandon FGC. 
In Ethiopia, which also has a strong and widely publicised criminal law against FGM/C, Boyden, 
Pankhurst, & Tafere (2013) found that, for many respondents, the practise of FGM/C had gone 
underground and possibly become stronger in reaction to criminalisation. Girls who had opposed 
the practise changed as they approached the age of marriage because of peer pressure from 
older girls, and some girls demanded and organised FGM/C on their own, without their parents’ 
knowledge, shielding their parents from prosecution. The authors conclude “that interventions to 
promote changes in practises that do not consider the underlying logic and potential unintended 
consequences for those affected are unlikely to achieve their aims and may engender resistance 
and result in adverse outcomes” (p. 42).  
Fourth, moral and social reasons contribute strongly to compliance. Tyler’s (1990, p. 45) 
pioneering Chicago-based study showed that self-reported legal compliance is correlated with 
morality, peer disapproval, and certainty of punishment). Summarising related literature, Nagin 
and Pogarsky (2001, p. 869) find that, “a belief that illicit conduct is wrong, and the fear of 
disapproval, embarrassment, or social stigma discourage offending behaviour.” Further, “the 
conforming influence of extra-legal [moral and social] [is] far greater than that from legal 
sanctions” (Nagin and Pogarsky, 2001, p. 869); the effect sizes of variables having to do with the 
certainty and severity of legal punishment are “modest to negligible” (Pratt et al. 2006, p. 383), 
and variables related to the threat of force of extra-legal sanctions, such as moral conscience or 
social disapproval are “among the most robust predictors of deterrence” (Pratt et al. 2006, p. 
385).  
Additionally, law itself is held in place not only by moral and penal motives but, crucially, by social 
norms of general and/or specific legal obedience. In the absence of a social norm of legal 
obedience, popular compliance may be low. The social norm of legal obedience may be low for 
historical reasons: the illegitimacy of laws in prior conditions of colonial occupation or of 
communist rule may have obstructed the emergence of such a norm. Sometimes the lack of a 
legal obedience social norm may reflect popular opposition or indifference to a particular law; 
sometimes general legal disobedience can exist among a minority of “legal nihilists” who pride 
themselves on defiance. And, importantly, the absence of a legal obedience social norm may be 
driven by obedience to conflicting customary law.  
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Fifth, criminal law is designed to regulate harmful deviance at the margins of social consensus 
(Mackie 2017), not socially acceptable behaviour. Dowry murder, for example, is a deviation from 
an accepted norm, with intended harmful consequences perpetrated by a few specific individuals 
and with a backwards-looking remedy: punishment of the guilty. Dowry itself, while also 
sometimes harmful, is situated differently: it is an accepted norm, associated with often indirect 
and unintended harmful consequences, that is carried by many, and is associated with a 
forwards-looking remedy: coordinated abandonment. It should not be surprising, then, that dowry 
is criminalised, without effect, in India (Mackie 2017). Enforcement would require jailing most of 
the population and law enforcers, who have limited resources and discretion, pursue crimes that 
they and the local community most want to be punished. Citizens do not obey anti-dowry laws 
because they expect the law to approximate popular views, thus undermining the general and 
particular legitimacy of the law.  Why obey, if others do not?  
Relatedly, Aldashev et al. (2012) find that a moderate law can increase the bargaining power of a 
local person governed by customary law who can credibly threaten to move a dispute to the 
formal, legal arena, thereby obtaining a local settlement more in her favour. Under these 
constraints, the law acts as a magnet, moving custom in its direction. An extreme law, that most 
believe to be enforceable, however, has no such magnet effect. Platteau (2010) confirms this 
finding in varying contexts across sub-Saharan Africa, suggesting that the social acceptability of 
FGM/C may, in some contexts, undermines the effectiveness of the law.  
Where conditions are favourable for international law, state compliance with international law, 
and states’ ability and will to enforce the law, such as in the United Kingdom or France, it is not 
clear how effective criminalisation of FGM/C has been. If arrest, prosecution, conviction, and 
punishment for violation cause deterrence, there have been few such actions (Berer 2015) in 
these countries. 
 
Study aim, research questions and objectives 
The overall aim of the cross-border study along the Burkina Faso and Mali border was to 
understand how to better use criminal law to help bring an end to the practise of FGM/C. 
Understanding the motivations and causes that lead the citizens of Mali and Burkina Faso to 
obey the law was a key secondary aim of the research.  
Overall, the cross-border study sought to answer these questions:  
1. How much do citizens obey laws prohibiting them to practise FGM/C?  
2. Among people born into a tradition of FGM/C, what are the reasons and causes that motivate 
them to obey or not a law prohibiting FGM/C? 
3. What are the moral, social, and punitive reasons that influence people to obey rules of 
conduct, the law in general, and, in particular, FGM/C law? 
4. What other reasons influence the choice to cut or not?  
5. How does the design and administration of legal implementation affect their choice to obey?  
6. Given the findings, what legal policy and programme responses, across varying contexts, 
would most effectively reduce the practise of FGM/C?  
The design and conduct of the research aimed to achieve these objectives:  
1. Measure the extent of legal obedience by literature review, limited inferences from DHS and 
Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) data (including methods to detect depressed self-
report), and qualitative and quantitative interviews and experiments in two countries.  
2. In those two countries, conduct local qualitative and quantitative studies, and in two countries 
larger quantitative studies, aimed at finding reasons people give for obeying laws and the 
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FGM/C law.  
3. In those same studies, find out what nonlegal reasons people give for cutting or not cutting.  
4. In those same studies, and for quantitative studies—small add-ons involving local officials 
and notables—find out how the content of the law, the design of its implementation, and the 
actual administration of its implementation affects compliance with FGM/C law. Desk review 
of the history, content, and implementation of FGM/C law in a given country.  
5. Synthesise study findings and relate them to policy and programme issues. 
 
Methods 
Study design 
We used a mixed-method design, involving quantitative and qualitative surveys that were 
implemented on the basis of a border-discontinuity.   
In the structured quantitative study, we randomly sampled two groups of people, aged 18 years 
and older, in each of six villages. We gathered the usual demographic data to test for the 
requisite homogeneity across paired communities. To overcome the social desirability bias often 
associated with questions that require self-reporting, we used a list experiment/unmatched count 
technique, a method known for assuring respondents of confidentiality and disguising the 
respondent’s actions or attitudes from the researcher and any other party. The unmatched count 
technique (Dalton, Wimbush, and Daily 1994) is designed in a manner such that it is clear to the 
respondent that no one can detect whether s/he committed the sensitive act being investigated. 
Unmatched count requires two large enough random samples of the population. Respondents in 
the control sample are presented, for example, with four benign or neutral activities and asked 
whether they have engaged in them anytime in some fixed period. They are to count the number 
of activities they did at least once and report the total, but to say nothing more. Respondents in 
the treatment sample are presented with those first four activities plus, say, cutting of girls by the 
family, and asked to count the number of activities they did at least once and report the total. The 
two random samples are compared and the number of people doing FGM/C can be deduced by 
subtracting the number of yes answers in the control condition from the number of yes answers 
in the treatment condition, and there is no way that anyone can identify any individual who 
performed the sensitive action. Unmatched count consistently yields higher reports of sensitive 
activity than self-report. 
The qualitative component was composed of Key Informants Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group 
Discussions (FGDs). Key informants were purposively selected from various positions within the 
chosen communities in order to understand participants’ opinions about the moral, social, and 
legal rules in the community. The FGDs aimed to elicit indirect responses to prompts on statutory 
law in general: vignettes on FGM/C and heterogeneous contrast practises such as theft of crop, 
rape, and a land inheritance dispute. Each vignette was designed to elicit typical moral, social, 
legal, and religious reasons people have for complying or not with a rule; what authority 
(conscience, family, chief, police, etc.) the typical person would turn to and why; typical 
experience with police and courts, if any; and how to improve resolution of problems. 
An example of vignette was: “The Konaté family has a young daughter, Monique. Her family is 
considering circumcision. The family has heard many different things for and against the practise: 
from their relatives, traditional and religious leaders, radio, nurses, teachers, government, NGOs 
and from others. After talking it over, they decide it is better for her NOT to be cut.  
1. What did they believe would happen if the girl were NOT cut? 
2. What reasons did they consider for NOT cutting her?  
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3. What will people around here say or do if they find out? 
 
Study sites 
We selected three matched communities on each side of the border. The criteria for selection 
were: 1) presence of the same dominant ethnic group; 2) high FGM/C according to Burkina Faso 
and Mali DHS data among many from the dominant ethnic group; and 3) paired communities no 
more than 50 km apart and reachable. The paired communities in the study were: Faramana 
(Burkina Faso)/Koury (Mali); Tansila (Burkina Faso)/ Boura (Mali); and Finkolo (Mali)/Koloko 
(Burkina Faso). A different ethnicity is dominant in each of these three cross-border sites. The 
Bobo, Senoufo, and Bwaba were the three majority ethnic groups belonging respectively to the 
above three pair villages. Given the mobility of the population, some participants of the 
quantitative survey were from other ethnic groups (e.g. Peulh, Mossi). 
 Figure1: The three pair sites along the Burkina Faso and Mali Border 
 
 
Participants 
The qualitative participants were composed of two types of informants. Key informants were 
composed of notables, such as community leaders, religious leaders, women’s leaders, 
government officials, health workers, local NGOs, and teachers; purposively identified based on 
their knowledge of and experiences with compliance with moral, social, and legal rules in the 
community, and people’s experiences with traditional justice, police, and the courts. We 
conducted semi-structured individual interviews among notables about their experiences with 
community regulation and ideas related to what could be done better. They were identified with 
an eye towards diversity of role within the community. Focus group discussions participants were 
comprised of four groups: Men aged 18–34 years, Men 35+ years, Women 18–34 years, and 
Women 35+ years. Four FGDs with 6–7 participants were conducted in each village. We 
recruited participants through community facilitators in each village to ensure diversity and 
inclusion. We asked them to assist the qualitative team leader to recruit participants widely. Our 
team leader was present during the whole process of the participants recruitment. In total, 7–10 
in-depth interviews with key informants and four discussions (FGDs) with adult respondents were 
conducted in each village. This represents a total of 60 KIIs and 24 FGDs carried out in the six 
villages.  
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The quantitative survey participants included men and women over 18 years of age. We targeted 
200 adult respondents per village and, ultimately, a total sample of 1209 individuals were 
surveyed, including 605 men and 604 women. The survey participants were recruited using a 
right-hand rule randomization for selecting households and the Kish method for selecting 
individual participants. Given the dearth of information about the sample frame in the study 
location, we chose to proceed with a sampling strategy that included randomisation at multiple 
levels. The exact procedure used is as follows: Upon arriving in a village, Team Leaders 
communicated with the village chief about the number and geographical arrangement of various 
neighbourhoods or localities. The Team Leaders then split the team up so as to have a starting 
point in each neighbourhood/locality. Data collectors started from a common point in each locality 
and fanned out in opposite directions using the right-hand rule technique. A random number from 
2–6 was chosen each day and data collectors counted the number of houses/compounds as they 
moved away from their common starting point, stopping when they arrived at the 
house/compound that was equal to the randomly selected number.   
After entering the house/compound, the data collector then determined whether he or she was 
dealing with a house or compound.  If it was a house, the enumerator would proceed with an 
electronic Kish-method sampling technique to select one male and one female respondent in that 
household.  This technique requires inputting all residents of the household (as defined above) 
and their genders into the survey platform via tablet.  The survey platform then chose the male 
and female respondent who would be asked to complete the survey.  If one or both of the 
respondents refused to participate, there was no replacement within the household.  Instead, if 
one respondent was willing to participate, the enumerator would interview that respondent and 
then move on to the next household.  If no respondents were willing to proceed, the enumerator 
would move on, without conducting any interviews in the household, to the next household 
(selected by counting houses until reaching the “number of the day” once again). 
If the enumerator found a compound rather than a household, the enumerator would move 
around the compound to the right (circling counter-clockwise) and count the households in the 
compound until he or she once again got to the randomly selected “number of the day”.  It is in 
this household that the enumerator would proceed with the Kish-method sampling technique 
described above.  Once any interviews conducted in this household were complete, the 
enumerator would continue counting households until he/she arrived at the next house that 
corresponded to the “number of the day.”  The enumerator would then start counting households 
inside a given compound, if there were any households left that had not been counted, before 
proceeding to count houses/compounds outside of the compound. 
As the data collectors proceeded, counting houses and conducting interviews, they made right 
turns at all intersections.  When conducting interviews in the same village on subsequent days, 
data collectors would start from different starting points, as selected by the Team Leader, and 
follow the approach outlined above while again using a randomly selected “number of the day” 
for household counting purposes. 
 
Instruments  
The qualitative instruments consisted of 1) a key informant interview guide; and 2) a semi-
structured interview guide.  The latter included a variety of vignettes. We chose to proceed in this 
manner because topics such as reasons for compliance or noncompliance with customary and 
statutory rules, and experiences with police and courts, require counterfactual reasoning. 
Vignettes helped to collect the richest and most informative data possible on why people comply 
with the law or not. The vignettes elicited typical moral, social, legal, and religious reasons 
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people have for complying or not with a rule; what authority (conscience, family, chief, police, 
etc.) the typical person would turn to and why; typical experience with police and courts, if any; 
and how to improve resolution of problems. 
For the quantitative survey, we utilised a questionnaire that included a “list experiment,” which is 
a technique used to elicit truthful responses on sensitive questions. In the context of this study, 
we wanted to collect truthful responses about whether or not one planned to continue practising 
FGM/C.  
Several of the topics covered on the qualitative survey overlapped to some degree with the 
individual quantitative questions, allowing for some comparison with group effects in the focus 
group discussion and individual experiences and knowledge from the KIIs. The quantitative and 
qualitative research instruments were developed and pre-tested in the capital of Burkina Faso, 
Ouagadougou. They were then revised, before data collection began, but after the data 
collectors were trained and had conducted the pilot. The interviews were conducted mostly in the 
local language Dioula (except with the government representatives), and the local translation for 
the French term “excision,” which is also used in the national policy (in Burkina Faso) and 
sensitisation campaigns in both countries.  
 
Procedures  
The quantitative data were collected electronically using Survey Solutions, an electronic data 
collection application, on tablets running the Android Operating System. After the programmer 
designed the survey on the Survey Solutions platform, a server request was made in order to 
reserve a server for data storage. The questionnaire was then loaded on the server and profiles 
for data collectors and supervisors were created. Finally, the questionnaire was “assigned” to the 
data collectors to allow them to utilise the questionnaire on their smartphone. A one-day pilot 
field test was done to test the tool and the logistics of community entry.  
After verification by Team Leaders, collected data were transmitted to a data server in real time. 
Data quality control was implemented in several ways. First, many possible response options 
were programmed into the tablets and all consistency and validity checks were built into the 
programme. Second, each team of data collectors was supervised by a Team Leader who was 
tasked with the responsibility to check the data for quality and ensure randomisation rules were 
followed correctly. Third, the research team also conducted monitoring visits and spot checks 
and made calls to the field teams to ensure quality and proper consenting procedures were 
followed. Fourth, the data management team also conducted weekly data quality checks on the 
data transmitted to the server; suspected errors and inconsistent or invalid data were then 
flagged and dealt with. This included ensuring that no duplicate entry was transmitted to the 
server. And, last but not least, an automated weekly data-collection progress report was 
generated on a few key indicators and shared with the research team to ensure that data were 
collected in the way it was envisaged to be collected. After all data were collected and sent to the 
server, data cleaning was conducted on all variables, all variables were labelled, and their coded 
categorical variable-assigned values were labelled. 
On the qualitative side, participants were recruited through local facilitators, who, in turn, were 
identified in each village during the PI field visits. During data collection, those facilitators 
assisted the qualitative Team Leader in identifying key informants. These Key Informants were 
either representatives from the Ministry of the Family, a Village Development Council (CVD—
Conseil villageois de dévelopement), a representative of a local NGO, or a local leader. During 
data collection, Team Leaders (two were designated for each village, depending on their 
familiarity with the study sites, to be the spokespersons for the group) were guided by these 
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facilitators to get in touch with potential participants while also seeking diversity of role. The same 
procedure was used in recruiting focus group participants. The FGD participants were 
reimbursed for their transport fees (2000 FCFA), but KIIs were not. The qualitative interviews and 
focus group discussions were audio-recorded. Participants’ permission was obtained before 
recording. The 24 days of data collection went smoothly and there were no major security 
problems for data collectors or incidents of distress from research participants during interviews. 
The only challenge was the reserve some FGD participants displayed with respect to the FGM/C 
theme. The data collectors were instructed to motivate participants and probe for further 
information, but also to be able to move to next questions when participant(s) were refusing or 
seemed uncomfortable about answering a specific question. Some reluctance to talk about 
FGM/C was present, however, and this must be taken into consideration as one interprets our 
analysis.  
 
Data analysis 
Quantitative data analysis 
Data were analysed in STATA 14, and results are presented below in tables and graphs. 
Categorical variables were analysed using descriptive frequency distributions and two-way cross 
tabulations. Where necessary, both the numbers and proportions are presented, otherwise only 
percentages are shown. Numerically collected variables were summarised using median as a 
measure of central tendency and inter-quartile range (IQR) as a measure of variability for skewed 
variables or mean and standard deviation as a measure of central tendency and variability, 
respectively, for approximately normally distributed variables.  
A list experiment was used to estimate planned future prevalence of FGM/C. List experiments 
allow researchers to ask about sensitive topics because there is no way for the researcher to 
know if any individual respondent is associated with the sensitive activity.  Each respondent 
simply reports a number of items that are true for him or her. In this case, a control group of 
respondents was given a list of five nonsensitive activities, while a treatment group was given a 
list of six activities, the five nonsensitive ones and the following: “Circumcise my daughter or 
granddaughter,” Researchers do, however, have access to the statistics associated with the 
entire sample and can infer group behaviour from same. In this case, we were able to calculate 
the proportion of respondents in the treatment group who planned to “circumcise their daughter 
or granddaughter.” 
Qualitative Data Analysis  
The audio-recordings of the 60 KIIs and 24 FGDs were transcribed and translated into French by 
the six qualitative RAs who collected the data. The PI did a quality check to review and validate a 
sample of the transcripts. After that, the qualitative Team Leader quality-checked all transcripts 
for typos and language.  This was particularly important given the fact that the transcripts were to 
be translated into English. Any language issue was reported to the PI who provided corrections. 
The PI translated a sample of 2 KIIs and 2 FGDs into English for the co-PI. They both read them 
closely and coded the sample transcripts to elicit emerging patterns. They then cross-checked 
patterns and developed a thematic coding framework, using both an inductive (from the data) 
and deductive (from the research instruments) approach. Once the quantitative results were 
ready, PI Wouango and the co-PI reviewed and refined the thematic coding framework. 
Four qualitative data analysts were then recruited in Senegal to code the qualitative data using 
Nvivo. They received a two-and-half-day training on the research rationale, the study sites, and 
the context-specific aspects of the research that were essential for them to be able to understand 
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the verbatim language in the transcripts. The transcripts were then coded in batches. The 
analysts coded transcripts of the first paired villages and their coding were quality-checked by the 
PI, who had Skype meetings with the analysts to provide feedback and respond to their queries. 
These meetings were indispensable to clarify the coding guidelines and to limit variations in the 
analysts’ coding style. A second batch of two paired village transcripts were then coded and a 
Skype call was used to discuss any issues. The FGD transcripts were the last batch to be coded.  
The personal information identifying the qualitative study participants (i.e. role of KIIs within the 
community, gender, age) were removed and transcripts were anonymized before analysis. A 
separate Excel file was produced to keep a record of this sensitive information. The file is kept in 
the Principal Investigator’s computer and only she has access to it.  
 
Ethical considerations 
The research protocol described herein submitted to and obtained ethical approvals from the 
Population Council Institutional Review Board, the Burkina Faso Ministry of Health’s Research 
Ethics Committee, and the Mali Ministry of Health’s Research Ethics Committee. Before the 
interviews could begin, all participants received informed consent forms (which were requested 
by Burkina Faso IRB).  Willing participants then signed (or fingerprinted) the form when they 
agreed to participate, indicating that they understood the aim of the research and willingly agreed 
to participate in it. Participants also received a copy of the consent form for their records.  
 
Results 
This section presents the results of the study under the following broad themes: types of  
disputes and conflict-resolution mechanisms, knowledge about legality/illegality of FGM/C, 
sources of information of formal and customary law, the list experiment, prevalence estimation 
from the list experiment, compliance motivations, religious and traditional obligations regarding 
FGM/C, knowledge of FGM/C practise as compared with other criminalised conduct, engendered 
knowledge of FGM/C, reasons for practise of FGM/C, continuation/discontinuation of FGM/C, 
awareness of social cost of FGM/C, and the endorsement experiment. In the FGM/C knowledge 
and practise sections we compare FGM/C with other criminalised activities like cutting wood in 
the forest or bush and paying police a bribe to avoid getting into trouble to demonstrate the 
hypothesis that people tend to underreport FGM/C because FGM/C is rooted in community 
customs while the other two are not. 
The study utilises mixed methods, both quantitative and qualitative, to arrive at its conclusions. 
Qualitative data are used either to confirm/contradict the results from the quantitative study or to 
explain in more detail the contexts and the processes of participants’ experiences and 
perspectives.   
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Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of participants 
Quantitative research participants  
A total of 1,209 participants were interviewed, 603 in Burkina Faso (50% male, 50% female) and 
606 in Mali (50% male, 50% female). A total of three communes from each country were targeted 
for interviews. There were 203 respondents (who completed interviews) from Faramana, 200 
from Koloko, and 200 from Tansila on the Burkina Faso side; and 202 from Koury, 201 from 
Finkolo, and 203 from Boura on the Mali side. The socio-demographic characteristics of the 
survey respondents are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1: Demographic characteristics of respondents interviewed in Burkina Faso and Mali, by gender 
  Burkina Faso Mali 
  
Male 
N=301 
Female 
N=302 
Total 
N=603 
Male 
N=304 
Female 
N=302 
Total 
N=606 
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
Age (median [IQR])  
38  
(30, 51) 
30  
(24, 41) 
34  
(26, 46) 
40  
(30, 50) 
34  
(24, 43) 
36  
(27, 47) 
Pair communes       
Faramana 100 (33.2) 103 (34.1) 203 (33.7) - - - 
Koury - - - 102 (33.6) 100 (33.1) 202 (33.3) 
Koloko  101 (33.6) 99 (32.8) 200 (33.2) - - - 
Finkolo - - - 100 (32.9) 101 (33.4) 201 (33.2) 
Tansila 100 (33.2) 100 (33.1) 200 (33.2) - - - 
Boura - - - 102 (33.6) 101 (33.4) 203 (33.5) 
Ethnicity       
  Bobo 56 (18.6) 59 (19.5) 115 (19.1) 52 (17.1) 61 (20.2) 113 (18.6) 
  Senoufo 75 (24.9) 75 (24.8) 150 (24.9) 90 (29.6) 91 (30.1) 181 (29.9) 
  Mossi 81 (26.9) 80 (26.5) 161 (26.7) 12 (3.9) 5 (1.7) 17 (2.8) 
  Peulh 21 (7.0) 22 (7.3) 43 (7.1) 17 (5.6) 22 (7.3) 39 (6.4) 
  Bwaba 5 (1.7) 7 (2.3) 12 (2.0) 14 (4.6) 12 (4.0) 26 (4.3) 
  Other 63 (20.9) 59 (19.5) 122 (20.2) 119 (39.1) 111 (36.8) 230 (38.0) 
Marital Status       
Never married 36 (12.0) 19 (6.3) 55 (9.1) 33 (10.9) 13 (4.3) 46 (7.6) 
Ever married 265 (88.0) 283 (93.7) 548 (90.9) 271 (89.1) 289 (95.7) 560 (92.4) 
Live in same household with 
parents/parents-in-law 
136 (45.2) 131 (43.4) 267 (44.3) 163 (53.6) 126 (41.7) 289 (47.7) 
Who makes decisions about 
money 
      
You 229 (76.1) 19 (6.3) 248 (41.1) 231 (76.0) 29 (9.6) 260 (42.9) 
Your spouse 8 (2.7) 222 (73.5) 230 (38.1) 8 (2.6) 229 (75.8) 237 (39.1) 
You and your spouse 
together 
6 (2.0) 8 (2.6) 14 (2.3) 11 (3.6) 9 (3.0) 20 (3.3) 
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  Burkina Faso Mali 
  
Male 
N=301 
Female 
N=302 
Total 
N=603 
Male 
N=304 
Female 
N=302 
Total 
N=606 
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
Your in-laws 2 (0.7) 15 (5.0) 17 (2.8) 4 (1.3) 16 (5.3) 20 (3.3) 
Other 56 (18.6) 37 (12.3) 93 (15.4) 50 (16.4) 19 (6.3) 69 (11.4) 
Number of children       
  None 45 (15.1) 33 (11.0) 78 (13.0) 38 (12.5) 23 (7.6) 61 (10.1) 
  1–3 children 96 (32.1) 132 (43.9) 228 (38.0) 92 (30.3) 114 (37.7) 206 (34.0) 
  4–8 children 116 (38.8) 130 (43.2) 246 (41.0) 129 (42.4) 147 (48.7) 276 (45.5) 
  9 or more 42 (14.0) 6 (2.0) 48 (8.0) 45 (14.8) 18 (6.0) 63 (10.4) 
Duration of stay in the 
community 
      
< 1 yr. 2 (0.7) 5 (1.7) 7 (1.2) 2 (0.7) 6 (2.0) 8 (1.3) 
1– 5 yrs. 16 (5.3) 37 (12.3) 53 (8.8) 9 (3.0) 18 (6.0) 27 (4.5) 
> 5 117 (38.9) 142 (47.0) 259 (43.0) 95 (31.3) 142 (47.0) 237 (39.1) 
Since birth 166 (55.1) 118 (39.1) 284 (47.1) 198 (65.1) 136 (45.0) 334 (55.1) 
Religion       
Islam 224 (74.4) 222 (73.5) 446 (74.0) 246 (80.9) 245 (81.1) 491 (81.0) 
Catholic 18 (6.0) 20 (6.6) 38 (6.3) 24 (7.9) 26 (8.6) 50 (8.3) 
Protestant 11 (3.7) 18 (6.0) 29 (4.8) 5 (1.6) 7 (2.3) 12 (2.0) 
Traditional 47 (15.6) 32 (10.6) 79 (13.1) 28 (9.2) 22 (7.3) 50 (8.3) 
Other 1 (0.3) 9 (3.0) 10 (1.7) 1 (0.3) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.2) 
 
The median age of respondents was 34 in Burkina Faso (38 for males and 30 for females) and 
36 in Mali (40 for males and 34 for females). About 9 out of 10 (91%) and 92% of the 
respondents from Burkina Faso and Mali, respectively, had ever been married at the time the 
survey was completed; meanwhile, 45% of those from Burkina Faso and 48% of those in Mali 
lived in the same house with their parents/parents-in-law. With regard to decision-making about 
money, there was clear variation by sex in both countries, where slightly more than three-
quarters of the male respondents (76%) said they made the decisions themselves, compared to 
less than 10% of their female counterparts. Slightly below half (47%) of the respondents from 
Burkina Faso and more than half (55%) of the respondents from Mali had lived in the area where 
interviews were conducted since birth, with the proportion of males in this category being higher 
in both countries (Table 1). Three-quarters (74%) and four-fifths (80%) of the respondents from 
Burkina Faso and Mali, respectively, were Muslim, while 6% in Burkina Faso and 8% in Mali 
practised Catholicism. 
Qualitative research participants 
Qualitative research participants were comprised of 60 key informants (males and females aged 
18 and over) and 6–7 participants, both males and females, aged 18 years and over for each of 
the 24 focus groups discussions  
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Table 2: Number of interviews conducted per village  
Type of 
interview 
Faramana 
(BF) 
Koury 
(Mali) 
Koloko 
(BF) 
Finnkolo 
(Mali) 
Tansila 
(BF) 
Boura 
(Mali) 
Total 
Key Informant 
Interviews 
11 12 12 7 10 8 60 
Focus Group 
Discussions 
 
4 4 4 4 4 4 24 
 
Most of the key informants were civil servants (35) who had some level of education. The 
remaining (25) were local leaders, such as village chiefs, imams, priests, CVDs, and 
representatives of local NGOs and youth and women movements. The FGD participants were 
mostly villagers with little or no education.  
 
Types of Disputes and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms 
Types of disputes 
The data shed light on some of the most common types of disputes among the population we 
surveyed. Overall, out of all people interviewed, the most reported types of disputes were 
conflicts over land (47%) and conflicts between breeders and farmers (27%). Nine percent of the 
respondents cited conflicts relating to culture, traditions, and customs, while 3% reported ethnic 
conflicts. Other responses included domestic conflicts and conflicts around child marriage. In 
Figure 2 these results are disaggregated by country and by gender for each country.  
Figure 2: Type of conflicts along the Burkina Faso and Mali border 
 
As evidenced by Figure 2 above, conflicts over land were the most common type of conflict in 
both Burkina Faso (47%) and Mali (46%), followed by conflicts between breeders, which were 
cited by slightly over a quarter of the respondents in both Burkina Faso and Mali. Conflicts 
relating to culture, traditions or customs were cited by about one in 10 of the respondents in both 
countries.  
Appendix Table 1 shows paired commune variations in terms of both types of disputes and 
existing conflict resolution mechanisms. In these results, we compare Faramana (Burkina Faso) 
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and Koury (Mali), Koloko (Burkina Faso) and Finkolo (Mali), and Tansila (Burkina Faso) and 
Boura (Mali). Results show that there were no significant differences between the pair 
communes but there existed gender differences within some communes. These results serve as 
a balance test on this issue. 
Importantly, the qualitative findings differ from the quantitative results on types of conflicts 
experienced.  Child and early marriage and women’s abduction were cited as the second- or 
third-most common types of disputes in the qualitative data. Child marriage is widespread in all 
communities, regardless of country. It is practised by the three ethnic groups equally (Bobo, 
Senoufo and Bwaba) in Burkina Faso and Mali and people justify it as being a common way that 
couples are formed. Child and early marriage can be arranged (parents give the girl without her 
consent), forced (the girl is kidnapped by a man/boy without her consent or the consent of her 
parents), or wanted (a girl flees with her boyfriend, sometimes to avoid an arranged marriage). 
The Senoufo community even has a word, “Kosseguê,” to describe this practice: a woman who is 
married has to send her first girl child back to her parents’ house to be married there. The law on 
age of marriage was almost unknown by most FGD respondents. The corpulence of the girl, the 
fact that she has menstruated, and the fact that she has developed breasts are indicators 
parents look for when deciding when to marry the girl, not the legal age. Below we provide some 
direct quotations on each variety of early marriage to further inform the reader about this 
practise. 
Kossegué as arranged marriage: “They say that in the Sénoufo communities, they practise the 
Kossegué. What is the Kossegué? It means that when you take a woman into a family, if that 
woman gives birth to a girl, the girl has to go back to her mother’s family to get married. 
However, our laws do not recogniSe that practise. So, as a result, there is a problem between 
the law and their culture. Often it is difficult for them to understand. When you tell them that a girl 
who is not 18 years old is a minor, someone who has not been to school cannot understand that. 
He/she says: “no as soon as you see the girl with breasts, well it's (laughs). So, often it makes it 
difficult to solve cases” (Male, KII, Koloko, Burkina Faso) 
Wanted early marriage: “This a variety of early marriage. The young person meets during the 
demonstrations in the different villages. The young man and the girl consult each other next door. 
You'll find that it's a girl engaged by another young man. So, if they have agreed with the girl, he 
comes to take the girl and then go away with her somewhere else. There is a problem there, 
because the man who engaged the girl had been working in the fields for his in-laws for three 
years. You will find that the latter had already done the three years of work for the girl's parents, 
and someone else is coming to take her to go away. That's the problem “(Male, KII, Koury, Mali) 
Kidnapping and abduction: Another variety of forced marriage is the abduction of married 
women. A woman who is already married and living with her husband can be abducted by 
another man. This is said to happen regularly within the communities, as explained below. 
“The conflicts that are common in our community are land conflictS and women's conflicts; 
someone can come and take someone else's wife, and this can create problems.”  
(Male, KII, Koury, Mali) 
 “Our Social Action department is mostly asked to intervene for cases relating to the abduction of 
women and girls.”  
(Male, KII, Faramana, Burkina Faso) 
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Conflict resolution mechanisms 
Quantitative respondents were asked who had the most common influence on what is required, 
permitted, or forbidden in the community. This was done to give an indication of what conflict 
resolution mechanisms exist in each locality. Appendix Table 1 shows the overall proportion of 
what respondents cited to be the most influential of these mechanisms. We disaggregate these 
results by gender. 
In Burkina Faso, local government was cited by 39% of the respondents as having the most 
influence, while 28% stated national government, 25% stated % stated traditional authorities (i.e. 
village chiefs, land chief, village elders), and 6% stated religious authorities. These options were 
given to them as multiple choice, including an option “other.” The rest either did not know or 
refused to respond to the question. There was a slightly significant difference in how male and 
female respondents answered this question (p=0.038), with 43% and 30% of the male 
respondents, respectively, in Burkina Faso and Mali, citing local and national governments, 
compared to 34% (local governments) and 27% (national governments) of the female 
respondents. The proportion of female respondents who cited religious authorities (8%) was also 
double that of male respondents who cited the same mechanism (4%). In Mali, a relatively higher 
proportion of the respondents said traditional authorities (36%) had more influence, followed by 
about a third of the respondents citing local governments. National government was a popular 
conflict resolution mechanism among 24% of the respondents and 7% cited religious authorities. 
The rest of the respondents either did not know or refused to respond to the question. There was 
no significant association between gender and type of conflict resolution response in Mali.  
The qualitative data indicate that there is a clear difference between the two countries. In Mali, 
traditional leaders, particularly Muslim leaders, opposed the idea of passing an FGM law in the 
country. Some interviewees openly explained that politicians do not dare to challenge these 
traditional authorities by enforcing an unwanted law.  
Qualitative KIIs and FGDs also provided in-depth information on conflict resolution mechanisms. 
These data suggest that the mechanism chosen (customary or government route) depends on 
the nature of the conflict, but conciliation is almost always reported to be the outcome. In general, 
people would use the customary route first and it is ONLY when no solution is found by way of 
that mechanism that the disputants turn to the government authorities (the prefect, the mayor, 
the police/gendarmerie, and finally the court). The main conflict resolver in all locations was 
reported to be the village chief. But he does not judge the case alone; he consults his ministers, 
the land chief (for land disputes), the Development Committee (in Burkina Faso), and even 
religious leaders to find a solution. The quotes below help illustrate how conflict resolution occurs 
at the village level. 
Q: How do you solve disputes over women abductions? 
R: “We go to the village chief; we tell the chief and his advisers that this person has taken that 
person's fiancée. So, the village chief and his counsellors can say: go tell the one who took 
another person's fiancée to bring the girl back so that she can join her real fiancé. So, when the 
messenger tells that message to the other party, the kidnapper comes back with the girl to the 
chief and the chief takes the girl to her parents. The parents in turn will drive the girl to her 
husband’s house. […] Everything is settled at the level of the village chief.”  
(Female, KII, Koury, Mali)   
Interestingly, even local government representatives often advise disputants to solve their 
problems first through the customary route, as explained below by a prefect. 
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“Generally, we call on communities to engage in grassroots discussions with the village chief, his 
advisors and notabilities. Each conflict that is related to land or to questions of customs and 
habits, to the exploitation of natural resources, we ask communities to go back to the village, to 
take the evil by the root, to exchange with the elders in order to find the solution.”  
(Male, KII-Security, Boura, Burkina Faso) 
When the customary route has failed, people will often turn to the local government (prefect, 
gendarmerie/police, court) or the mayor. In some rare cases, people go straight to the police or 
the prefect when they want the other party to be punished or when they want to rely less on 
customary norms. For example, a man who abducted a girl without her parents’ consent might go 
to the local government. Some extreme disputes are also taken directly to the local government, 
such as a fight that injured or killed a person. A case is then taken to court if no solution is found 
by the local government.  
 
Legal knowledge 
Knowledge of legality or illegality of FGM/C practise 
Respondents were also asked to give their opinion whether to the best of their knowledge they 
thought FGM/C was legal and whether they had a legal obligation to comply with the law 
prohibiting the practice. We then compared this with what they thought about other criminalised 
activities like cutting wood in the forest or bush and paying a bribe to the police to avoid getting 
into trouble. Figure 3 shows the results by country, disaggregated by gender within each country.  
Figure 3: Proportion of respondents in Burkina Faso and Mali who think FGM/C is legal 
 
Overall, 87% of all the respondents in Burkina Faso and 80% of all the respondents in Mali 
thought that FGM/C was illegal, and 6% of the respondents from both Burkina Faso and Mali did 
not know whether FGM/C was illegal or not. While there was no significant difference between 
male and females in their knowledge of whether FGM/C was legal or illegal in Burkina Faso, 
there was a significant difference in FGM/C legal knowledge between males and females in Mali 
(p=0.001), with 84% of males thinking FGM/C was illegal compared to 75% of females. Table 3 
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shows results disaggregated by pair communes. We compared Faramana (BF) and Koury (M), 
Koloko (BF) and Finkolo (M), and Tansila (BF) and Boura (M). We also looked at how FGM/C 
legal knowledge compares to legal knowledge related to other activities like cutting wood in the 
forest and paying police a bribe to avoid getting into trouble. 
Table 3 Knowledge of legality or illegality of FGM/C among pair communes in Burkina Faso and Mali 
 Faramana 
(BF) 
Koury  
(M) 
Koloko 
(BF) 
Finkolo 
(M) 
Tansila 
(BF) 
Boura 
(M) 
Total 
Is FGM/C legal in Burkina Faso/Mali? 
Yes 14 (6.9) 29 (14.4) 17 (8.5) 35 (17.4) 14 (7) 25 (12.3) 134 (11.1) 
No 166 (81.8) 148 (73.3) 179 (89.5) 163 (81.1) 178 (89.0) 171 (84.2) 1005 (83.1) 
Don’t know 23 (11.3) 25 (12.4) 4 (2.0) 3 (1.5) 8 (4.0) 7 (3.5) 70 (5.8) 
Is cutting wood in the forest legal in Burkina Faso/Mali? 
Yes 20 (9.9) 52 (25.7) 6 (3.0) 58 (28.9) 16 (8.0) 36 (17.7) 188 (15.6) 
No 171 (84.2) 125 (61.9) 193 (96.5) 137 (68.2) 179 (89.5) 165 (81.3) 970 (80.2) 
Don’t know 12 (5.9) 24 (11.9) 1 (0.5) 5 (2.5) 5 (2.5) 2 (1.0) 49 (4.1) 
Refused to 
answer 0 (0.0) 1 (0.5) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.5) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (0.2) 
Is paying police a bribe to avoid getting to trouble legal in Burkina Faso/Mali? 
Yes 34 (16.8) 37 (18.3) 17 (8.5) 54 (26.9) 13 (6.5) 27 (13.3) 182 (15.1) 
No 156 (76.9) 138 (68.3) 182 (91.0) 146 (72.6) 185 (92.5) 172 (84.7) 979 (81.0) 
Don’t know 10 (4.9) 27 (13.4) 1 (0.5) 1 (0.5) 2 (1.0) 4 (2.0) 45 (3.7) 
Refused to 
answer 3 (1.5) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 3 (0.3) 
 
The results in Table 3 above indicate that a relatively higher proportion of participants from 
Burkina Faso—Faramana (82%), Koloko (90%), and Tansila (89%)—reporting that FGM/C was 
illegal compared to those from Mali—Koury (73%), Finkolo (81%), and Boura (83%), 
respectively. We also found that 11% and 12% of the respondents in Faramana and Koury 
respectively did not know whether FGM/C was legal or not. Commune variation does exist in the 
sample. In Tansila, 87% of the male respondents and 91% of the female respondents knew 
FGM/C was illegal. Apart from Tansila, a relatively higher proportion of male respondents knew 
FGM/C was illegal compared to females. It bears mentioning here that the figures on the Mali 
side are particularly noteworthy, given that FGM/C is NOT illegal in Mali. In other words, legal 
knowledge in surveyed towns in Mali is strikingly inaccurate, but in a way that may reduce the 
practice of FGM/C. 
We also note respondents’ legal knowledge with respect to subjects other than FGM/C.  The 
proportion of those who did not know whether an activity was illegal in Faramana was 
considerably lower in terms of knowledge of the legality of cutting wood in the forest (6%) and 
paying police a bribe (5%). A similar pattern (not knowing if an activity is legal or not) was noted 
in Koloko (2% FGM/C), with 1% not knowing whether cutting wood in the forest was illegal and 
1% not knowing whether paying the police a bribe was illegal; in Tansila, these numbers were 
with 4% for FGM/C, 3% for cutting wood in the forest, and 1% for paying the police a bribe. 
Compared to their FGM/C responses, relatively lower proportions of participants from communes 
in Mali (Koury, Finkolo, Boura) reported other activities, like cutting wood in the forest and paying 
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police a bribe, to be illegal. Appendix Table 2 shows the results disaggregated by gender and 
commune.  
The fact that a high proportion of people in Burkina Faso know that FGM/C is illegal (Faramana 
82%, Koloko 90%, and Tansila 89%) confirms the findings of previous studies (Ramey et al. 
2019; CNLPE 2016; UNFPA 2016). This strong knowledge was also persistent among FGD 
participants, who were well aware that FGM/C is illegal in Burkina Faso and stated that this is 
one of the reasons why they no longer cut girls. 
The Mali results on legal knowledge showed Koury (73%), Finkolo (81%), and Boura (83%) 
believing that FGM/C is illegal. As mentioned briefly above, there is no law banning FGM/C in 
Mali. We need to dive deeper through further research to explain why respondents in Mali are so 
wrong (in a good way) about FGM/C law in their own country. We need to test the hypotheses 
related to possible cross-border effects of the FGM/C campaigns that have taken place in 
Burkina Faso; it is possible cross-border diffusion of ideas and knowledge explains the surprising 
Mali results. It is also possible that sensitisation campaigns undertaken by anti-FGM/C NGOs in 
Mali may have affected legal knowledge. Regardless, future research should investigate any and 
all factors that led people in the surveyed villages in Mali to believe that FGM/C is illegal. This is 
particularly true given that our qualitative data indicate that even some local government 
representatives in Mali think that FGM/C is illegal in their own country. The below three 
qualitative excerpts should help illustrate some of the legal knowledge complexities we found on 
the ground. 
“Now I would like to know if there is a law against FGM/C in Mali? 
 Yes, there is a law prohibiting FGM/C in Mali, as I said, there was a decision. 
Is it the same as in Burkina Faso?  
Well, I cannot say because I haven’t read the content of the laws of two countries; I don't know 
their details, but I think that these countries have about the same views on decision-making 
against FGM/C, the content of the laws can vary slightly but the main goal of these laws is for 
women to thrive.  
One last question, when did the law against FGM/C in Mali come into effect? 
It is in 2003, if I am not mistaken. The measure has been taken and it was said on TV and radio 
by doctors that girls should not undergo excision.” 
       Male, KII, Koury, Mali 
 “This law states that any person who is caught in the process of carrying out this practise will be 
punished, and this sanction may result in the payment of a fine in the sense that the practise 
leads to unfortunate complications on the girl's body.” 
Female, FGD 35+, Finnkolo, Mali 
“As I said, in Mali, it seems that the law is not enforced; many people are afraid to do it officially 
[the cutting], they really do it underground. They don’t do it openly.” 
                                     Male, KII, Finnkolo, Mali 
To further complicate this picture, some participants in Mali said that they do not know whether or 
not an FGM/C law exists in Mali, but that they do not respect the sensitisation messages they 
hear on the radio. Below are the arguments used by 18–34-year-old FGD participants to justify 
why this is so. 
Q: You heard on the radio that FGM/C is not good, but do people here respect that? 
 22 
 
No. 6: “No, people don’t respect it.” 
No. 1: “We listen to the radio, but we do not respect it because those who even say not to do it, 
hide to cut their own daughters. They think we are bushmen, which is why we also cut our 
daughters [laughers]. On the radio, they said that it is bad, yet those who say it do it 
underground.” 
No. 3: “No, but deciding not to cut a girl is bad in the sense that boys will consider her as 
"blakolo" [a pejorative expression in Dioula which means an impure person] and will laugh while 
saying that she will have difficulty finding a husband; this is why it is difficult for us to respect the 
law.” 
Females, FGD 18–34, Koury, Mali 
Source of information about statutory and customary law 
Table 4 below shows the main sources of information on statutory law, as well as for customary 
law and associated practises.  The results are disaggregated by country and by gender within 
each country. 
Table 4: Main sources of information for statutory law and customary law 
  Burkina Faso Mali   
  Male  
(N=301) 
Female 
(N=302) 
Total 
(N=603) 
Male 
(N=304) 
Female 
(N=302) 
Total 
(N=606) 
Total  
(N=1209) 
Sources of information about statutory law 
Radio 136 (45.2) 118(39.1) 254 (42.1) 187 (61.5) * 156 (51.7) 343 (56.6) ‡ 597 (49.4) 
Television 65 (21.6) 59 (19.5) 124 (20.6) 58 (19.1) 53 (17.5) 111 (18.3) 235 (19.4) 
Newspaper/magazines 5 (1.7) * 0 (0.0) 5 (0.8) 3 (1.0) 1 (0.3) 4 (0.7) 9 (0.7) 
Family/fiends 45 (15.0) 83 (27.5) ** 128 (21.2) ‡ 18 (5.9) 50 (16.6) ** 68 (11.2) 196 (16.2) 
Observation 13 (4.3) 12 (4.0) 25 (4.1) 6 (2.0) 11 (3.6) 17 (2.8) 42 (3.5) 
Elected officials 22 (7.3) 14 (4.6) 36 (6.0) 17 (5.6) 18 (6.0) 35 (5.8) 71 (5.9) 
Traditional authorities 1 (0.3) 5 (1.7) 6 (1.0) 8 (2.6) 4 (1.3) 12 (2.0) 18 (1.5) 
Religious authorities 2 (0.7) 1 (0.3) 3 (0.5) 1 (0.3) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.2) 4 (0.3) 
Police/gendarmerie 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.3) 1 (0.3) 2 (0.3) 2 (0.2) 
Other 11 (3.7) 8 (2.6) 19 (3.2) 5 (1.6) 5 (1.7) 10 (1.7) 29 (2.4) 
Don’t know 1 (0.3) 2 (0.7) 3 (0.5) 0 (0.0) 3 (1.0) 3 (0.5) 6 (0.5) 
Sources of information about customary law and practises 
Radio 5 (1.7) 8 (2.6) 13 (2.2) 21 (6.9) 26 (8.6) 47 (7.8) ‡ 60 (5.0) 
Television 6 (2.0) 3 (1.0) 9 (1.5) 1 (0.3) 3 (1.0) 4 (0.7) 13 (1.1) 
Newspaper/magazines 1 (0.3) 1 (0.3) 2 (0.3) 1 (0.3) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.2) 3 (0.3) 
Family/friends 112 (37.2) 134 (44.4) 246 (40.8) 96 (31.6) 123 (40.7) * 219 (36.1) 465 (38.5) 
Observation 37 (12.3) 50 (16.6) 87 (14.4) 39 (12.8) 39 (12.9) 78 (12.9) 165 (13.7) 
Elected officials 12 (4.0) 10 (3.3) 22 (3.6) 12 (3.9) 9 (3.0) 21 (3.5) 43 (3.6) 
Traditional authorities 116 (38.5) ** 86 (28.5) 202 (33.5) 114 (37.5) * 86 (28.5) 200 (33.0) 402 (33.3) 
Religious authorities 3 (1.0) 2 (0.7) 5 (0.8) 18 (5.9) 12 (4.0) 30 (5.0) ‡ 35 (2.9) 
Police/gendarmerie 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Other 7 (2.3) 6 (2.0) 13 (2.2) 1 (0.3) 1 (0.3) 2 (0.3) 15 (1.2) 
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  Burkina Faso Mali   
  Male  
(N=301) 
Female 
(N=302) 
Total 
(N=603) 
Male 
(N=304) 
Female 
(N=302) 
Total 
(N=606) 
Total  
(N=1209) 
Don’t know 2 (0.7) 2 (0.7) 4 (0.7) 0 (0.0) 3 (1.0) 3 (0.5) 7 (0.6) 
Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.3) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.2) 1 (0.1) 
Note: * significant at 0.05 level by gender, ** significant at 0.01 level by gender 
           † significant at 0.05 level by country, ‡   significant at 0.01 level by country 
 
Radio was the main source of information regarding statutory law, as reported by about half of all 
respondents. About one-fifth and 16%, respectively, said that television and family/friends/ 
community were their main sources of information regarding statutory law. There were significant 
differences by country (p<0.001) and by gender in both Burkina Faso (p=0.005) and Mali 
(p=0.004), in terms of what respondents believe to be their main source of information on 
statutory law. Forty-five percent of male respondents and 39% of the female respondents in 
Burkina Faso thought that the radio was the main source, with 15% of male respondents and 
28% of female respondents thinking family was the main source. In Mali, 62% of male 
respondents and 52% of female respondents thought radio was the main source of information 
regarding statutory law. Notably, as compared to the 6% of the male respondents who thought 
family or friends were their main source of information regarding statutory law, 17% of female 
respondents believed the same. 
Meanwhile, in terms of sources of information regarding customary law, a third of all respondents 
believed this to be traditional authorities, 39% thought it was family or friends, and 14% believed 
observation to be their primary source of information. There were significant differences by 
country (p<0.001), but we did not observe significant differences by gender in either Burkina 
Faso (p=0.310) or Mali (p=0.118). Forty-one percent of respondents from Burkina Faso, as 
compared to 36% of respondents from Mali, stated that family or friends were their main source 
of information regarding customary law and associated practises, while 34% of respondents from 
Burkina Faso, as compared to 29% of respondents from Mali thought it was traditional 
authorities. Notably, less than 1% of respondents from Burkina Faso thought religious authorities 
were the main source, as compared to 6% in Mali. Appendix Table 3 details the main sources of 
information regarding statutory law and customary law and practises by pair communes and by 
gender within each commune. 
Key informants and FGD participants largely confirmed the diverse sources of information on 
customary law found in the quantitative data. Radio was their main source, in addition to 
family/friends/community, traditional leaders (the village chief; the Village Development 
Committee [CVD] in Burkina Faso; the Land Committee [COFO] in Mali), community meetings 
with the local government (the health workers, mayors, prefects), NGOs, and education at 
schools. It is important to note that many have received quite a lot of information on the health 
consequences of FGM/C through local health workers. Also of note is the fact that, while 
customary law is a written law, the majority of the people in the study sites are illiterate and, thus, 
their knowledge of it is mediated by others. The local radio station, which includes broadcasts in 
the local language, is the most accessible media used by government officials, NGOs, judges, 
and anyone who wants their message to reach the maximum number of people.  Finally, in some 
cases, people learn about the law when they have to deal with the authorities, so they learn by 
experience.  The qualitative data below are meant to illustrate some of the key findings. 
How have you learned that FGM/C is illegal? 
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“I learned from the health workers who told us not to do it anymore because the law bans cutting 
the girls.” 
               Female, FGD 35+, Faramana, Burkina Faso 
 
“To be aware of government laws, for example the court, the local Departmental Court [the 
prefecture] often makes publications called bench publications and those who are educated read 
them and when the illiterate person asks, they are explained to them.”  
Male, KII, Faramana, Burkina Faso 
“There are radio broadcasts where the judge even comes to explain certain provisions of the law 
to the public. Here in Mali, when people have problems, they go directly to the traditional chief or 
to the mayors, who are supposed to explain the laws to the population because the population 
does not come directly to us to learn about the law or for guidance. It is when they come to us for 
specific problems that we explain the law to them. However, it is difficult, especially for people 
who have never been to school, it is not easy to make them understand and accept the law. 
Often, for these people we even take the Penal Code and read them the provision of the law that 
applies to the offence in question and everything related to it.” 
Male, KII, Koury, Mali 
Legal obligation to comply with the law 
We also sought to determine whether respondents believed that people had any legal obligation 
to comply with the law prohibiting FGM/C. Figure 4 shows the proportion of respondents who 
thought they had a legal obligation to comply with FGM/C law in both Burkina Faso and Mali, 
disaggregating by gender within each country. 
Figure 4: Proportion of respondents who reported having a legal obligation to comply with the law, in 
Burkina Faso and Mali 
 
 
Overall, 64% of all the respondents in both countries thought people had an obligation to comply with 
a law prohibiting FGM/C, while 33% said they did not have any legal obligation to do that, and 3% did 
not know. Overall, 67% and 61% of respondents from Burkina Faso and Mali, respectively, were of 
the opinion that people had a legal obligation. There were significant differences by gender in both 
countries with 5% and 6% of female respondents in Burkina Faso (p=0.025) and Mali (p=0.004), 
respectively, not knowing whether they had a legal obligation, as compared to 1% of their male 
counterparts saying the same. 
Legal punishment 
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Respondents were asked if they knew anyone who had been punished or penalised for practising 
FGM/C, for cutting wood in the forest, or for paying police a bribe in order to avoid getting into trouble.  
They were also asked what type of punishment they thought they would receive for a violation. Table 
5 shows the overall results of whether respondents knew anyone who had been punished, while 
Figure 5 shows the type of punishment respondents thought they would receive for violating each law. 
Table 5: Proportions of who had been punished for practising FGM/C or cutting wood in the forest or 
paying police a bribe 
 Burkina Faso (B) Mali (M) TotalB+M 
 Female 
(N=302) 
Male 
(N=301) 
TotalBF 
(N=603) 
Female 
(N=302) 
Male 
(N=304) 
TotalM 
(N=606) 
(N=1209) 
Has anyone you know been penalised for practising FGM/C 
Yes 49 (16.2) 68 (22.6) 117 (19.4) 63 (20.9) 74 (24.3) 137 (22.6) 254 (21.0) 
No 244 (80.8) 228 (75.8) 472 (78.3) 228 (75.5) 225 (74.0) 453 (74.8) 925 (76.5) 
Don’t know 9 (3.0) 5 (1.7) 14 (2.3) 10 (3.3) 5 (1.6) 15 (2.5) 29 (2.4) 
Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.3) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.2) 1 (0.1) 
Has anyone you know been penalised for cutting wood in the forest/bush? 
Yes 65 (25.5) 73 (24.3) 138 (24.9?) 42 (13.9) 55 (18.1) 97 (16.0) 235 (19.4) 
No 231 (76.5) 225 (74.8) 456 (75.6) 254 (84.1) 242 (79.6) 496 (81.9) 952 (78.7) 
Don’t know 5 (1.7) 3 (1.0) 8 (1.3) 5 (1.7) 7 (2.3) 12 (2.0) 20 (1.7) 
Refused to answer 1 (0.3) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.2) 1 (0.3) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.2) 2 (0.2) 
Has anyone you know been penalised for paying police a bribe to avoid getting into trouble? 
Yes 98 (32.5) 120 (39.9) 218 (36.2) 90 (29.8) 125 (41.1) 215 (35.5) 433 (35.8) 
No 202 (66.9) 179 (59.5) 381 (68.2) 209 (69.2) 175 (57.6) 384 (63.4) 765 (63.3) 
Don’t know 2 (0.7) 2 (0.7) 4 (0.7) 2 (0.7) 4 (1.3) 6 (1.0) 10 (0.8) 
Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.3) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.2) 1 (0.1) 
 
Overall, 21% of respondents knew someone who had been punished for practising FGM/C, 19% 
knew of someone who had been punished for cutting wood in the forest, and 36% knew of 
someone who had been punished for paying police a bribe. There were no significant differences 
in the proportion of those who knew someone who had been punished for practising FGM/C by 
country (p=0.393) or by gender, in both Burkina Faso (p=0.092) and in Mali (p=0.313). There 
were also no significant differences by gender at the commune level.  
Figure 5 below presents the types of punishment respondents believe are associated with 
practising FGM/C. Respondents in both countries answered that the first sanction is paying a fine 
(28.2% in Mali and 25.4% in Burkina Faso) followed by imprisonment in Burkina Faso and no 
sanction in Mali.  
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Figure 5: Respondents’ opinions on types of punishment that they believe are associated with FGM/C in 
Burkina Faso and Mali 
 
In addition, Appendix Table 4 details the proportion of respondents who had been punished for 
practising FGM/C and the nature of the punishment. These data are disaggregated by pair 
commune and by gender within each commune. 
It should once again be noted that the Mali results described above are surprising. This is 
because there is no law against FGM/C in Mali.  Despite this, 22.6% of respondents said they 
knew someone who had been punished for practising FGM/C (compared to 19.4% of 
respondents in Burkina Faso). We need to understand the specific actions for which these 
people were punished. The below response from a key informant who is a representative of a 
local court in Mali provides some insight into how FMG/C may be indirectly covered by other laws 
in Mali. 
“Now let’s assume that a family is considering cutting their daughter, is this allowed? 
You know that the Malian law implicitly says that FGM/C is prohibited, I say ‘implicitly’ […]. So 
implicitly, if we want to make what is called an interpretation of the law, it is clear that this 
practise is prohibited by the Malian law. Now, has the word FGM (female genital mutilation) or 
the word excision reached the level of political courage to say it openly? No! You know that 
generally FGM is practised, generally it is barely accepted […] there is no FGM/C problem 
brought to us, but the problems arise when the health of the girl is concerning as a result of this 
practise. If there is a case of death or disability, the parents now go to the authorities and there 
the magistrates, the judges; have the right words to qualify the facts. Maybe they will use assault 
and battery, or at least they will use the right words, but they will not say genital mutilation or 
excision, they will find the right words to repress all the parties involved in this practise. […] Until 
now you will not see the words excision and female genital mutilation anywhere in the Penal 
Code, neither in the Persons and Family Code nor in the Malian Constitution.”  
Male, KII, Koury, Mali 
We also sought to determine which actors were punishable by law according to respondents and 
who they believed was responsible for enforcement of FGM/C law in Burkina Faso and Mali. This 
section also examines what respondents thought would happen to a person, in terms of 
punishment if he/she were to practise FGM/C. Figure 6 shows the proportion of people 
respondents believed to be punishable for practising FGM/C.  
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Figure 6: Proportions of persons who respondents thought should be punished for practising FGM/C 
 
In both Burkina Faso and Mali, a relatively higher majority of respondents believe that the 
provider who performs the procedure (74% Burkina Faso, 53% Mali) and the parents of the girl 
(66% Burkina Faso, 49% Mali) are punishable under the law. There was a significant difference 
between the proportion of male (70%) and female (61%) respondents in Burkina Faso who 
thought the parents of the girl were the ones who would be punished for practising FGM/C 
(p=0.022). The proportion of respondents who did not know who was to be punished for FGM/C 
violations was significantly higher in Mali (22%) than in Burkina Faso (5%) and proportions of 
those who thought anyone with knowledge of FGM/C could be punished was higher in Burkina 
Faso (15%) than in Mali (7%). Details related to perceptions of who should be punished for 
FGM/C violations by pair commune are presented in Appendix Table 4. 
The quantitative data described above are generally consistent with the qualitative results. Most 
key informants and FGD participants said that the person most likely to be punished for FGM/C 
was the provider who performed the cutting and the parents who brought their daughter to the 
provider.  
“Well, the culprits are the parents first, the parents, mom and dad, because the child belongs to 
them. They are the ones who brought their daughter to this practise in any case, they are the 
ones who are in any case the decision-makers, the child is not responsible.”  
Male, KII, Koury, Mali 
Who will be punished? 
“According to the law, I personally think that there's the family, it’s the family that initiated, it’s the 
family that took the initiative to go and cut the girl, it’s the family!” 
Male, KII, Faramana, Burkina Faso 
 
“I think everyone should be considered guilty. The person who brought her/his daughter to 
perform FGM/C must be condemned as well as the cutter.” 
       Male, FGD, Faramana, Burkina Faso 
 
Moving beyond perceptions of who is punishable for FGM/C violations, Table 6, below, shows 
which actors respondents believe to be responsible for enforcing FGM/C law, as well as other 
criminalised activities like cutting wood in the forest/bush and paying police bribes to avoid 
getting into trouble. 
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Table 6: Respondents’ perceptions on who enforces the law, by country and by gender 
 Burkina Faso (B) Mali (M) TotalB+M 
 Male 
(N=301) 
Female 
(N=302) 
TotalB 
(N=603) 
Male 
(N=304) 
Female 
(N=302) 
TotalM 
(N=606) 
(N=1209
) 
Who enforces the law against FGM/C? 
 
Police/gendarmerie 
181 
(60.1) 
207 
(68.5) 
388 
(64.3) 
192 
(63.2) 199 (65.9) 391 (64.5) 
779 
(64.4) 
Courts 39 
(13.0) 26 (8.6) 
65 
(10.8) 
36 
(11.8) 17 (5.6) 53 (8.7) 
118 (9.8) 
Social Action 21 (7.0) 13 (4.3) 34 (5.6) 12 (3.9) 13 (4.3) 25 (4.1) 59 (4.9) 
Someone else 
24 (8.0) 14 (4.6) 38 (6.3) 
35 
(11.5) 31 (10.3) 66 (10.9) 
104 (8.6) 
Don’t know 35 
(11.6) 
42 
(13.9) 
77 
(12.8) 29 (9.5) 41 (13.6) 70 (11.6) 
147 
(12.2) 
Refused to answer 1 (0.3) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.2) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.3) 1 (0.2) 2 (0.2) 
Who enforces the law against cutting wood in the forest/bush? 
Police/gendarmerie 198 
(65.8) 
227 
(75.2)* 
425 
(70.5) 
177 
(58.2) 184 (60.9) 361 (59.6) 
778 
(65.0) 
Courts 18 (6.0) 18 (6.0) 36 (6.0) 19 (6.3) 8 (2.6) 27 (4.5) 63 (5.2) 
Social Action 46 
(15.3) 23 (7.6)* 
69 
(11.4) 18 (5.9) 15 (5.0) 33 (5.4) 
102 (8.4) 
Someone else 
17 (5.6) 15 (5.0) 32 (5.3) 
44 
(14.5) 39 (12.9) 83 (13.7) 
115 (9.5) 
Don’t know 
22 (7.3) 19 (6.3) 41 (6.8) 
46 
(15.1) 55 (18.2) 101 (16.7) 
142 
(11.8) 
Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.3) 1 (0.2) 1 (0.1) 
Who enforces the law against paying police a bribe to avoid getting into trouble? 
Police/gendarmerie 228 
(75.7) 
242 
(80.1) * 
470 
(77.9) 
212 
(69.7) 202 (66.9) 414 (68.3) 
884 
(73.1) 
Courts 13 (4.3) 4 (1.3) * 17 (2.8) 16 (5.3) 8 (2.6) 24 (4.0) 41 (3.4) 
Social Action 21 (7.0) 10 (3.3) 31 (5.1) 10 (3.3) 12 (4.0) 22 (3.6) 53 (4.4) 
Someone else 
28 (9.3) 28 (9.3) 56 (9.3) 
43 
(14.1) 42 (13.9) 85 (14.0) 
141 
(11.7) 
Don’t know 11 (3.7) 18 (6.0) 29 (4.8) 23 (7.6) 37 (12.3) 60 (9.9) 89 (7.4) 
Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.3) 1 (0.2) 1 (0.1) 
Notes: 
* significant at 0.05 level 
 
The data indicate that 64% of respondents thought that the police are primarily responsible for 
enforcing FGM/C law, while 10% thought it was enforced by the courts, 5% by Social Action, and 
12% did not know. Perception of who enforces the law against cutting wood in the forest follow a 
similar trend, with 65% thinking it was the police, 5% courts, 8% Social Action and 12% reporting 
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that they did not know. With respect to paying police a bribe to avoid trouble, a slightly higher 
proportion was noted: 73% thought it was the police, while 3% thought it was the courts. 
In terms of country-level comparison, there was a significant differences between the proportion 
of people respondents believed to be responsible for enforcing FGM/C law (p=0.046), with a 
slightly higher proportion of respondents in Burkina Faso (12%) than in Mali (6%) thinking it was 
actually the courts that enforced the law against FGM/C. Proportions of those who thought it was 
the police (64% in Burkina Faso and 66% in Mali) did not differ significantly by country. There 
were no significant differences by gender in terms of who respondents believe to be responsible 
for enforcing FGM/C law in both Burkina Faso (p=0.051) and Mali (p=0.053). Further details 
regarding respondents’ perceptions on who enforces the FGM/C law, disaggregated by pair 
commune, are presented in Appendix Table 5. 
It is important to note once again that the results in Mali are consistent with people believing that 
FGM/C is illegal in Mali, while there is still no specific law banning FGM/C in that country. In both 
countries, the police and gendarmerie are the first line of intervention to arrest a person, and it is 
not surprising that they are perceived to be the first to enforce the law.  
Respondents were also asked whether they thought someone would be punished if they were to 
plan to practise FGM/C. The same inquiries were made for cutting wood in the forest and paying 
the police a bribe to avoid trouble. Figure 7 shows the results for Burkina Faso and Mali, 
disaggregated by gender. 
Figure 7: Proportion of respondents who thought a person would be punished for practising FGM/C 
compared to what they thought if they did other criminalised conduct  
 
If someone were to organize an instance of FGM/C, 66% of respondents in Burkina Faso and 
55% of respondents in Mali thought that person would be punished. Compared to figures for 
FGM/C, the proportions of those who thought someone would be punished if the person were to 
cut wood in the forest (80%) or pay police bribe to avoid trouble (82%) was higher. Trends were 
similar by gender, with higher proportions of both male and female respondents saying that if 
someone was to cut wood in the forest (81% male, 79% female) or pay police a bribe to avoid 
trouble (79% male, 83% female), that person would be punished, particularly as compared to the 
same figures for FGM/C (68% male, 64% female). In Mali however, there was no significant 
difference between the proportion of respondents who thought someone would be punished if 
that person were to organise FGM/C (55%) as compared to some who had paid the police a 
bribe to avoid trouble (56%). Proportions of those who thought someone would be punished if 
he/she cut wood in the forest were, however, slightly lower (48%) and a similar trend was 
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observed for both male and female respondents. These perceptions, disaggregated by pair 
commune, are presented in Appendix Table 5. 
Overall, it is important to note that, in both countries, respondents perceived there to be a higher 
probability of getting punished when cutting wood in the forest or paying a bribe to the police to 
avoid trouble than when organizing FGM/C. And this is true despite the fact that Mali does not 
have a specific FGM law, while Burkina Faso does.  
Respondents were also asked how, hypothetically, being arrested for practising FGM/C, would 
be perceived by the people they know best—whether these individuals would approve or 
disapprove of their arrest. Table 7 shows the overall results, as well as the results for Burkina 
Faso and Mali, disaggregated by gender within each country. 
Table 7: Approval or disapproval of arrest of individuals for practising FGM/C compared to whether 
they practised other criminalised conduct 
  Burkina Faso Mali   
  Male  
(N=301) 
Female 
(N=302) 
Total 
(N=603) 
Male 
(N=304) 
Female 
(N=302) 
Total 
(N=606) 
Total  
(N=1209) 
Disapprove of arrest for practising FGM/C? 
  Disapprove greatly 117 (38.9) 111 (36.8) 228 (37.8) 112 (36.8) 104 (34.4) 216 
(35.6) 
444 (36.7) 
  Disapprove somewhat 63 (20.9) 65 (21.5) 128 (21.2) 67 (22.0) 69 (22.8) 136 
(22.4) 
264 (21.8) 
  Disapprove a little 63 (20.9) 53 (17.5) 116 (19.2) 51 (16.8) 63 (20.9) 114 
(18.8) 
230 (19.0) 
  Do not disapprove 55 (18.3) 58 (19.2) 113 (18.7) 72 (23.7) 54 (17.9) 126 
(20.8) 
239 (19.8) 
  Don’t know 3 (1.0) 15 (5.0)* 18 (3.0) 2 (0.7)* 11 (3.6) 13 (2.1) 31 (2.6) 
  Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.3) 1 (0.2) 1 (0.1) 
Disapprove of arrest for cutting wood in the forest? 
  Disapprove greatly 108 (35.9) 109 (36.1) 217 (36.0) 141 (46.4) 134 (44.4) 275 
(45.4) † 
492 (40.7) 
  Disapprove somewhat 57 (18.9) 57 (18.9) 114 (18.9) 66 (21.7) 64 (21.2) 130 
(21.5) 
244 (20.2) 
  Disapprove a little 48 (15.9) 58 (19.2) 106 (17.6) 43 (14.1) 44 (14.6) 87 (14.4) 193 (16.0) 
  Do not disapprove 81 (26.9) 70 (23.2) 151 (25.0)† 51 (16.8) 52 (17.2) 103 
(17.0) 
254 (21.0) 
  Don’t know 7 (2.3) 8 (2.6) 15 (2.5) 3 (1.0) 7 (2.3) 10 (1.7) 25 (2.10 
  Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.3) 1 (0.2) 1 (0.1) 
Disapprove of arrest for paying police a bribe to avoid trouble? 
  Disapprove greatly 108 (35.9) 105 (34.8) 213 (35.3) 128 (42.1) 132 (43.7) 260 
(42.9)† 
473 (39.1) 
  Disapprove somewhat 62 (20.6) 61 (20.2) 123 (20.4) 73 (24.0) 70 (23.2) 143 
(23.6) 
266 (22.0) 
  Disapprove a little 60 (19.9) 66 (21.9) 126 (20.9) 52 (17.1) 48 (15.9) 100 
(16.5) 
226 (18.7) 
  Do not disapprove 63 (20.9) 62 (20.5) 125 (20.7)† 50 (16.4) 45 (14.9) 95 (15.7) 220 (18.2) 
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  Burkina Faso Mali   
  Male  
(N=301) 
Female 
(N=302) 
Total 
(N=603) 
Male 
(N=304) 
Female 
(N=302) 
Total 
(N=606) 
Total  
(N=1209) 
  Don’t know 8 (2.7) 8 (2.6) 16 (2.7) 1 (0.3) 6 (2.0) 7 (1.2) 23 (1.9) 
  Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.3) 1 (0.2) 1 (0.1) 
† significant by country at 5% significance level; * significant by gender at 5% significance level 
 
Slightly more than one-third of all respondents thought that the people they knew best would 
strongly disapprove of their arrest if they were arrested for practising FGM/C, 22% would 
somewhat disapprove, 19% would disapprove just a little, while 20% would not disapprove at all. 
There is a similar trend in the data with respect to other activities. A higher percentage of the 
respondents thought the people they knew best would disapprove strongly (40.7%) or somewhat 
strongly (20%) if they were arrested for cutting wood in the forest, and disapprove greatly (39%) 
or somewhat (22%) if they were arrested for paying the police a bribe to avoid trouble. 
There were no significant differences (p=0.686) in the proportion of the respondents from Burkina 
Faso (38%) and Mali (36%) who thought that the people they knew best would disapprove 
greatly if they were arrested for practising FGM/C. There were, however, significant differences 
(p=0.001) between the proportion of respondents from Burkina Faso (36%) and Mali (45%) who 
thought people would greatly disapprove if they were arrested for cutting wood in the forest. In 
addition, among people who though the people they know best would disapprove greatly if they 
were arrested for paying a bribe to the police, there was a significant difference (p=0.003) 
between Burkina Faso (35%) and Mali (43%). There were no significant differences when the 
data were analysed by gender in both countries. In this case, slightly more than a third of 
respondents thought people they knew would greatly disapprove if they were arrested for 
practising any of the above criminalised activities, and about a fifth thought these same people 
would somewhat disapprove. Details related to these results, analysed by pair commune, are 
presented in Appendix Table 5. 
It is worth noting that, though respondents in both countries stated their respect for the law, up to 
59% in Burkina Faso would disapprove (greatly or somewhat) if people they knew were arrested 
for practising FGM/C. Local and social ties, and other local reasons, therefore, seem to be more 
important that the law.  
 
The List Experiment 
A list experiment is a technique used to elicit truthful responses to sensitive questions and to 
overcome desirability bias. Desirability bias is known to cause respondents to profer inaccurate 
responses. In the context of this study, the sensitive question that we sought to answer was 
whether an individual planned to continue practising FGM/C. List experiments require that the 
survey sample be randomly divided into two sub-samples and for one of the sub-samples to be 
read a list of not very sensitive activities and then asked to count how many of the items are true 
for the respondent. The other sub-sample is then provided the same list of activities, plus an 
extra activity related to the sensitive issue under study.  
In this study, the overall sample of 1,209 was randomly divided in such a way that 50% of 
respondents received the control list, which included items 1 thru 5 below (and excluded the 
sensitive question). The other sub-sample then received all six items listed below (including the 
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sensitive item). All respondents were asked to count the number of items they planned to do in 
the future and to report that number back to the enumerator.  
1. Visit a sick relative 
2. Cut woods in the bush/forest 
3. Pay the police/gendarmerie a bribe to avoid trouble 
4. Accuse a family member of witchcraft 
5. Celebrate a religious holiday.  
6. Circumcise my daughter or granddaughter 
A two-sample t-test was used to compare the means of the two groups (Table 6). There was a 
significant difference (p<0.001) between the mean number of responses, with the treatment 
group having a slightly higher mean (3.1) than the control group (2.9). If none of the respondents 
presented with #6 planned to circumcise their daughter in the future, we would expect the means 
of the two groups to be the same (statistically), but since the mean was higher, we can deduce 
that some of the respondents do plan to circumcise daughters in the future. In all of the 
communes in Mali, there were significant differences between the mean number of activities 
reported by those in the treatment and control groups. In Burkina Faso, however, the difference 
in means was not significant (p=0.20) across control and treatment groups in any commune 
(p>0.05). These results are consistent with some degree of FGM/C abandonment in Burkina 
Faso, even though lack of significance does not necessarily indicate that FGM/C has been fully 
abandoned in Burkina Faso, vis-à-vis Mali. 
Planned future prevalence estimation from the list experiment 
An estimate of planned FGM/C “prevalence” was estimated using a list experiment. Respondents 
were asked to report the total number of listed activities they planned to carry out “in the future.”  
“Circumcise my daughter or granddaughter” was listed in the experimental/treatment condition, 
but not in the control. We were then able to obtain an estimate of planned FGM/C “prevalence” 
by computing the difference in the total counts between the treatment group and the control 
group, expressed as a fraction of the total number of individuals in the treatment group.  
As indicated in Table 8 below, the above-described procedure and analysis resulted in an 
estimated planned “prevalence” of 28% among all respondents. Burkina Faso had an estimated 
planned “prevalence” of 14% while Mali had 44%. All communes from Mali had a higher planned 
“prevalence estimate” compared to their comparative communes from Burkina Faso.  The data 
suggest that the law in Burkina Faso may have had an effect on future plans to circumcise girls. 
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Table 8: Estimation of planned future FGM/C prevalence using list experiment in Burkina Faso and Mali 
  Treatment group (T) Control group (C)       
  Mean  Total  Mean  Total (Ct) T-
Test 
Pr 
(T>C) 
Prevalence (%) 
estimate (Tt - 
Ct)/nt 
(95% CI) (Tt) (95% CI) 
Overall 3.1 (3.0, 3.2) 1774 2.9 (2.8, 2.9) 1817 3.6 <0.001 28.4 
Country 
Burkina 2.8 (2.7, 3.0) 856 2.7 (2.6, 2.8) 815 1.3 0.20 13.5 
Mali 3.4 (3.2, 3.5) 1026 3.0 (2.9, 3.1) 894 3.7 <0.001 43.6 
Paired Communes 
Faramana 2.8 (2.5, 3.0) 281 2.7 (2.5, 2.8) 269 0.6 0.53 11.8 
Koury 3.3 (3.1, 3.6) 341 2.9 (2.7, 3.1) 291 2.5 0.01 49.0 
Koloko 2.9 (2.7, 3.1) 291 2.7 (2.5, 2.9) 266 1.3 0.19 24.8 
Finkolo 3.5 (3.2, 3.8) 357 3.1 (2.8, 3.3) 305 2.7 0.008 51.5 
Tansila 2.8 (2.6, 3.1) 284 2.8 (2.6, 3.0) 280 0.3 0.79 4.0 
Boura 3.2 (2.9, 3.5) 328 3.0 (2.8, 3.2) 298 1.2 0.23 29.1 
Notes: 
1. Prevalence was estimated as the difference between the total number of activities by the treatment group and the 
control group expressed as a fraction of the total number of respondents in the treatment group. 
2. nt is the number of individuals in the treatment group. 
 
We also examined cross-border differences in the mean number of reported activities and 
performed a two-sample t-test to compare these differences on a country basis. Table 9 presents 
these results in terms of overall cross-border differences, as well as pair commune differences.  
Table 9: Burkina Faso–Mali cross-border comparison of the mean number of activities reported by the 
respondents randomized in the treatment group 
  Burkina Faso (B) Mali (M)     
 Mean (95% CI)   Mean (95% CI)  T-Test Pr (Bm = Mm) 
Burkina/Mali 2.8 (2.7, 3.0) 3.4 (3.2, 3.5) -5.0 <0.001 
Paired communes     
Faramana/Koury 2.8 (2.5, 3.0) 3.3 (3.1, 3.6) -3.2 <0.001 
Koloko/Finkolo 2.9 (2.7, 3.1) 3.5 (3.2, 3.8) -3.6 <0.001 
Tansila/Boura 2.8 (2.6, 3.1) 3.2 (2.9, 3.5) -1.9 0.030 
Notes  
Bm= Mean of number of activities reported by participants in the treatment group in Burkina Faso.  
Mm=Mean of number of activities reported by participants in the treatment group in Mali 
 
The mean number of activities reported by respondents in Mali was higher than those in Burkina 
Faso (p<0.001) and a similar trend replicates itself across paired communes.  
In order to cross-check our quantitative findings with the qualitative data, we focused on Boura 
(29.1) and Tansila (4.0), where planned future “prevalence” was lowest. 
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From the point of view of our key informants and FGD participants, some people in their 
communities continue to practice FGM/C underground: crossing the border to Mali to have girls 
cut, or cutting girls during the rainy season, or cutting them at a younger age “when the baby is 
still at her mother’s back.” These practices are mostly linked to tradition in Burkina Faso, or to 
religion and tradition in Mali, but also to pressure from elders and other gatekeepers of 
customary norms and practices. The excerpts below from qualitative transcripts should help 
illustrate what individuals in Boura and Tansila believe prevalence rates to be, as well as why 
and how they believe the practice continues. 
“I have the impression that the tradition occupies a more important place than we think. Some 
have agreed to give it up, but others continue to cut.”  
Female, FGD 35+, Boura, Mali 
 
"We have learned that FGM/C is not good. The elders used to say that during childbirth it will be 
easy when you are cut, but if you are uncut it will be difficult during childbirth; that is why some 
adults women are cut during childbirth. Today, they cut before the birth. "  
Female, FGD 18–34, Boura, Mali 
There seems to be an intergenerational dispute over whether or not to cut, and our participants 
were openly against the practice and blaming the elders and the traditions. The cutters are those 
who help perpetuate the traditions of cutting. Participants also believed that the practice would 
decrease when the elders who strongly support it were no longer in this world. In addition, as the 
cutters are getting older and will one day die, chances are that there would be no more providers. 
“In the past, all households used to cut their girls. Today you will find that some people still 
practise it and others do not. If some people continue to cut, it is because there are cutters that 
are still around, but if they’re no longer there, the practise will stop [laughters].”  
Male, FGD 35+, Tansila, Burkina Faso 
 
 “We had an association called ‘deenba djè‘ which had received FGM/C training from the 
Catholic church. After the training, we dedicated our body and soul to the fight against FGM/C, 
which led to disagreements between us and our mothers. Personally, none of my four daughters 
have been cut. For this reason, my mother-in-law spent all her time insulting me and telling me 
that I had taken over the children.” 
Female, FGD 35+, Boura, Mali 
 “[…] because those who used to do the practice are no longer here [they are dead].” 
Male, FGD 18–34, Tansila, Burkina Faso 
However, the majority of participants believe that the practice is declining and that it will continue 
to do so. The reasons are multidimensional. People in Burkina Faso most fear the harsh FGM/C 
law, and in Mali people most fear the health consequences of a cutting that may turn wrong: a 
death of the girl or hemorrhage after cutting. In both cases, they will have to deal with the FGM/C 
law (in Burkina Faso) and law on physical harm (in Mali). These health and death risks were 
recurrent themes in the FGD discussions with men and women in Tansila/Boura regardless of 
their age. They believe that this fear led some parents to abandon the practice and that others 
will do so in the future. Hence, they strongly oppose FGM/C.  
“In any case, I think there are no advantages in FGM/C. People used to say in the past that 
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FGM/C was a way to avoid infidelity. While today, with the evolution of the science, it has been 
shown that FGM/C itself causes certain diseases that can affect women's reproductive health. 
Diseases such as tetanus, syphilis, and other infections.”  
Female, FGD 18–34, Tansila, Burkina Faso 
“In some areas such as Marala [the participant makes a gesture to indicate a direction], there are 
women who have up to 7 children but who have not been cut; there are some people who do not 
do it anymore. My daughter who accompanied you [the research assistant] is not cut, nor is her 
younger sister. The people in our household have not accepted to cut their daughters because 
they say there are consequences. They refused to cut their daughter.”  
Female, FGD 35+, Boura, Mali 
 
“FGM/C for me, well, it has no advantage. The customary leaders in the past acted as if it were a 
custom. However, this is not a custom. I don't see any advantages.” 
Male, FGD 18–34, Boura, Mali 
“We were told that an uncut woman has complications during childbirth compared to a woman 
who is cut. That’s what people used to say when FGM/C was practised, but now [laughter], now 
we no longer practise it here but our daughters who are cut have no problems during childbirth; 
on the contrary, they give birth more easily. Anyway, I don’t see any advantages to FGM/C.”  
Male, FGD 35+, Tansila, Burkina Faso 
In summary, the FGD data support the list experiment’s projection of a decrease in FGM/C in 
both villages. But data from health worker key informants are also important, because they are in 
a position to know whether a woman or girl is cut or not. The two health workers who were 
interviewed in Tansila had divergent points of view on the current state of FGM/C practise. The 
first one confirmed that he delivered young women that are uncut, while the other reported that 
the younger and older women he has delivered are all cut. Excerpts from their transcripts are 
below. 
Given your position here, at the health centre, do you really think that people have stopped the 
practise of FGM/C? 
 
“ Yes ! When I say yes, it is because I receive many women in my health centre, and I can say 
that people have stopped the practise of FGM/C a lot. Because most of the cases we see are 
really women who may already have more than six children, and if we take their ages and go 
back in time, we will find that the practise has already been done a long time ago. But with the 
younger girls we meet today, we really feel that there are many who have not been cut. So, I can 
say that with this comparison already, the practise has really decreased.” 
Male, KII, Tansila, Burkina Faso 
“As far as I know, almost all the women we dealt with during childbirth are all circumcised.” 
Young and old alike? 
“Yes, young and old, so I tell myself that FGM/C is still practised but clandestinely. Otherwise I 
eould have seen the girls who are cut. And I can say that since I've been here, since I've been 
delivering babies, I've never found an uncut girl.” 
Male, KII, Tansila, Burkina Faso 
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This divergence in experience is noteworthy and leads one to wonder why, in the same village, 
one health worker delivered uncut girls/women and the other did not. It may be that the second 
health worker joined the village recently, as noted by our research assistant.  
 
Compliance Motivations 
This section investigates what motivates people born into a tradition of FGM/C to obey, or not 
obey, a law prohibiting the practice.  
Motivations to obey the law 
Respondents were asked what motivated them to obey the statutory law and the customary law. 
Figure 8 shows what motivates respondents themselves, as well what respondents believe 
motivates others to obey the statutory law.  
Figure 8:  Individual motivations to obey statutory law 
 
Respect for the law was the most important motivator for respondents (individually) to obey the 
statutory law (first panel in Figure 9), with 54% of all respondents reporting this when 
interviewed. There was no significant difference between the countries on this factor (p=0.081). 
Pleasure from following one’s conscience and fear of legal sanction were also mentioned by 16% 
and 12% of the respondents, respectively. Other factors included social esteem, fear of guilt and 
fear of social sanctions.  
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There was also no significant difference between responses by gender in both Burkina Faso and 
Mali in terms of what motivated respondents to obey the formal law, with 55% of male 
respondents and 48% of female respondents in Burkina Faso thinking respect for the law was 
the main factor that motivated them to obey the statutory law. In Mali, 53% and 51% of male and 
female respondents, respectively, also thought respect for the law was the main motivating factor 
for them. 
When asked what they thought motivated others to obey the statutory law, respect for the law 
was still reported as the main factor by 52% of respondents, with 13% and 20%, respectively, 
saying others would be motivated by the pleasure they get from following their own conscience 
and fear of legal sanction. 
In summary, respondents (individually) obey the law most often because of a sense of legal 
obligation and they believe others behave similarly.  Fear of legal sanction comes in as only the 
second or third reason. Hence punishment does not seem to be what induces people to obey the 
law. These data suggest that we should rethink the harshness of the penalties associated with 
FGM/C and other laws. Appendix Table 6 details tesults, disaggregated by pair commune.  
We also sought to know whether respondents’ motivation to obey statutory law was the same or 
different from their motivation to obey customary law. Figure 9 shows what respondents believe 
motivates them (individually) to obey customary law and what they believe motivates others. 
Figure 8:  Individual motivations to obey customary law 
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Overall, 28% of all respondents thought that respect for the law motivated them to obey 
customary law. The pleasure one gets from following one’s conscience and social esteem were 
each reported by 17% of the respondents. Notably, about one-fifth of respondents said fear of 
social sanctions (ancestors, gods, etc.) motivated them to obey customary law. There was a 
marginally significant difference by country (p=0.05) on this particular question, with the 
proportion of respondents who reported fear of social sanctions being 23% in Burkina Faso and 
only 16% in Mali.  
The data suggest a different pattern when respondents were asked what they thought motivated 
others to obey customary law. Fear of social sanctions was reported by a relatively higher 
proportion of the respondents (33%). The social sanctions can be social isolation and 
marginalisation within the community; they can also include something mystic that would happen 
to the individual who does not obey the local rules (a weird illness, disability, or a sudden death). 
The French word “fétiches” [something mystical] was recurrent in the responses of the qualitative 
participants. Respect for the law was mentioned by 27% of respondents, and this is 
approximately equivalent to what motivated the respondents individually, as reported above. 
There were also significant differences in the proportion of responses by country, with 36% of the 
respondents from Burkina Faso and 29% of the respondents from Mali mentioning fear of social 
sanctions as the main factor motivating others to obey customary law. Notably, 12% of 
respondents from Burkina Faso, compared to 17% of respondents from Mali said that pleasure 
from following one’s conscience was their main motivating factor, with 3% in Burkina Faso, 
compared to 1% in Mali, saying they were motivated by fear or guilt. There were, however, no 
significant differences by gender in either Burkina Faso (p=0.230) or Mali (p=0.373) on what 
motivated respondents (individually) to obey customary law, nor were there differences in terms 
of what respondents believed motivated others. (Appendix Table 7). 
Motivations to disobey the law 
When asked when people in their communities think it is permissible to disobey statutory law, 
28% of all respondents thought it would be permissible if it contradicts religion/custom, 28% 
thought it would be permissible when they themselves do not agree with the law, 23% thought it 
would be permissible when authorities do not respect the law themselves, and 13% said it would 
be permissible if there were no sanctions for non-application of the law. When asked about 
customary law (Table 10), 51% said it would be permissible to disobey customary law if it 
contradicts religion and 7% thought it would be permissible when it contradicts statutory law.
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Table10: When would it be permissible to disobey the statutory or customary law? 
  Burkina Mali Total 
  Male 
(N=301) 
Female 
(N=302) 
Total 
(N=603) 
Male 
(N=304) 
Female 
(N=302) 
Total 
(N=606) 
  
When would it be permissible to disobey the statutory law? 
Contradicts with 
religion/custom 
79 (26.2) 91 (30.1) 170 (28.2) 83 (27.3) 85 (28.1) 168 (27.7) 338 (28.0) 
I do not agree with the law 77 (25.6) 87 (28.8) 164 (27.2) 82 (27.0) 97 (32.1) 179 (29.5) 343 (28.4) 
The authorities do not respect 
the law 
58 (19.3) 61 (20.2) 119 (19.7) 94 (30.9) 61 (20.2*) 155 (25.6) 274 (22.7) 
No sanctions for non-
application of the law 
44 (14.6) 50 (16.6) 94 (15.6) 30 (9.9) 38 (12.6) 68 (11.2) 162 (13.4) 
Other 92 (30.6) 55 (18.2)* 147 (24.4) 80 (26.3) 58 (19.2*) 138 (22.8) 285 (23.6) 
Don’t know 17 (5.6) 25 (8.3) 42 (7.0) 4 (1.3) 23 (7.6)* 27 (4.5) 69 (5.7) 
Refused to answer 1 (0.3) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.2) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.1) 
When would it be permissible to disobey the customary law? 
Contradicts with 
religion/custom 
153 (50.8) 155 (51.3) 308 (51.1) 150 (49.3) 154 (51.0) 304 (50.2) 612 (50.6) 
Exceeded law/backwards 68 (22.6) 78 (25.8) 146 (24.2) 67 (22.0) 61 (20.2) 128 (21.1) 274 (22.7) 
Contradicts with the statutory 
law 
28 (9.3) 19 (6.3) 47 (7.8) 16 (5.3) 16 (5.3) 32 (5.3) 79 (6.5) 
Too restrictive 65 (21.6) 62 (20.5) 127 (21.1) 52 (17.1) 53 (17.5) 105 (17.3) 232 (19.2) 
Segregationist law 30 (10.0) 21 (7.0) 51 (8.5) 31 (10.2) 21 (7.0) 52 (8.6) 103 (8.5) 
Other 35 (11.6) 41 (13.6) 76 (12.6) 64 (21.1) 53 (17.5) 117 (19.3) 193 (16.0) 
Don’t know 11 (3.7) 15 (5.0) 26 (4.3) 5 (1.6) 18 (6.0)* 23 (3.8) 49 (4.1) 
Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (0.7) 2 (0.3) 2 (0.2) 
Note: * significant at 0.05 significance level. 
 
There were significant differences between the proportions of respondents who said it would be 
permissible to disobey the statutory law (p=0.02) in Burkina Faso (20%) and Mali (26%). A 
significant difference was also observed between Burkina Faso (16%) and Mali (11%) in the 
proportion of respondents who thought it would be permissible to disobey the statutory law if 
there were no sanctions for non-application of the law (noncompliance) (p=0.03). There were, 
however, no significant differences between Burkina Faso and Mali in terms of whether 
respondents thought it would be permissible to disobey the customary law (p>0.05). 
In Mali, significant differences were observed between the proportion of male respondents (31%) 
and female respondents (20%) who thought it would be permissible to disobey statutory law 
when the authorities themselves do not obey/respect the law. There were no significant 
differences, however, in terms of the proportions of respondents in the other categories when 
analysed by gender in both Burkina Faso and Mali. Results, disaggregated by pair commune, are 
presented in Appendix Tables 8 and 9. 
When is it acceptable to disobey Burkina Faso and/or Mali’s statutory law? 
Table 11 shows the proportions of respondents who believe a particular situation would make it 
acceptable to disobey Burkina Faso’s and/or Mali’s statutory law. The data show the overall 
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proportion, as well as a cross-country comparison; they are also disaggregated by gender within 
each country. 
Table 11: When is it acceptable to disobey Burkina Faso’s/Mali’s Statutory law? 
  Burkina Faso Mali Total 
(N=1209) 
It is acceptable to break/disobey Burkina 
Faso/Mali statutory law: 
Male 
(N=301) 
Female 
(N=302) 
Total 
(N=606) 
Male 
(N=304) 
Female 
(N=302) 
Total 
(N=606) 
If this law is clearly against one’s moral 
principles (Yes) 
187 (62.1) 201 (66.6) 388 
(64.3) 
196 (64.5) 197 (65.2) 393 
(64.9) 
781 (64.6) 
If one would find it too costly to obey this 
law (Yes) 
123 (40.9) 131 (43.4) 254 
(42.1) 
123 (40.5) 149 (49.3)* 272 
(44.9) 
526 (43.5) 
If one knows that this law is not enforced 
(Yes) 
171 (56.8) 181 (59.9) 352 
(58.4) 
190 (62.5) 196 (64.9)* 386 
(63.7) 
738 (61.0) 
If one knows that most of the people he or 
she knows best do not follow this law (Yes) 
91 (30.2) 128 (42.4)* 219 
(36.3) 
105 (34.5) 126 (41.7)* 231 
(38.1) 
450 (37.2) 
If one knows that most of the people he or 
she knows best would approve of breaking 
this law (Yes) 
102 (33.9) 132 (43.7)* 234 
(38.8) 
108 (35.5) 131 (43.4)* 239 
(39.4) 
473 (39.1) 
If one does not know about this law (Yes) 195 (64.8) 216 (71.5) 411 
(68.2) 
222 (73.0) 226 (74.8) 448 
(73.9) 
859 (71.1) 
If one thinks that this law was made without 
representing the interests of people like him 
or her (Yes) 
153 (50.8) 170 (56.3) 323 
(53.6) 
172 (56.6) 183 (60.6) 355 
(58.6) 
678 (56.1) 
If one thinks this law is enforced unfairly 
(Yes) 
195 (64.8) 213 (70.5)* 408 
(67.7) 
219 (72.0) 218 (72.2) 437 
(72.1) 
845 (69.9) 
Note: *Significant at 5% significance level. 
Overall, 70% of the respondents thought it would be acceptable to break the law if one thought 
the law was enforced unfairly, 65% said it would be acceptable if the law was clearly against 
one’s moral principles, 44% if one finds it too costly to obey the law, 56% if one thinks that the 
law was made without representing the interests of people like him/her, and 71% thought it would 
be acceptable if one did not know about the law. The proportion of respondents who thought it 
would be acceptable to break the statutory law were significantly different between Burkina Faso 
(68%) and Mali (74%) (p=0.046). The proportions of respondents who agreed to all other 
situations listed in Table 11 were not significantly different between the two countries. In both 
Burkina Faso and Mali, significant differences (p<0.05) were observed, however, in the 
proportion of male and female respondents who agreed that it would be acceptable to break the 
statutory law if one knew that most of the people one knows best would approve of breaking that 
law, and also if one knew that most of the people one knows best do not follow that law.   A 
higher proportion of female than male respondents was observed in both cases (Table 11). 
How the design and administration of the legal implementation strategy affects the choice 
to obey 
We asked qualitative research participants for their thoughts on FGM/C law. In Burkina Faso, 
almost all key informants who opposed FGM/C said it was a good law despite the fact that they 
did not know much about the content of the law. They did know that anyone who was caught 
practising FGM/C was at risk for jail time and fines. They also believe that the design of the law 
was necessary to protect girls from FGM/C health consequences (hemorrhage, death, problems 
during childbirth, infections, etc.). Participants in Mali were also supportive of Burkina Faso’s 
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FGM/C law. Some knew nothing about the law, but when briefed about its contents, they were 
supportive and even insisted that Mali must have the same law. In fact, regardless of the village 
and the country, all those who opposed FGM/C still believed that the law was a good tool and it 
should be enforced more effectively to better punish those doing the cutting underground. This 
highlights the fact that enforcement of the law remains a challenge in remote areas in Burkina 
Faso. The transcript excerpts below illustrate how respondents think about FGM/C law. 
 What do you think about Burkina Faso’s FGM/C law ? 
“I think it is a very good example that Mali should follow to really put an end to this clandestine 
practise of FGM/C. If we have a specific law, it is good because the very presence of the law 
itself is a deterrent. And as soon as we start to seriously punish those who continue to cut, you 
will see that the others will give it up, there will be no more customers at all.” 
Male, KII, Koury, Mali  
Why do you say the Burkina FGM/C law is a good law? 
“Because it protects girls and women and prevent them from hardship, but the enforcement of 
such a law is difficult here, people are still hiding to cut. If the law were properly applied, we 
would like it.” 
Female, KII, Kokoko, Burkina Faso 
Conflict between customary law and statutory law 
Qualitative research participants were asked about conflicts between customary law and 
statutory law. Participants in both countries talked about child marriage, FGM/C, and the way in 
which the two laws resolve conflicts. Child marriage and FGM/C are both considered by 
international law to be harmful practises to girls and women. Yet, these practises are widespread 
in the study sites in both countries, as our data demonstrate. Participants explained that FGM/C 
and child marriage are cultural practises passed down from their ancestors, and that many 
people resist abandoning them; this is, in part, because some do not even understand why they 
should stop practising FGM/C. The statutory law has fixed a legal age of marriage which the 
communities do not use/recognise. Most people do not even know that there is a legal age of 
marriage, as some parents have brought their 16 year-old daughters to the civil hall to celebrate 
their civil marriages. From a local perspective, a girl is ready to be married when her breasts 
develop, when she begins to menstruate, or when her parents feel that she starts to get 
interested in “boys.” Child marriage, whether forced or arranged, is part of the everyday lives of 
the people in our study sites.  
It is worth noting here that FGM/C is a practice influenced by social norms and is usually 
culturally justified, but some populations also believe that the advantages of continuing the 
practice outweigh the drawbacks. Participants in Mali study sites were more prone to speak in 
favour of FGM/C. Indeed, a government representative even said openly that they support 
FGM/C because of their religion and culture, before concluding the interview by saying that their 
daughters were just cut a week before the RAs had come to the village.  
The transcript excerpts below illustrate how respondents think about conflicts between statutory 
and customary law, FGM/C, and child marriage. 
“People here are used to giving their daughters away whenever they want. There is also this 
problem that exists. However, as of today in Mali, everyone knows that forced marriage is not 
allowed, nor is the abduction of women, which is also punishable. Everyone in Mali knows that, 
but the repression is not easy, and it is also related to the different communities. It is a part of 
their practises.” 
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        Male, KII, Koury, Mali 
“The two laws contradict each other on other subjects such as marriage. From the point of view 
of customary or religious law, a girl even at 14 can be married. Yet modern law prohibits this; this 
too is a point of disagreement.”  
Male, KII, Faramana, Burkina Faso 
On what subjects are the two laws in conflict?  
“From my point of view, FGM/C is part of it because according to modern law FGM/C is a bad 
thing, yet from the point of view of customary law some people think that a girl who is not cut is 
full of sexual pleasure, others also say that it is not right; in fact many things are said. For me, 
this is where these laws are in conflict. Some religious and also some master preachers say that 
they cut their daughters, yet modern law prohibits it.” 
Female, KII, Faramana, Burkina Faso 
Respondents also highlighted some aspects of statutory and customary law that are inherently 
contradictory. For instance, with respect to most statutory law, conflict resolution is based on 
enforcement and punishment. The outcome in the vast majority of situations is exacted against 
an individual. This fact stands in contrast to how customary law resolves disputes. Customary 
law tends to focus on conciliation, finding a solution that is best for the community, not the 
individual. Some participants were in favour of statutory law because they found that it was fair 
and focused on the rights of the individual, particularly those of women and children, who do not 
have much of a voice in customary law proceedings.  
“Often at the level of inheritance there is a blockage, there is a total disconnect between 
customary law and national law, but generally people apply the customary law without problem 
and find that it works very well, but every time that the modern devices of justice are seized and 
begin to apply on these issues, it is a real problem because in the collective conscience they 
cannot understand that members of the same family brought each other to the authorities or to 
the courts to settle disputes.” 
Male, KII, Koury, Mali 
“The two are sometimes in conflict; most of the time people do not trust the positive law [the civil 
law] because they think there is an injustice and the law is not for all cases. In reality this is what 
the average citizen thinks. He thinks the law is never applicable. It is the richest one who always 
wins. That's it!”  
KII, Male, Koury, Mali 
Reasons why women and girls undergo FGM/C 
Religious and traditional beliefs regarding FGM/C practise  
Respondents were asked whether they believed that FGM/C is permitted by their religion and 
customs. Their responses were then compared with responses on “cutting wood in the forest” 
and “paying the police a bribe to avoid trouble.” Table 12 shows these results, disaggregated by 
country and by gender. 
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Table 12: Perceptions on whether FGM/C is permitted by religion and customs 
  Burkina Faso Mali Total 
(N=1209) 
  
  Male 
(N=301) 
Female 
(N=302) 
Total 
(N=603) 
Male 
(N=304) 
Female 
(N=302) 
Total 
(N=606) 
Believe that the following is permitted by religion 
FGM/C 57 (18.9)* 38 (12.6) 95 (15.8) 61 (20.1) 65 (21.5) 126 (20.8)† 221 (18.3) 
Cutting wood in the forest 96 (31.9) 87 (28.8) 183 (30.3) 126 (41.4) 113 (37.4) 239 (39.4)† 422 (34.9) 
Paying police a bribe to avoid 
trouble 
106 (35.2) 107 (35.4) 213 (35.3) 129 (42.4) 116 (38.4) 245 (40.4) 458 (37.9) 
Believe that the following is permitted by customs 
FGM/C 63 (20.9) 62 (20.5) 125 (20.7) 74 (24.3) 73 (24.2) 147 (24.3) 272 (22.5) 
Cutting wood in the forest 116 (38.5) 117 (38.7) 233 (38.6) 165 (54.3) 160 (53.0) 325 (53.6)† 558 (46.2) 
Paying police a bribe to avoid 
trouble 
123 (40.9) 126 (41.7) 249 (41.3) 152 (50.0) 148 (49.0) 300 (49.5)† 549 (45.4) 
Notes: † significant by country at 5% significance level; * significant by gender at 5% significance level 
 
About a fifth of all the respondents thought FGM/C was permitted by their religion, while 35% and 
38%, respectively, thought cutting wood in the forest or paying the police a bribe to avoid trouble 
was permitted by their religion. There was a significant difference (p=0.05) between the 
proportions of those who thought FGM/C was permitted by their religion in Burkina Faso (16%) 
and Mali (21%). A significant difference was also observed (p<0.001) between the proportion of 
respondents who thought cutting wood was permitted by their religion in Burkina Faso (30%) and 
Mali (39%). There was, however, no significant difference (p=0.197) between the proportion of 
those who thought paying the police a bribe to avoid trouble was permitted by their religion in 
Burkina Faso (35%) and Mali (38%). Nineteen percent of male respondents and 13% of female 
respondents (p=0.013) in Burkina Faso, and 16% of male respondents and 20% of female 
respondents (p=0.007) in Mali, thought FGM/C was permitted by their religion. Finally, there were 
no significant differences between Burkina Faso and Mali on the proportion of male and female 
respondents who thought cutting wood in the forest or paying the police a bribe to avoid trouble 
was permitted by their religion.  
We also sought to understand whether respondent perceptions of whether the above-described 
activities were permitted by their religion differed from whether they believe FGM/C, cutting wood 
in the forest or paying the police a bribe to avoid trouble is permitted by their customs. Overall, 
compared to the religion responses discussed above, a similar pattern was observed in the 
proportion of respondents who thought FGM/C, cutting wood in the forest, or paying the police a 
bribe to avoid punishment was permitted by their customs. Twenty-three percent of all 
respondents thought FGM/C was permitted by their customs. A relatively higher proportion of 
respondents said that cutting wood in the forest (46%) and paying the police a bribe to avoid 
trouble (45%) was permitted by their customs. When comparing the two countries, a higher 
proportion of respondents in Mali thought FGM/C was permitted by their customs (24%) than 
among those in Burkina Faso (21%), p=0.014. A similar pattern was seen for respondents who 
thought cutting wood in the forest (Mali 54%, Burkina Faso 39%, p<0.001) and paying the police 
a bribe to avoid trouble (Mali 50%, Burkina Faso 41%, p=0.01) were permitted by their customs. 
There were, however, no significant differences observed in either country for all three activities 
when the results were disaggregated by gender (Table 12).  
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Figure 10 shows respondents’ perceptions of whether FGM/C is permitted by religion and 
customs by pair commune. In the graph, pair communes are arranged alongside each other. 
Faramana in Burkina Faso is compared to Koury in Mali, Koloko in Burkina Faso is compared to 
Finkolo in Mali, while Tansila in Burkina Faso is compared to Boura in Mali. 
Figure 10: Proportion of respondents who believe FGM/C is permitted by their religion and customs 
 
The data suggest that, in Faramana, a slightly higher proportion of female respondents (17%) 
thought FGM/C was permitted by their customs, as compared to by their religion (11%); and this 
difference is significant. In Koury, however, the proportion of female respondents who thought 
FGM/C was permitted by their religion (22%) was not significantly different from those who said it 
was permitted by their customs (21%). In Koloko, a higher proportion of both male (25%) and 
female (27%) respondents thought FGM/C was permitted by their customs, as compared to their 
religion (16% male, 15% female). There was no significant difference between the proportion of 
male respondents who thought FGM/C was permitted by their religion and those who thought it 
was permitted by their customs. However, for women, a higher proportion of female respondents 
in Koloko (34%) thought FGM/C was permitted by their customs, as compared to the 27% who 
thought it was permitted by their religion. In Tansila, a slightly higher proportion of male 
respondents (22%) thought FGM/C was permitted by their religion, as compared to the 20% who 
thought it was permitted by their customs. A different scenario was observed among women, 
where 18%, as compared to 12% of female respondents thought it was permitted by their 
customs and religion, respectively. In Boura, 20% of male respondents thought FGM/C was 
permitted by their customs, while 10% thought it was permitted by their religion. Among female 
respondents, 18% thought it was permitted by their customs and 15% thought it was permitted by 
their religion.  
Reasons for practising FGM/C 
Table 13 shows why respondents thought FGM/C was practised in their respective communities. 
The results are disaggregated by country and by gender within each country. 
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Table 13: Reasons for practise of FGM/C in Burkina Faso and Mali 
  Burkina Faso Mali 
Total  
(N=872) 
  
Male  
(N=206) 
Female 
(N=175) 
Total 
(N=381) 
Male  
(N=263) 
Female 
(N=228) 
Total 
(N=491) 
 
Because everyone 
else does it 45 (23.7) 49 (29.5) 94 (26.4) 51 (21.5) 56 (27.7) 107 (24.4) 201 (25.3) 
Religious 
Obligation 5 (2.6) 4 (2.4) 9 (2.5) 13 (5.5) 10 (5.0) 23 (5.2) 32 (4.0) 
Tradition 11 (5.8) 15 (9.0) 26 (7.3) 31 (13.1) 31 (15.3) 62 (14.1)† 88 (11.1) 
Because there a 
few arrests for 
those who 
practice 48 (25.3) 27 (16.3) 75 (21.1) 43 (18.1) 29 (14.4) 72 (16.4) 147 (18.5) 
Other 78 (41.1) 59 (35.5) 137 (38.5) 103 (43.5) 78 (38.6) 181 (41.2) 318 (40.0) 
Don’t know 19 (10.0) 21 (12.7) 40 (11.2) 22 (9.3) 24 (11.9) 46 (10.5) 86 (10.8) 
Notes: † significant by country at 5% significance level; * significant by gender at 5% significance level 
 
A quarter of respondents (25%) said they practised FGM/C because everyone else did it (26% 
Burkina Faso, 24% Mali, p=0.512), 4% said it was a religious obligation (3% Burkina Faso, 5% 
Mali, p=0.053), 11% because of tradition (7% Burkina Faso, 14% Mali, p=0.002), and 19% said 
they practised it because there were few arrests for those who did so (21% Burkina Faso, 16% 
Mali, p=0.092). In Burkina Faso, 24% of male respondents and 29% of female respondents said 
they practised FGM/C because everyone else does it (p=0.213), and similar proportions were 
also observed in Mali (22% male, 28% female, p=0.131). Significant differences by sex were 
observed among respondents who cited few arrests as the reason why they continued to practice 
FGM/C in Burkina Faso (25% male vs. 16% female, p=0.038) while in Mali there were no 
significant difference by gender (14% male vs. 16% female, p=0.286). 
We also compared the reasons given for practising FGM/C by those who said FGM/C was 
permitted by their religion against those who said it was permitted by their customs (Figure 11). 
In Burkina Faso, 46% of respondents who thought FGM/C was permitted by their religion said 
they practised it because everyone else did it, as compared to a third (33%) of those who thought 
it was permitted by their customs. There was no significant difference in Mali (27%), however. 
Among those who thought FGM/C was permitted by their religion, as compared to those who 
thought FGM/C was permitted by their customs, responses related to religious obligation, 
tradition, and few arrests did not differ significantly.  
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Figure 11: Reasons for practising FGM/C among those thinking  FGM/C was permitted by religion/custom 
 
The qualitative results generally confirmed the quantitative data in this particular subject area. 
Interviewees linked the continuation of FGM/C to their customs and religion. We asked our key 
informants and our FGD participants the reasons for having women and girls undergo FGM/C in 
their community. Depending on the country, the ethnic groups and the experiences of the 
participants, a variety of reasons were invoked to justify the continuation of the practise. 
Culture/tradition, social reasons (such as marriageability), health reasons, pressure from elders, 
and sexuality were all listed.  
Cultural reasons (or customs) were listed in both countries as one of the main justifications for 
the continued practise of FGM/C. Many respondents said they used to cut because it was their 
culture, their tradition, and that some continue to cut girls, even underground, because they still 
believe it is a part of their cultural practises and that these should be maintained.  Regardless of 
gender, those who still support the practice are convinced that they are doing the right thing for 
their culture and that cutting has no disadvantages. The transcript excerpts below illustrate 
respondents’ thinking on this issue. 
“We were born to find this practise, so we do it until now and we haven’t stopped it.” 
“For a very long time this has been done and there have been no disadvantages until now and 
we practise it without complications, which is why we do it.”  
Female, FGD 35+, Finkolo, Mali 
“Since it is a practise of our ancestors, we only have to conform to it and perpetuate this 
tradition.” 
Male, FGD 18–34, Koury, Mali 
Interestingly, only a few participants in Burkina Faso linked the practise of FGM/C to religion, and 
when they did, mainly to Islam. However, in Mali, participants said it is permitted and even 
requested by Islam, because Muslim women/girls must be pure. Given the fact that religious 
leaders have power in Mali, no politician dares to challenge their views by openly passing a law 
to ban the practise. The transcript excerpts below illustrate respondents’ thinking on this subject. 
“We would have liked to always have our girls cut because we were born and found that this 
practise had been around for a long time. Moreover, in the Muslim religion, FGM/C is an 
obligation.” 
Male, KII, Finnkolo, Mali 
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Q: You just said that people would say nothing about a family who decided to cut their daughter? 
 
“The prophet said, excuse me for the phrase, to cut so that the woman would not be hurt and 
there would be no consequences. The prophet says not to cut too much, you understand. We 
must not be ashamed to say things as they are. If I don’t explain it this way, you won’t have the 
answers to your questions. The prophet said to cut, but not to exceed a certain level.” 
Male, KII, Koury, Mali 
In addition to religious reasons, respondents reported social reasons that led parents to cut their 
daughters. As they put it, belonging and being fully a woman within the community is only 
possible when one is cut. Participants explained that being cut is the ritual that allows a girl to 
become a woman and to enter the circle of women. So, an uncut woman, regardless of her age 
and whether she is married or not, is not mature and remains eternally a little girl. She has not 
grown up yet, so she cannot be fully a part of the community, and she cannot attend some 
women’s activities that take place within her community. The only way to escape this pressure is 
when a husband is supportive of his wife’s uncut status. The transcript excerpt below helps 
elucidate thinking on this issue. 
“Well, if she is not cut and she is married it depends on how her husband understands it. Her 
husband may want this, or he may not want this. He can say that this one is not cut, so that she 
has not entered the field of women, she is still a girl. She is still a little girl, she's not a woman 
yet.” 
Male, KII, Finkolo, Mali 
In the absence of a supportive husband, social pressure and isolation can foster suffering among 
uncut girls/women. To put an end to this situation, women sometimes ask to be cut in order to 
belong to the community. Also, in some communities where the practise runs deep, uncut girls 
will have a hard time getting married. Men want or are expected to marry a cut woman, and 
those who are not will be marginalised, much like their female counterparts. The transcript 
excerpts below illustrate how important social marginalisation is to the continuation of the 
practise. 
What will people say about a girl who grew up without being cut? 
“People will say it’s not good and they will start criticising her parents.” 
 
“People will show contempt for her and start criticising her negatively. Moreover, it will be difficult 
for this girl to have a husband because men will sabotage her.” 
Male, FGD 18–34, Koury, Mali 
“Those who oppose this practise will say that it is very good, but those who are in favour will feel 
betrayed and will hardly accept to marry the daughters of this family and by ricochet to give their 
daughter in marriage to the family who refuses to cut its girls.” 
Female, FGD, Finnkolo, Mali 
“In our area for example, there is a fetish and when the girl is not cut, she is considered a child, 
regardless of her age. During the various rituals, the uncut girl cannot take part because she is 
considered a little girl.” 
Male, FGD 18–34, Koury, Mali 
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In addition to the social reasons for continuing FGM/C, control of women’s sexuality was also a 
recurrent theme in the narratives of the qualitative research participants. People used to believe, 
and some still do, that cutting functions to “make girls/women stay quiet.” Many still believe that a 
cut woman has less sexual desire and will not cheat on her husband.  
“A girl who is not cut is very dizzy, but those who are cut are not.” 
Male, FGD 35+, Koury, Mali 
“As a local responsible, some people come to us with arguments that support FGM/C: they stand 
up for FGM/C because of the fact that an uncut woman remains faithful even if her husband is 
away for one year. An uncut woman cannot be faithful even if her husband is absent for only one 
month.” 
Male, KII, Koloko, Burkina Faso 
In addition, participants from our FGDs believe that health and maternity reasons lead some 
parents to continue cutting their daughters. Some people believe that if a girl is not cut, she 
cannot give birth; and that she will have health issues. Some even believe that an uncut woman 
or girl can be a source of health problems to her partner or husband. Though some FGD 
participants said this is not proven to be true today, there are people in their communities who 
strongly believe that cutting has many health advantages. 
Other participants linked decreases in cutting to early pregnancies experienced by girls today. 
They even see the campaign against FGM/C to be the main cause of the current early pregnancy 
situation. Given that they have stopped cutting girls, some believe that uncut girls like more sex 
and have sexual intercourse at an earlier age, hence the early pregnancies. They then justify 
early marriage by saying that abandonment of cutting forces them to make different marital 
choices. However, some participants also contradict this sexual control argument, arguing that 
nowadays they see cut and uncut girls equally “turning around men.” Therefore, early pregnancy 
has more to do with the education the parents give to their daughters than being cut or not cut 
per se. Awareness of the consequences of FGM/C has led some parents to openly oppose 
FGM/C in their communities so that their daughters are not cut. However, the social pressure 
remains so strong that many years of efforts to protect girls can vanish when a grown woman 
asks to be cut herself, as explained below. 
“Personally, none of my four daughters have been cut. For this reason, my mother-in-law spent 
all her time insulting me and telling me that I had taken over the children. One of them was about 
to get married, and she was so influenced that she finally told me that she had to go and have 
herself cut. I replied by telling her that there was no way and that if she did it, I was no longer her 
mother. We fought; fought; and the year before last year, the cutter who spent many years 
without coming, came to the village and swept away all these years of effort because some girls 
who went on their own to have themselves cut were flattered, yet they were married and already 
had children. Girls that their parents did not cut went on their own to do it. "   
Female, FGD 35+, Boura, Mali 
Behaviours/actions in face of FGM/C 
Respondents were asked what they would do if they learned that a neighbour was going to 
practise FGM/C. Table 13 presents overall proportions and disaggregated by country and by 
gender. 
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Table 13: What would you do if you found out a neighbour was going to practise female genital 
mutilation/cutting 
  Burkina Faso Mali 
Total 
(N=1209) 
  Male 
(N=301) 
 
Female 
(N=302) 
 
Total 
(N=603) 
 
Male 
(N=304) 
 
Female 
(N=303) 
 
Total 
(N=606) 
 
 
Nothing 114 (37.9) 112 (37.1) 226 (37.5) 103 (33.9) 119 (39.4) 222 (36.6) 448 (37.1) 
Call telephone line 
(hotline) 3 (1.0) 2 (0.7) 5 (0.8) 6 (2.0) 3 (1.0) 9 (1.5) 
14 (1.2) 
Tell the 
police/gendarme 36 (12.0) 43 (14.2) 79 (13.1)† 26 (8.6) 17 (5.6) 43 (7.1) 
122 (10.1) 
Tell a social worker 10 (3.3) 3 (1.0) 13 (2.2) 4 (1.3) 8 (2.6) 12 (2.0) 25 (2.1) 
Tell local 
authorities 25 (8.3) 17 (5.6) 42 (7.0) 34 (11.2) 26 (8.6) 60 (9.9) 
102 (8.4) 
Tell a health 
worker 5 (1.7) 4 (1.3) 9 (1.5) 2 (0.7) 4 (1.3) 6 (1.0) 
15 (1.2) 
Tell a local NGO 1 (0.3) 1 (0.3) 2 (0.3) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (0.2) 
Talk to a family 
member 63 (20.9) 77 (25.5) 140 (23.2) 61 (20.1) 78 (25.8) 139 (22.9) 
279 (23.1) 
Do something else 70 (23.3) 53 (17.6) 123 (20.4) 82 (27.0) 49 (16.2) 131 (21.6) 254 (21.0) 
Don’t know 9 (3.0) 16 (5.3) 25 (4.1) 8 (2.6) 17 (5.6) 25 (4.1) 50 (4.1) 
Notes: † significant by country at 5% significance level; * significant by gender at 5% significance level 
 
Overall, 37% of all respondents said they would do nothing, 23% said they would talk to a family 
member, 10% said they would talk to the police, and 8% said they would tell local authorities. A 
significant difference was observed among respondents who said they would talk to the police 
between respondents surveyed in Burkina Faso (13%) and Mali (7%), p=0.001. No significant 
differences were observed between respondents who said they would do nothing (38% Burkina 
Faso, 37% Mali); talk to a family member (23% Burkina Faso, 23% Mali); or tell local authorities 
(7% Burkina Faso, 10% Mali). In Both Burkina Faso and Mali, a relatively higher proportion of 
female respondents (~25%), as compared to male respondents (~20%) would talk to a family 
member (p=0.033). Details regarding how residents of particular pair commune behave in the 
face of FGM/C are presented in Appendix Table 12. 
FGM/C prevalence estimates: Perceptions of the number of girls cut in the community 
Respondents were also asked about their perceptions of how many girls have been cut in their 
communities and whether they had been cut themselves. Table 14 presents the overall 
proportions, as well as these proportions disaggregated by country and by gender. 
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Table 14: How many girls in your community do you think have been cut? 
  Burkina Faso Mali 
Total 
(N=1209) 
  
Male Female Total 
(N=603) 
Male Female Total 
(N=606) 
  
(N=301) (N=302) (N=304) (N=303) 
How many girls in your community have been circumcised? 
Everyone/all girls 24 (8.0) 23 (7.6) 47 (7.8) 39 (12.8) 41 (13.6) 
80 
(13.2) † 
127 
(10.5) 
Most people/girls 50 (16.6) 48 (15.9) 98 (16.3) 56 (18.4) 54 (17.9) 
110 
(18.2) 
208 
(17.2) 
Some people/girls 43 (14.3) 47 (15.6) 90 (14.9) 59 (19.4) 42 (13.9) 
101 
(16.7) 
191 
(15.8) 
A few people/girls 83 (27.6) * 57 (18.9) 140 (23.2) 87 (28.6) * 54 (17.9) 
141 
(23.3) 
281 
(23.2) 
No one/no girl 72 (23.9) 99 (32.8) * 
171 (28.4) 
† 44 (14.5) 81 (26.8)* 
125 
(20.6) 
296 
(24.5) 
Don’t know 29 (9.6) 28 (9.3) 57 (9.5) 19 (6.3) 30 (9.9) 49 (8.1) 106 (8.8) 
Have you or anyone in your family been circumcised? 
  Yes 89 (29.6) 86 (28.5) 175 (29.0) 107 (35.2) 113 (37.4) 
220 
(36.3) † 
395 
(32.7) 
  No 197 (65.4) 198 (65.6) 395 (65.5) 180 (59.2) 167 (55.3) 
347 
(57.3) 
742 
(61.4) 
  Don’t know 15 (5.0) 18 (6.0) 33 (5.5) 15 (4.9) 21 (7.0) 36 (5.9) 69 (5.7) 
Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (0.7) 1 (0.3) 3 (0.5) 3 (0.3)  
Notes: † significant by country at 5% significance level; * significant by gender at 5% significance level 
 
Overall, 28% of respondents thought that all or most girls had been cut, 23% thought a few girls 
had been cut, and 25% thought no girl had been cut; an additional 9% did not know. By country, 
28% of respondents from Burkina Faso, as compared to 21% of respondents from Mali (p=0.002) 
thought that no girl had been cut in their communities and these proportions differed significantly 
between male and female respondents in each country. About a quarter (24%) of male 
respondents compared to a third (33%) of female respondents in Burkina Faso (p=0.016), and 
15% of male and 27% of female respondents in Mali (p<0.001) thought that no girl had been cut 
in their respective communities. 
When asked whether they or someone in their family had been cut, one-third (33%) of all 
respondents (overall) said yes, with their numbers being 29% in Burkina Faso and 36% in Mali, 
p=0.007. There was no significant difference in the proportions by sex in each country: 30% of 
male and 29% of female respondents in Burkina Faso and 35% of male and 37% of female 
respondents in Mali. These estimates, disaggregated by pair commune, are presented in 
Appendix Table 10. 
Knowledge of FGM/C practise as compared to other criminalised conduct  
Figures 12 and 13 present the overall proportion of respondents with knowledge of FGM/C in 
comparison with other criminalised conduct, such as paying the police a bribe to avoid trouble 
and cutting wood in the forest. The results are disaggregated by country and by gender.  
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Figure 12: Familiarity with FGM/C compared to other criminalised conduct 
 
Overall, 75% of respondents were familiar with FGM/C practise, with 85% and 90%, respectively, 
saying they were familiar with cutting wood in the forest and paying the police a bribe to avoid 
trouble. The proportion of respondents who were familiar with FGM/C practise was higher in Mali 
(79%) than it was in Burkina Faso (72%), p=0.002, and in both countries the proportion of male 
respondents with knowledge was higher than that of female respondents (Burkina Faso: male 
77%, female 66%, p=0.002; Mali: male 88%, female 70%, p<0.001). We also observed that the 
proportion of those who said they were familiar with FGM/C was significantly lower than those 
who said they were familiar with cutting wood in the forest as well as paying the police a bribe to 
avoid trouble. The difference margin between familiarity with FGM/C and other criminal conduct 
was bigger among women in both Burkina Faso and Mali. More precisely, the difference margin 
between the proportion of female respondents in Burkina Faso who said they were familiar with 
cutting wood in the forest was 12.2%, while for male respondents it was 6.2%. In Mali, there was 
a similar pattern: the difference margin between the proportion of female respondents who said 
they were familiar with cutting wood in the forest was 15.3%, as compared to male respondents 
(2.6%).  
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Figure 13: Perceptions on practise of FGM/C in the community compared to other criminalised conduct 
 
We also observed that 61% of all respondents (overall) thought that FGM/C was practised in 
their communities, while 62% and 78% thought cutting wood in the forest and paying the police a 
bribe to avoid trouble were practised. The proportions significantly differed by country. 
Approximately 53% of respondents in Burkina Faso and 68% of respondents in Mali (p<0.001) 
thought FGM/C was practised in their communities. Similar patterns were observed among 
respondents who thought that people in their communities cut wood in the forest (47% Burkina 
Faso, 78% Mali, p<0.001) and paid the police bribes to avoid trouble (68% Burkina Faso, 87% 
Mali, p<0.001). In Mali, the proportion of respondents who thought that FGM/C was practised in 
their community was lower than that for both cutting wood in the forest (78%) and paying the 
police a bribe to avoid trouble (87%). Meanwhile, in Burkina Faso, the proportion of those who 
thought FGM/C was practised in their community was slightly higher than that for cutting wood in 
the forest (47%), but lower than that for paying the police a bribe to avoid trouble (68%). The 
proportion of male respondents who thought FGM/C was practised in their communities was 
higher than that of female respondents in both Burkina Faso (58% male vs. 49% female, 
p=0.045) and Mali (76% male vs. 60% female, p<0.001). A similar pattern is also seen in the 
proportion of those who thought people in their communities cut wood in the forest (Burkina 
Faso: 50% male, 44% female, p=0.207; Mali: 82% male, 74% female, p=0.022) and paid police a 
bribe to avoid trouble (Burkina Faso: 70% male, 66% female, p=0.267; Mali: 91% male, 84% 
female, p=0.010).  
 
Reasons for women and girls not undergoing FGM/C 
Continuation/discontinuation of FGM/C 
Respondents were asked whether they thought FGM/C should continue or not, as well as 
whether they themselves planned to continue the practise even if everyone else in their 
communities was going to stop it. They were also asked their opinion on how much consideration 
they give to whether others practise FGM/C when deciding whether to do so themselves (Table 
14 and Figure 15) 
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Figure 14: Continuation of FGM/C among respondents even if everyone else in their community was to 
discontinue it 
 
Overall, 17% of respondents stated that they would continue practising FGM/C even if everyone 
else in their community were to stop the practice (14% Burkina Faso, 21% Mali, p=0.003). This 
was however slightly lower than those who said they would continue cutting wood in the forest 
(19%) and paying the police bribes to avoid trouble (22%).  Disaggregated by gender within each 
country, 15% of male and 13% of female respondents in Burkina Faso (p=0.470), as compared 
to 22% of male and 19% of female respondents in Mali (p=0.243), said they would continue 
practising FGM/C even if everyone else in their community were to stop it. 
When asked whether they individually believed FGM/C should be stopped or should continue, 
18% of respondents overall believed that the practice should continue (15% Burkina Faso, 21% 
Mali, p=0.005) (Figure 14).  This was slightly lower than those who believed cutting wood in the 
forest should continue (24%) and paying the police bribes to avoid trouble (36%). The 
proportions of those who believed these practises should continue were generally lower in 
Burkina Faso than in Mali. There was no significant difference in the proportions of those who 
believed FGM/C should continue by gender in both Burkina Faso (13% male,16% female, 
p=0.365) and Mali (18% male, 23% female, p=0.149), though proportions of male were slightly 
lower. This confirms the work of Varol et al, (2015) showing generally greater support of 
abandonment among men in certain communities. For both male and female respondents in 
Burkina Faso, the proportions of those who believed FGM/C should continue was not 
significantly different from those who believed cutting wood in the forest should continue (male: 
13% vs. 14%; female: 16% vs. 15%) but lower than paying the police bribes to avoid trouble 
(male: 13% vs. 28%; female: 16% vs. 28%) should continue. In Mali, however, the proportions of 
those who thought FGM/C should continue was significantly lower than those who thought 
cutting wood in the forest (male: 18% vs. 33%; female: 23% vs. 35%) and paying the police 
bribes to avoid trouble (male: 18% vs. 41%; female: 23% vs. 46%) should continue. 
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Figure 15: Proportions of those who believe FGM/C should continue in Burkina Faso and Mali 
 
 
Table 15: Perceptions regarding the continuation/discontinuation of FGM/C in Burkina Faso and Mali 
  Burkina Faso Mali 
Total  
(N=1209)   
Male  
(N=301) 
Female 
(N=302) 
Total 
(N=603) 
Male  
(N=304) 
Female 
(N=302) 
Total 
(N=606) 
If everyone else in your community were to stop FGM/C would you continue doing it? 
Yes 45 (15.0) 39 (12.9) 84 (13.9) 68 (22.4) 56 (18.5) 
124 
(20.5)† 208 (17.2) 
No 250 (83.1) 252 (83.4) 502 (83.3) 230 (75.7) 
234 
(77.5) 
464 
(76.6) 966 (79.9) 
Don’t know 5 (1.7) 11 (3.6) 16 (2.7) 5 (1.6) 12 (4.0) 17 (2.8) 33 (2.7) 
Refused to answer 1 (0.3) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.2) 1 (0.3) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.2) 2 (0.2) 
When deciding to practise FGM/C or not, how much consideration do you put to the question of whether 
others practise it or not? 
Much consideration 59 (19.6) 62 (20.5) 121 (20.1) 65 (21.4) 56 (18.5) 
121 
(20.0) 242 (10.2) 
Some 
consideration 72 (23.9) 74 (24.5) 146 (24.2) 69 (22.7) 69 (22.8) 
138 
(22.8) 284 (23.5) 
Not much 
consideration 52 (17.3) 53 (17.5) 105 (17.4) 49 (16.1) 43 (14.2) 92 (15.2) 197 (16.3) 
No consideration 100 (33.2) 84 (27.8) 184 (30.5) 103 (33.9) 
101 
(33.4) 
204 
(33.7) 388 (32.1) 
Don’t know 18 (6.0) 29 (9.6) 47 (7.8) 18 (5.9) 
33 
(10.9)* 51 (8.4) 98 (8.1) 
Do your neighbours approve or disapprove if you practise FGM/C on your daughter in your household? 
Strongly approve 10 (3.3) 7 (2.3) 17 (2.8) 34 (11.2) 27 (8.9) 
61 
(10.1)† 78 (6.5) 
Approve 79 (26.2) 72 (23.8) 151 (25.0) 78 (25.7) 87 (28.8) 
165 
(27.2) 316 (26.1) 
Disapprove 143 (47.5) 149 (49.3) 
292 (48.4) 
† 122 (40.1) 
118 
(39.1) 
240 
(39.6) 532 (44.0) 
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Strongly 
disapprove 59 (19.6) 53 (17.5) 112 (18.6) 60 (19.7) 49 (16.2) 
109 
(18.0) 221 (18.3) 
Don’t know 10 (3.3) 21 (7.0)* 31 (5.1) 10 (3.3) 21 (7.0)* 31 (5.1) 62 (5.1) 
Do you believe FGM/C should continue or should it be stopped? 
Continue 40 (13.3) 48 (15.9) 88 (14.6) 56 (18.4) 70 (23.2) 
126 
(20.8) † 214 (17.7) 
Stopped 258 (85.7) 245 (81.1) 503 (83.4) 245 (80.6) 
218 
(72.2) 
463 
(76.4) 966 (79.9) 
Don’t know 3 (1.0) 8 (2.6) 11 (1.8) 3 (1.0) 13 (4.3) 16 (2.6) 27 (2.2) 
Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 1 (0.3) 1 (0.2) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.3) 1 (0.2) 2 (0.2) 
Notes: † significant by country at 5% significance level; * significant by gender at 5% significance level 
  
Appendix Table 11 presents detailed results on the continuation/discontinuation rate of FGM/C 
disaggregated by pair commune and by gender. 
Awareness of the social costs of FGM/C  
When asked whether, in their opinion, life in the village was more difficult or less difficult for uncut 
women, 18% of respondents (16% Burkina Faso, 21% Mali, p=0.041) thought life is more difficult 
for uncut women. Disaggregated by gender, no significant differences were observed where 17% 
of male and 15% of female respondents from Burkina Faso, and 21% of male and 20% of female 
respondents from Mali thought life would be much more difficult for uncut women. On the other 
hand, 35% of all respondents (34% Burkina Faso and 36% Mali, p=0.434) thought life would be 
much less difficult for uncut women in their communities. In both countries, the proportions of 
male and female respondents stating this response were not significantly different (Burkina Faso: 
33% male vs. 34% female, p=0.688; Mali: 35% male vs. 37% female, p=0.717). 
Table 16: Social costs of FGM/C for uncut women in Burkina Faso and Mali 
  Burkina Faso Mali 
Total  
(N=1209) 
Is life much more or less 
difficult for the uncut 
women? 
Male  
(N=301) 
Female 
(N=302) 
Total 
(N=603) 
Male  
(N=304) 
Female 
(N=302) 
Total 
(N=606) 
Life is much more difficult 52 (17.3) 44 (14.6) 96 (15.9) 65 (21.4) 59 (19.5) 
124 
(20.5)† 
220 
(18.2) 
Life is somewhat difficult 38 (12.6) 52 (17.2) 90 (14.9) 40 (13.2) 37 (12.3) 77 (12.7) 
167 
(13.8) 
Life is neither more or less 
difficult 59 (19.6) 46 (15.2) 105 (17.4) 45 (14.8) 50 (16.6) 95 (15.7) 
200 
(16.5) 
Life is somewhat less difficult 31 (10.3) 19 (6.3) 50 (8.3) 27 (8.9) 17 (5.6) 44 (7.3) 94 (7.8) 
Life is much less difficult 99 (32.9) 104 (34.4) 203 (33.7) 111 (36.5) 
106 
(35.1) 
217 
(35.8) 
420 
(34.7) 
Don’t know 22 (7.3) 36 (11.9) 58 (9.6) 16 (5.3) 
31 
(10.3)* 47 (7.8) 105 (8.7) 
Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 1 (0.3) 1 (0.2) 0 (0.0) 2 (0.7) 2 (0.3) 3 (0.3) 
Notes: † significant by country at 5% significance level; * significant by gender at 5% significance level 
Appendix Table 12.includes detailed results, disaggregated by pair commune and by gender.  
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This same topic was covered with qualitative participants (KII and FGD) by way of a vignette in 
which we asked them what would happen to a family that decided NOT to cut their daughter. We 
wanted to know what would happen to the uncut girl, and what would happen to the parents of 
the uncut girl. We also asked them why this family decided not to cut their daughter.  
Responses to this vignette were illuminating. Among a number of other reasons that can lead a 
family to abandon cutting, the health consequences of cutting were a recurrent theme, from both 
key informants and FGD participants across all villages and in both countries. Respondents’ 
knowledge of the health consequences of FGM/C seemingly came from the media (radio, TV), 
during the awareness-raising campaigns, but also from the lived experience of witnessing a 
cutting that turned out particularly poorly. Some people have seen the disadvantages of FGM/C 
for themselves and have learned that there are enormous risks to continuing the practice. 
In addition to abandoning FGM/C for health reasons, some people have abandoned or said they 
would abandon FGM/C because they are sacred of legal consequences. This is particularly true 
in Burkina Faso, but also in Mali, despite the fact that there is no FGM/C law in place there. 
People in Mali are scared about the health consequences of FGM/C that may land them in jail (a 
huge hemorrhage or the death of the girl). The narratives below, from women FGDs participants, 
provide great summaries of the health consequences argument for abandoning the practice.  
"I fully agree that we must abandon FGM/C. Our old lady [mother-in-law] insisted that my three 
daughters be cut. Long before we travelled to the cutter, she had talked about the two girls 
because my third daughter was always on my back. However, along the way, she changed her 
mind and told me that all three of my daughters must be cut. Once it was done, for the youngest 
one, it healed in less than a week. On the other hand, for the second one, we were very hot [hard 
time] because it bled so much that I didn’t know which Saint to dedicate myself to; I regretted that 
so much and it took the intervention of a parent to stop the bleeding; he was the one who came 
to talk; we had to talk and finally we had to do what we didn't want to in order to stop the 
bleeding. Since that day, I am concerned, I no longer agree with FGM/C.”  
Female, 35+FGD, Boura, Mali 
“I told you about the story of my daughter. It was SOPAL [local medication] that we used to have 
the bleeding stop. That day, we did everything, but we couldn’t take her to the hospital. And 
when someone advised us to use SOPAL and we applied it, the blood stopped flowing.” 
 Female, FGD 35+, Koury, Mali 
“I have five daughters and it is only the elder who has not been able to escape FGM/C, otherwise 
the other four are not cut. People brag about this issue of FGM/C, but not everyone does it; there 
are some who have categorically refused to do so. I witnessed a case, and had it not been for my 
intervention, the girl was going to die. She could not be taken to the hospital because people 
were asked not to practise cutting anymore. So, after having cut the girl in question, at night her 
parents came to wake me up because the girl was constantly bleeding. I washed the wound with 
saltwater and the blood stopped flowing. Around 3 a.m., the bleeding started again, and the 
parents came to call me again; I did the same thing, i.e., I washed the wound with saltwater. The 
night was also the same scenario and the child was at the end of her strength, yet she kept 
bleeding. I had to go to the Catholic mission to ask the priest for help. He gave me cotton, 
compress and Betadine because he thought someone had hurt himself. This allowed the blood 
flow to stop. We continued this way until the wound healed. Then I went back to give the rest to 
the priest, and he asked me what had happened, but I didn’t tell him the truth. I figured the most 
important thing was that he had just saved a life. If I had told him the truth that day, he wasn’t 
going to give me the medicine and the child would die because we didn’t have time to hang out 
anymore.” 
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 Female, FGD 35+, Boura, Mali 
An essential part of the health consequences story is the impact of health workers on convincing 
some parents to abandon the practice or at least to say that they would do so. Female FGD 
participants regularly talked about the health workers who told them not to cut their daughters 
anymore because of the health consequences associated with the practice. Given that women 
are often the ones within the family who brings any unwell kids to a community health worker, 
women may be scared that health workers will find out about any continued practise of FGM/C 
during health visits. Health workers also take the opportunity during medical visits to talk and 
educate mothers about the consequences of FGM/C. The transcript excerpts below should help 
illustrate the importance of community health workers to FGM/C abandonment. 
“We do not do it anymore because the doctors told us not to.” 
Male, KII, Faramana, Burkina Faso 
“We followed what the health workers told us. I learned with the health workers who told us not to 
cut the girls anymore” 
Female, KII, Faramana, Burkina Faso 
“The government has even made a decision to put an end to FGM/C in all our health centres. I 
had to post it here in the centre; but if I make the posters, the wind will take them away. 
Otherwise it is forbidden and in case someone is caught in it, I don't know how it will happen; 
because they told you it is forbidden and you dare to do it; so if they take you, you will be 
punished, according to the laws in force.” 
Male, KII, Koury, Mali 
Consequences for the uncut girl 
Qualitative participants stated that there are two types of consequences for uncut girls. The 
positive one is that nothing will happen to her. She will be accepted in the community, she will 
get married, have children with no problem, and she will not suffer during childbirth. Indeed, 
unless a woman’s husband speaks about it openly, no one will know that she is uncut. 
Participants who were more against FGM/C in Burkina Faso and Mali were more likely to say 
that nothing will happen to an uncut woman or girl. In Burkina Faso, where the law bans FGM/C 
and where people are only cutting underground, respondents refused to say anything negative 
about uncut girls. Even in Mali, which has no FGM/C law, people are scared that cutting may turn 
out badly, thus, no one would say anything negative about the consequences for uncut women 
and girls. Instead they said some people would even congratulate the family who decides not to 
cut its girls.  
“Nothing will happen to the uncut girls in our community. I personally know girls in the situation 
who got married, who have not suffered anything, and who have even had children; absolutely 
nothing will happen to them.” 
Female, KII, Faramana, Burkina Faso 
Despite these progressive attitudes among some, other participants reported that people in 
communities that still believe FGM/C is a good thing will see an uncut girl differently. She can 
face mockery from others and people may fear approaching her. An uncut girl will also face 
problems when it comes time for her to get married. If she marries in a community where FGM/C 
is practised, she may be marginalised. It is even possible that no man in the community would 
like to marry her. Importantly, all of these perceptions of uncut girls are linked to the perceived 
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benefits of the cutting. In Mali, the uncut girl is called a blakoro [someone who is immature, 
impure], a negative word that shows that an uncut girl is not like other pure women.  
 “The girl is considered as it is said in Bambara language a ‘blakoro‘ [an uncut woman], she is not 
a perfect woman.” 
Male, KII, Koury, Mali 
“I know that it is at the weddings that people often say that this girl is not cut. It seems that there 
are even girls who have even been sent back to their parents because they were not cut. I 
haven't seen these cases, but I've heard a lot about them. This means that for many parents, it is 
what pushes them to cut their daughters. They do not want her husband one day to repudiate her 
because she is not cut”. 
Male, KII Health, Faramana, Burkina Faso 
Consequences for the uncut girl’s parents 
When respondents were asked what would happen to parents who refused to cut their 
daughters, qualitative responses were also divided. Most participants responded that nothing 
would happen to them because everyone knows that FGM/C has many disadvantages and is 
illegal. Such attitudes prevail, even in Mali, where FGM/C per se is not illegal. However, others 
believe that they will face social isolation and marginalisation because they will have betrayed 
their community rules by failing to practise FGM/C. Being ostracised or socially dead in such 
communities can cause psychosocial trauma. The below transcript excerpt shows how some 
respondents view the social isolation that can result from FGM/C abandonment. 
“I think that socially the family will be indexed. Well, actually that's the main thing I see, since you 
belong to a community that has its laws. When you challenge these laws, it's like you're getting 
out of the community. So that's what it's all about, this isolation, your way of seeing things that 
makes you leave the community. You have refused to respect the rules on a customary level and 
that is what can put you aside, that is what I see.” 
Male, KII, Tansila, Burkina Faso 
The duelling perceptions of the consequences of FGM/C abandonment for uncut girls and their 
parents confirm that there has been a positive shift in perceptions and behaviours. However, it 
also shows there is some resistance that supports FGM/C as a social norm (Mackie 2017; 
Cislaghi and Heise 2017) under which one is expected to conform to what others do and expect 
you to do. The social rejection and the shame associated with not conforming to what the 
majority do, or are perceived to do, can force an individual to conform, even relatively unwillingly, 
to a practise that they may not agree with.  
 
Discussion  
As with previous studies (Diop et al., 2008; GRIGED 2008; UNFPA 2016; CNLPE 2016a, 2016b; 
Crisman et al. 2016), we find that FGM/C in our study communities is still strongly linked to 
cultural, societal, and religious beliefs that demand that women and girls undergo the practise. 
This perception can lead to the stigmatisation and isolation of uncut girls and their parents, 
particularly in communities in Mali, where adult women ask to be cut in order to lessen the social 
pressure. 
While FGM/C persists in both Burkina Faso and Mali, the government of Burkina Faso has taken 
measures to curb and eradicate the practise. The government of Mali, in contrast, has not 
passed a law that specifically criminalises FGM/C. Many draft laws have received “continued 
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objections, particularly from high-profile religious leaders who support the practise” (28TooMany 
2018). However, the Malian government does have a strategy in put an end to FGM/C. In 2002 it 
established the National Programme for the Fight against Excision (Programme National de Lutte 
pour l’abandon de l’Excision) (PNLE); it also adopted a National Action Plan that addresses 
FGM/C for the period 2015–19. It is against this backdrop that our study was conducted in three 
pair villages along the Burkina Faso–Mali border. Its findings are revealing. 
Perhaps the most interesting relates to legal knowledge, with 87% and 80% of respondents in 
Burkina Faso and Mali, respectively, thinking that FGM/C is illegal in their country. Burkina 
Faso’s FGM/C law was also well known by our qualitative respondents and this is consistent with 
previous research conducted in Burkina Faso (CNLPE 2016a, 2016b; UNFPA 2016). Mali, 
however, has no such law.  Despite this, many respondents in Mali seem to think that the 
practise is in fact illegal there. The number of people who report FGM/C to be illegal in Mali is 
lower than it is in Burkina, which suggests that the law appears to be working in Burkina, but we 
still need to explain why respondents in Mali are so wrong (in a good way) about FGM/C law in 
their own country. 
We also found out that respect for the law was the main reason that motivated respondents 
individually to obey the law while they believed that fear of social sanctions motivated others to 
do so, and not fear of punishment in the first instance. Overall, 64% of respondents in both 
countries (67% in Burkina Faso and 61% in Mali) believed people had an obligation to comply 
with a law prohibiting FGM/C. This moral obligation is a key motivation behind legal obedience. 
Our results also confirm what is already known: FGM/C is a practise driven by social norms, 
which is the social expectations that members of a group hold of one another (Mackie et al. 
2015). When asked whether they would pursue FGM/C if everyone in their community were to 
stop it, 83.3% and 76.6% of respondents in Burkina Faso and Mali, respectively, said they would 
stop the practise. This suggests that the fight against the practice should continue to focus on a 
variety of efforts at the community level and, particularly, ones that work through community 
leaders as key players reaching consensus on abandonment. The Mali–Burkina Faso 
comparison showed that law interacts with other motivations and with the ultimate decision to 
continue or stop FGM/C. 
Legal pluralism (multiple legal authorities) was predominant, in terms of conflicts resolution as 
well as regulating people’s behaviours. Statutory and customary law are sometimes in conflict, 
including on women’s and girls’ rights issues such as child marriage, FGM/C, and access to land 
for women. Interventions for FGM/C abandonment should recognise the fact of legal pluralism 
where it exists. Disobedience of FGM/C law in the context of legal pluralism was also a matter of 
allegiance to conflicting customary or religious authorities. Though FGM/C is the crux of this 
study, these findings have implications for other areas in plural legal contexts. 
The relationship between child/early marriage and FGM/C is also an important, and somewhat 
expected finding from our qualitative data. Child/early marriage is a form of gender-based 
violence and is just as harmful a practise to girls as FGM/C, which was pointed out by many 
qualitative respondents.  
“If you get married when you are still a child, you will suffer enormously: if you get pregnant, your 
delivery could be difficult […]”  
Female, FGD, Faramana, Burkina Faso.  
Interestingly, qualitative FGD respondents from some communities in Burkina Faso (Faramana 
and Koloko) were keener to speak openly about child marriage (also illegal) and its 
manifestations than they were about FGM/C. This openness and close relationship between two 
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harmful practises also suggest how Burkina Faso’s FGM/C law has affected perceptions at the 
community level. 
In addition, health workers seemed to have tremendous influence on women in our study 
communities.  They are a respected source of knowledge regarding FGM/C prohibition and 
health consequences. Many female participants reported that they have stopped cutting their 
daughters because health workers told them to stop. Health workers also provide confidence to 
women who face social pressure to cut their daughters. Our findings suggest that health workers 
are agents of change and play an important role in the abandonment process. They should be 
receiving more support from their respective governments to continue to advise and advocate for 
the abandonment of FGM/C, not only among their female patients, but among all patients in the 
community, particularly as fear of health consequences is a key driver of FGM/C abandonment 
within these communities.  
 
Limitations 
Contamination: The study was designed to minimise possible contamination, i.e., participants 
from village A talking about the study to people from village B. This was accomplished by way of 
a minimum distance between each pair village of 30 km. There may have been some 
contamination beyond our control, but we expect from our experience on the ground that this was 
minimal. 
KII sample: We selected our key informants to obtain a diversity of roles and positions within 
each community with the goal of gathering diverse, in-depth information on our topics of interest. 
We interviewed the maximum number of key informants available, but we may not have reached 
saturation where the samples were relatively small (seven in Boura vs. 12 in Finkolo).  
FGD sample: We recruited participants through community facilitators in each village to ensure 
diversity and inclusion. We asked them to assist our team leader to recruit participants widely. 
Our team leader was present during the whole process with participants, but we had no means to 
control whether participants with different points of view were excluded.  
FGM/C law in Burkina Faso: Measures were taken to build trust with the study participants and 
to ensure they were at ease participating in the study; this included providing information on 
anonymity and confidentially of the data and random selection of quantitative survey participants. 
However, given that FGM/C is criminal in Burkina Faso and people do know of prosecutions, this 
may have hindered their responses. Our experience suggests that most participants felt little fear 
and were forthcoming, but this cannot be totally excluded as a source of data contamination.  
Security situation: The data were collected in a very insecure environment, we may not have 
been able to reach as many participants as we would have liked. The cross-border methodology 
demanded that data collectors leave villages as quickly as possible. With more time, we may 
have been able to reach other participants who were absent, resulting in more diverse data.  
The list experiment: The list experiment, which was designed to get around various respondent 
biases and to provide a more accurate estimate of planned future prevalence than possible using 
other methodological approaches, also has limitations. For instance, it is possible, despite the 
anonymity provided by the list experiment, that respondents will still seek to hide any intention of 
practising FGM/C. If this is true, the prevalence rates we find here would be underestimates.  It is 
also possible that respondents might plan to practise FGM/C in the future but fail to carry out 
these intentions due to a variety of intervening factors, including frustration of efforts by 
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authorities.  In this case, the prevalence rates we find would be overestimates.  Unfortunately, 
there are few ways to reduce remaining limitations of the list experiment approach. 
Researchers’ triangulation: Given the impossibility of getting a sample of transcripts translated 
from French into English, the co-PI was unable to access the qualitative data and to largely 
contribute to the interpretation. To try to mitigate this, the team held regular meetings as the 
analysis progresses to discuss the emerging themes from the data in French. 
 
Conclusion  
The shift towards FGM/C abandonment is occurring in Burkina Faso. The list experiment results 
confirm this trend; there is a very clear cross-border difference for each of the village pairs, with 
higher reported rates of planned FGM/C in Mali than in Burkina Faso. This suggests that the law 
is working in Burkina Faso and that some combination of harsh enforcement and complementary 
implementation efforts have been beneficial. In Burkina Faso, participants have strong 
knowledge of FGM/C law, confirmed previous findings. The Mali results on legal knowledge 
(Koury 73%, Finkolo 81%, and Boura 83%) believing that FGM/C is illegal) are unexpected and 
fascinating. This is important in terms of future efforts to pass an FGM/C law in Mali. Awareness 
of health consequences and the risk of a girl’s death, in addition to respect for the law, drives 
some families to abandon the practise or at least say they will do so. Health workers and local 
leaders seemingly play a key role in the shift towards abandonment.  
These above positive results are complicated by the persistence of attitudes, beliefs, and 
perceptions that FGM/C still has many advantages. There are still many people who strongly 
support FGM/C, even in Burkina Faso, where projected prevalence is very low. Further research 
should explore the extent of this resistance, its motivations and causes, in order to discern the 
abandonment message that is best suited to the specific contexts of those people who have 
resisted all actions taken so far.  
 
Implications for Policy/Programmes/Research 
Programmatic suggestions 
• Strengthen the role of health workers as agents of change in all interventions aiming to 
eliminate FGM/C in both countries.  
Policy suggestions 
• Continue to pursue the sensitisation and awareness-raising efforts implemented by the 
government of Burkina Faso over the last 20 years. As part of this, the FGM/C law was 
translated into the three main local languages (Mooré, Dioula, and Fulfuldé) and 
communicated via local radio. This strategy may even be working beyond the border, as 
evidenced by the data on legal knowledge in Malian pair villages. The local language of all 
six pair villages is Dioula, which means that messages delivered via radio reach communities 
on both sides of the border. 
• Implement and strengthen international coordination to eliminate cross-border FGM/C. Our 
results revealed that regional cooperation is necessary to curb FGM/C in the border area. 
Instead of passing a different law in Mali, a regional law that is effectively applied in both 
neighbouring countries would be an effective tool given the legal knowledge of Malian 
respondents indicated by our findings. A regional law that intensifies efforts at the 
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community-level across the border should help to reduce the underground practise of cross-
border FGM/C.  
• Engage with local leaders to encourage abandonment. We find that customary law is strong 
in our study communities and that the village chief is primarily responsible for conflict 
resolution, though he often consults other key community members (imam, land chief) 
depending on the nature of the conflict. This means that approaches to end FGM/C will be 
more effective when powerful and influential leaders are on board. The government of 
Burkina Faso has experience implementing FGM/C law through community leaders, where 
village chiefs, imams, and other influential people are involved in all community interventions. 
• Develop strategies, particularly in Mali, to convince religious leaders (who have tremendous 
influence) to ask followers to stop pursuing the practise. 
• Experiment interventions using acceptable alternatives to FGM/C, such as other harmless 
rites of passage to replace FGM/C in areas where there has been resistance to all actions 
undertaken to date combat the practise. 
Research Suggestions 
• Conduct research to better understand the source of knowledge for people in Mali who think 
that FGM/C is illegal in their country and to better understand the dissonance between 
individual/local acceptance of the behaviour and attitudes that FGM/C is nationally 
unacceptable. Future efforts should investigate any and all factors explaining why the 
practise persists despite acknowledgement of the unacceptability and the illegality of the 
practise. 
• Scale up cross-border research to include other countries neighbouring Burkina Faso that 
have an FGM/C a law (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Niger) and where Burkinabe families also cross 
the border to have their daughters undergo the practice (GRIGED 2008; UNFPA 2016). 
Replicate the list experiment to assess the effect or contribution of the law and strengthen the 
findings. This methodology can easily be applied to other countries that want to assess the 
cross-border effects of their law. 
• Despite a shift to FGM/C abandonment in Burkina Faso, there are still some families that 
continue to practise FGM/C and plan to do so in the future. They are strong supporters of the 
practice and their attitudes, behaviours, and perceptions are linked to the advantages of the 
practice, as well as cultural and social reasons. Underground continuation of the practise, 
such as cross-border FGM/C, cutting girls at young age, and cutting during the rainy season, 
is therefore not surprising. Medicalisation is also occurring in some settings. A sound 
anthropological study involving the community-level immersion of involved researchers may 
help to provide in-depth knowledge about how to persuade deep supporters of FGM/C to 
abandon the practise. The design of this study could be informed by lessons learned in other 
settings where increased abandonment has taken place.  
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Appendices  
Table 1: Types of disputes and conflict resolution mechanisms 
  Faramana Koury Koloko Finkolo Tansila Boura 
 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=103) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=101) 
Female 
(N=99) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(101) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=101) 
Q24. Give an example of a problem or a conflict that the members of your community encounter often 
  Conflict between breeders and 
farmers 29 (29.0) 27 (26.2) 34 (33.3) 27 (27.0) 30 (29.7) 27 (27.3) 25 (25.0) 32 (31.7) 25 (25.3) 21 (21.0) 26 (25.5) 29 (28.7) 
  Land conflict 37 (37.0) 37 (35.9) 40 (39.2) 34 (34.0) 59 (58.4) 52 (52.5) 61 (61.0) 53 (52.5) 44 (44.4) 52 (52.0) 52 (51.0) 41 (40.6) 
  Conflict of ethnic/nationality 
affiliation 7 (7.0) 5 (4.9) 1 (1.0) 3 (3.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (2.0) 4 (4.0) 2 (2.0) 3 (2.9) 4 (4.0) 
  Conflict relating to 
culture/traditions/customs 10 (10.0) 11 (10.7) 10 (9.8) 12 (12.0) 4 (4.0) 5 (5.1) 4 (4.0) 5 (5.0) 13 (13.1) 18 (18.0) 8 (7.8) 10 (9.9) 
  Other 17 (17.0) 23 (22.3) 17 (16.7) 24 (24.0) 7 (6.9) 14 (14.1) 10 (10.0) 9 (8.9) 13 (13.1) 7 (7.0) 13 (12.7) 17 (16.8) 
Q50: Thinking about the rules in terms of what is required, permitted, or prohibited in this community, which has the most influence on what community members do? 
  The national government 23 (23.0) 21 (20.4) 22 (21.6) 23 (23.0) 34 (33.7) 29 (29.3) 26 (26.0) 20 (19.8) 32 (32.0) 31 (31.0) 25 (24.5) 27 (26.7) 
  The local government 40 (40.0) 26 (25.2) 19 (18.6) 21 (21.0) 36 (35.6) 34 (34.3) 24 (24.0) 38 (37.6) 53 (53.0) 44 (44.0) 44 (43.1) 44 (43.6) 
  Traditional authorities 28 (28.0) 33 (32.0) 48 (47.1) 46 (46.0) 27 (26.7) 30 (30.3) 37 (37.0) 28 (27.7) 12 (12.0) 20 (20.0) 33 (32.4) 28 (27.7) 
  Religious authorities 6 (6.0) 17 (16.5) 8 (7.8) 5 (5.0) 3 (3.0) 5 (5.1) 13 (13.0) 15 (14.9) 3 (3.0) 2 (2.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (2.0) 
  Other [ask who:] 2 (2.0) 1 (1.0) 2 (2.0) 2 (2.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
  Don't know 1 (1.0) 5 (4.9) 3 (2.9) 3 (3.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
  Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
 
Table 2 : Legal obligation 
 Faramana Koury Koloko Finkolo Tansila Boura 
  
Male  
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=103) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=101) 
Female 
(N=99) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(101) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=101) 
Q112. To the best of your knowledge, is female genital mutilation/cutting legal in Burkina Faso/Mali? 
  Yes 6 (6.0) 8 (7.8) 14 (13.7) 15 (15.0) 6 (5.9) 11 (11.1) 17 (17.0) 18 (17.8) 7 (7.0) 7 (7.0) 11 (10.8) 14 (13.9) 
  No 88 (88.0) 78 (75.7) 83 (81.4) 65 (65.0) 94 (93.1) 85 (85.9) 83 (83.0) 80 (79.2) 87 (87.0) 91 (91.0) 89 (87.3) 82 (81.2) 
  Don't know 6 (6.0) 17 (16.5) 5 (4.9) 20 (20.0) 1 (1.0) 3 (3.0) 0 (0.0) 3 (3.0) 6 (6.0) 2 (2.0) 2 (2.0) 5 (5.0) 
Q113. To the best of your knowledge, is cutting wood in the forest/bush legal in Burkina Faso/Mali? 
  Yes 11 (11.0) 9 (8.7) 33 (32.4) 19 (19.0) 1 (1.0) 5 (5.1) 28 (28.0) 30 (29.7) 9 (9.0) 16 (8.0) 19 (18.6) 17 (16.8) 
  No 83 (83.0) 88 (85.4) 63 (61.8) 62 (62.0) 100 (99.0) 93 (93.9) 71 (71.0) 66 (65.3) 87 (87.0) 179 (89.5) 83 (81.4) 82 (81.2) 
  Don't know 6 (6.0) 6 (5.8) 6 (5.9) 18 (18.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 4 (4.0) 4 (4.0) 5 (2.5) 0 (0.0) 2 (2.0) 
Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Q114. To the best of your knowledge, is paying police a bribe to avoid trouble legal in Burkina Faso/Mali? 
  Yes 18 (18.0) 16 (15.5) 22 (21.6) 15 (15.0) 8 (7.9) 9 (9.1) 23 (23.0) 31 (30.7) 5 (5.0) 13 (6.5) 11 (10.8) 16 (15.8) 
  No 74 (74.0) 82 (79.6) 68 (66.7) 70 (70.0) 93 (92.1) 89 (89.9) 77 (77.0) 69 (68.3) 94 (94.0) 185 (92.5) 89 (87.3) 83 (82.2) 
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 Faramana Koury Koloko Finkolo Tansila Boura 
  
Male  
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=103) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=101) 
Female 
(N=99) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(101) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=101) 
  Don't know 7 (7.0) 3 (2.9) 12 (11.8) 15 (15.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 2 (1.0) 2 (2.0) 2 (2.0) 
Refused to answer 1 (1.0) 2 (1.9) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Q115. In your opinion, do people have a legal obligation to comply with a law prohibiting female genital mutilation/cutting? 
  Yes 64 (64.0) 64 (62.1) 62 (60.8) 51 (51.0) 71 (70.3) 69 (69.7) 59 (59.0) 54 (53.5) 67 (67.0) 66 (66.0) 75 (73.5) 71 (70.3) 
  No 33 (33.0) 25 (24.3) 36 (35.3) 34 (34.0) 30 (29.7) 30 (30.3) 41 (41.0) 45 (44.6) 33 (33.0) 34 (34.0) 27 (26.5) 28 (27.7) 
  Don't know 3 (3.0) 14 (13.6) 4 (3.9) 15 (15.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (2.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (2.0) 
Q116. In your opinion, do people have a legal obligation to comply with a law prohibiting cutting wood in the forest/bush? 
  Yes 82 (82.0) 73 (70.9) 55 (53.9) 52 (52.0) 81 (80.2) 78 (78.8) 40 (40.0) 49 (48.5) 77 (77.0) 68 (68.0) 69 (67.6) 59 (58.4) 
  No 17 (17.0) 25 (24.3) 44 (43.1) 39 (39.0) 20 (19.8) 21 (21.2) 60 (60.0) 52 (51.5) 22 (22.0) 31 (31.0) 33 (32.4) 42 (41.6) 
  Don't know 1 (1.0) 5 (4.9) 3 (2.9) 7 (7.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Refused to Answer 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (2.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Q117. In your opinion, do people have a legal obligation to comply with a law prohibiting paying police a bribe to avoid trouble? 
  Yes 67 (67.0) 63 (61.2) 54 (52.9) 50 (50.0) 73 (72.3) 72 (72.7) 49 (49.0) 47 (46.5) 72 (72.0) 68 (68.0) 65 (63.7) 60 (59.4) 
  No 31 (31.0) 34 (33.0) 44 (43.1) 44 (44.0) 28 (27.7) 27 (27.3) 51 (51.0) 54 (53.5) 28 (28.0) 31 (31.0) 37 (36.3) 41 (40.6) 
  Don't know 1 (1.0) 6 (5.8) 4 (3.9) 5 (5.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Refused to answer 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
 
Table 3: Source of information about the law 
  Faramana  Koury Koloko Finkolo Tansila Boura 
  
Male  
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=103) 
 Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=101) 
Female 
(N=99) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(101) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=101) 
Legal knowledge [formal law]                          
  Radio 40 (40.0) 34 (33.0) 
 
60 (58.8) 
42 
(42.0) 38 (37.6) 34 (34.3) 62 (62.0) 
55 
(54.5) 58 (58.0) 50 (50.0) 65 (63.7) 59 (58.4) 
  Television 17 (17.0) 13 (12.6) 
 
17 (16.7) 
16 
(16.0) 32 (31.7) 27 (27.3) 24 (24.0) 
20 
(19.8) 16 (16.0) 19 (19.0) 17 (16.7) 17 (16.8) 
 Newspapers/magazines 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)  0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (2.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (2.0) 0 (0.0) 3 (3.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 
  Family/friends/community 18 (18.0) 33 (32.0) 
 
9 (8.8) 
26 
(26.0) 15 (14.9) 26 (26.3) 4 (4.0) 
14 
(13.9) 12 (12.0) 24 (24.0) 5 (4.9) 10 (9.9) 
  Observation (do as everyone else 
does) 4 (4.0) 8 (7.8) 
 
3 (2.9) 2 (2.0) 4 (4.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 3 (3.0) 5 (5.0) 3 (3.0) 3 (2.9) 6 (5.9) 
  Elected officials 15 (15.0) 7 (6.8)  3 (2.9) 5 (5.0) 2 (2.0) 5 (5.1) 5 (5.0) 6 (5.9) 5 (5.0) 2 (2.0) 9 (8.8) 7 (6.9) 
  Traditional authorities 0 (0.0) 4 (3.9)  7 (6.9) 2 (2.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 2 (2.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
  Religious authorities 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0)  1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
  Other 4 (4.0) 2 (1.9)  2 (2.0) 3 (3.0) 7 (6.9) 5 (5.1) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 2 (2.0) 1 (1.0) 
  Don't know 1 (1.0) 2 (1.9)  0 (0.0) 3 (3.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Legal knowledge [customary law]                          
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  Faramana  Koury Koloko Finkolo Tansila Boura 
  
Male  
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=103) 
 Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=101) 
Female 
(N=99) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(101) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=101) 
  Radio 2 (2.0) 1 (1.0)  7 (6.9) 9 (9.0) 1 (1.0) 2 (2.0) 5 (5.0) 6 (5.9) 2 (2.0) 5 (5.0) 9 (8.8) 11 (10.9) 
  Television 4 (4.0) 0 (0.0)  1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 2 (2.0) 2 (2.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 
  Family/friends/community 32 (32.0) 35 (34.0) 
 
36 (35.3) 
38 
(38.0) 38 (37.6) 48 (48.5) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 32 (31.4) 37 (36.6) 
  Observation (do as everyone else 
does) 14 (14.0) 20 (19.4) 
 
9 (8.8) 9 (9.0) 8 (7.9) 12 (12.1) 28 (28.0) 
48 
(47.5) 42 (42.0) 51 (51.0) 20 (19.6) 16 (15.8) 
  Elected officials 3 (3.0) 0 (0.0) 
 
5 (4.9) 5 (5.0) 4 (4.0) 7 (7.1) 10 (10.0) 
14 
(13.9) 15 (15.0) 18 (18.0) 2 (2.0) 2 (2.0) 
  Traditional authorities 41 (41.0) 42 (40.8) 
 
40 (39.2) 
32 
(32.0) 42 (41.6) 24 (24.2) 5 (5.0) 2 (2.0) 5 (5.0) 3 (3.0) 34 (33.3) 29 (28.7) 
  Religious authorities 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 
 
3 (2.9) 3 (3.0) 2 (2.0) 1 (1.0) 40 (40.0) 
25 
(24.8) 33 (33.0) 20 (20.0) 4 (3.9) 4 (4.0) 
  Other 2 (2.0) 2 (1.9)  0 (0.0) 3 (3.0) 4 (4.0) 3 (3.0) 11 (11.0) 5 (5.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 
  Don't know 2 (2.0) 2 (1.9)  1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
 
Table 4 : Legal punishment 
  Faramana Koury Koloko Finkolo Tansila Boura 
Columns by: Gender 
Male  
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=103) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=101) 
Female 
(N=99) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(101) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=101) 
Q118. To your knowledge, has anyone you know of ever been legally punished for having practised female genital mutilation/cutting? 
  Yes 18 (18.0) 12 (11.7) 28 (27.5) 25 (25.0) 22 (21.8) 16 (16.2) 25 (25.0) 21 (20.8) 28 (28.0) 21 (21.0) 21 (20.6) 17 (16.8) 
  No 80 (80.0) 84 (81.6) 70 (68.6) 67 (67.0) 78 (77.2) 82 (82.8) 74 (74.0) 78 (77.2) 70 (70.0) 78 (78.0) 81 (79.4) 83 (82.2) 
  Don't know 2 (2.0) 7 (6.8) 4 (3.9) 7 (7.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 2 (2.0) 2 (2.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 
  Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Q121. Under the law, who is punishable for having practised female genital mutilation/cutting? 
The practitioner who performs the 
operation 70 (70.0) 66 (64.1) 41 (40.2) 39 (39.0) 75 (74.3) 84 (84.8) 41 (41.0) 50 (49.5) 79 (79.0) 75 (75.0) 73 (71.6) 76 (75.2) 
The parents of the cut daughter 65 (65.0) 55 (53.4) 44 (43.1) 50 (50.0) 67 (66.3) 64 (64.6) 44 (44.0) 39 (38.6) 79 (79.0) 66 (66.0) 58 (56.9) 59 (58.4) 
The cut daughter 0 (0.0) 2 (1.9) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 2 (2.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 
Anyone with knowledge of the 
cutting 15 (15.0) 26 (25.2) 6 (5.9) 7 (7.0) 14 (13.9) 12 (12.1) 8 (8.0) 5 (5.0) 16 (16.0) 9 (9.0) 10 (9.8) 8 (7.9) 
Don't know 2 (2.0) 7 (6.8) 33 (32.4) 25 (25.0) 4 (4.0) 2 (2.0) 33 (33.0) 30 (29.7) 5 (5.0) 8 (8.0) 5 (4.9) 7 (6.9) 
Q124. To the best of your knowledge, what is the punishment for having practised female genital mutilation/cutting? 
  Verbal or written warning 22 (22.0) 19 (18.4) 22 (21.6) 22 (22.0) 13 (12.9) 19 (19.2) 24 (24.0) 26 (25.7) 13 (13.0) 26 (26.0) 19 (18.6) 26 (25.7) 
  Imprisonment 20 (20.0) 22 (21.4) 16 (15.7) 13 (13.0) 23 (22.8) 23 (23.2) 15 (15.0) 11 (10.9) 23 (23.0) 25 (25.0) 29 (28.4) 19 (18.8) 
  A fine 21 (21.0) 27 (26.2) 32 (31.4) 30 (30.0) 31 (30.7) 23 (23.2) 28 (28.0) 23 (22.8) 29 (29.0) 22 (22.0) 28 (27.5) 30 (29.7) 
  No sanction 16 (16.0) 17 (16.5) 19 (18.6) 18 (18.0) 23 (22.8) 23 (23.2) 31 (31.0) 36 (35.6) 26 (26.0) 23 (23.0) 22 (21.6) 22 (21.8) 
  Other sanction [specify] 7 (7.0) 1 (1.0) 5 (4.9) 1 (1.0) 7 (6.9) 5 (5.1) 2 (2.0) 3 (3.0) 6 (6.0) 2 (2.0) 2 (2.0) 2 (2.0) 
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  Don't know 14 (14.0) 17 (16.5) 7 (6.9) 15 (15.0) 4 (4.0) 6 (6.1) 0 (0.0) 2 (2.0) 3 (3.0) 2 (2.0) 2 (2.0) 2 (2.0) 
  Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
 
Table 5: Who enforces the law? 
  Faramana Koury Koloko Finkolo Tansila Boura 
Columns by: Gender 
Male  
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=103) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=101) 
Female 
(N=99) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(101) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=101) 
Q127.  To the best of your knowledge, who enforces the law against female genital mutilation/cutting? 
  The police/gendarmerie 57 (57.0) 56 (54.4) 60 (58.8) 60 (60.0) 58 (57.4) 70 (70.7) 64 (64.0) 68 (67.3) 66 (66.0) 81 (81.0) 68 (66.7) 71 (70.3) 
  The courts 14 (14.0) 9 (8.7) 12 (11.8) 4 (4.0) 13 (12.9) 11 (11.1) 12 (12.0) 6 (5.9) 12 (12.0) 6 (6.0) 12 (11.8) 7 (6.9) 
  The Social Action 
Services 3 (3.0) 4 (3.9) 4 (3.9) 5 (5.0) 14 (13.9) 6 (6.1) 7 (7.0) 7 (6.9) 4 (4.0) 3 (3.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 
  Somebody else 7 (7.0) 2 (1.9) 10 (9.8) 6 (6.0) 8 (7.9) 7 (7.1) 11 (11.0) 11 (10.9) 9 (9.0) 5 (5.0) 14 (13.7) 14 (13.9) 
  Don't know 18 (18.0) 32 (31.1) 16 (15.7) 24 (24.0) 8 (7.9) 5 (5.1) 6 (6.0) 9 (8.9) 9 (9.0) 5 (5.0) 7 (6.9) 8 (7.9) 
  Refused to answer 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Q130. If someone were to organise the cutting of a girl/woman, do you think that person would be punished? 
  Yes 64 (64.0) 52 (50.5) 59 (57.8) 55 (55.0) 73 (72.3) 72 (72.7) 47 (47.0) 49 (48.5) 67 (67.0) 70 (70.0) 62 (60.8) 59 (58.4) 
  No 28 (28.0) 34 (33.0) 36 (35.3) 30 (30.0) 28 (27.7) 26 (26.3) 52 (52.0) 47 (46.5) 31 (31.0) 27 (27.0) 38 (37.3) 39 (38.6) 
  Don't know 8 (8.0) 17 (16.5) 7 (6.9) 14 (14.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 5 (5.0) 2 (2.0) 3 (3.0) 2 (2.0) 3 (3.0) 
  Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Thinking of the five people who know you best, if you were arrested for having practised female genital mutilation/cutting, how much would they disapprove? 
  Disapprove greatly 44 (44.0) 41 (39.8) 32 (31.4) 32 (32.0) 41 (40.6) 35 (35.4) 42 (42.0) 35 (34.7) 32 (32.0) 35 (35.0) 38 (37.3) 37 (36.6) 
  Disapprove somewhat 23 (23.0) 22 (21.4) 25 (24.5) 21 (21.0) 17 (16.8) 20 (20.2) 20 (20.0) 23 (22.8) 23 (23.0) 23 (23.0) 22 (21.6) 25 (24.8) 
  Disapprove a little 19 (19.0) 13 (12.6) 19 (18.6) 18 (18.0) 23 (22.8) 19 (19.2) 12 (12.0) 22 (21.8) 21 (21.0) 21 (21.0) 20 (19.6) 23 (22.8) 
  They would not 
disapprove 12 (12.0) 12 (11.7) 24 (23.5) 17 (17.0) 19 (18.8) 25 (25.3) 26 (26.0) 21 (20.8) 24 (24.0) 21 (21.0) 22 (21.6) 16 (15.8) 
  Don't know 2 (2.0) 15 (14.6) 2 (2.0) 11 (11.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
  Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
 
Table 6: Motivations to obey the formal law 
 Faramana Koury Koloko Finkolo Tansila Boura 
 
Male  
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=103) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=101) 
Female 
(N=99) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(101) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=101) 
Q52: Thinking about the laws of [Burkina Faso / Mali], what motivates YOU most to respect the law?  
 Because it is the law and it 
must be respected 52 (52.0) 54 (52.4) 58 (56.9) 47 (47.0) 60 (59.4) 53 (53.5) 46 (46.0) 56 (55.4) 59 (59.0) 50 (50.0) 63 (61.8) 55 (54.5) 
Pleasure of following your 
conscience 19 (19.0) 6 (5.8) 9 (8.8) 10 (10.0) 16 (15.8) 16 (16.2) 17 (17.0) 19 (18.8) 16 (16.0) 24 (24.0) 16 (15.7) 21 (20.8) 
Social esteem 3 (3.0) 5 (4.9) 4 (3.9) 4 (4.0) 6 (5.9) 2 (2.0) 4 (4.0) 8 (7.9) 2 (2.0) 9 (9.0) 7 (6.9) 7 (6.9) 
Fear of leagal sanction 20 (20.0) 27 (26.2) 12 (11.8) 14 (14.0) 8 (7.9) 9 (9.1) 11 (11.0) 13 (12.9) 15 (15.0) 6 (6.0) 5 (4.9) 7 (6.9) 
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Fear of guilt 0 (0.0) 2 (1.9) 2 (2.0) 2 (2.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 
Fear of social sanction 
(ancestors, gods) 0 (0.0) 2 (1.9) 1 (1.0) 2 (2.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Other [specify] 5 (5.0) 6 (5.8) 13 (12.7) 11 (11.0) 11 (10.9) 16 (16.2) 21 (21.0) 5 (5.0) 8 (8.0) 11 (11.0) 10 (9.8) 10 (9.9) 
Don't know 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 3 (2.9) 9 (9.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Q53: With regard to the laws [of Burkina Faso / Mali], what motivates OTHERS most to comply with them?  
Because it is the law and it 
must be respected 55 (55.0) 43 (41.7) 55 (53.9) 44 (44.0) 57 (56.4) 54 (54.5) 45 (45.0) 54 (53.5) 52 (52.0) 49 (49.0) 62 (60.8) 56 (55.4) 
 Pleasure of following your 
conscience 9 (9.0) 8 (7.8) 10 (9.8) 4 (4.0) 9 (8.9) 13 (13.1) 9 (9.0) 16 (15.8) 19 (19.0) 20 (20.0) 13 (12.7) 22 (21.8) 
Social esteem 4 (4.0) 4 (3.9) 2 (2.0) 4 (4.0) 3 (3.0) 2 (2.0) 4 (4.0) 11 (10.9) 2 (2.0) 2 (2.0) 4 (3.9) 1 (1.0) 
Fear of legal sanction 25 (25.0) 31 (30.1) 14 (13.7) 29 (29.0) 19 (18.8) 16 (16.2) 25 (25.0) 12 (11.9) 23 (23.0) 18 (18.0) 15 (14.7) 15 (14.9) 
Fear of guilt 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 2 (2.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (2.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (2.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (2.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 
Fear of social sanction 
(ancestors, gods) 0 (0.0) 5 (4.9) 5 (4.9) 4 (4.0) 3 (3.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (2.0) 2 (2.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Other 4 (4.0) 7 (6.8) 8 (7.8) 5 (5.0) 7 (6.9) 10 (10.1) 15 (15.0) 3 (3.0) 3 (3.0) 6 (6.0) 7 (6.9) 6 (5.9) 
Don't know 2 (2.0) 4 (3.9) 6 (5.9) 10 (10.0) 1 (1.0) 3 (3.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (2.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
 
Table 7: Motivations to obey the customary law 
  Faramana Koury Koloko Finkolo Tansila Boura 
  
Male  
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=103) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=101) 
Female 
(N=99) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(101) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=101) 
Q54: About the customs and traditions of your community, what motivates YOU most to follow the customary rules?  
Because it is the law and it 
must be respected 22 (22.0) 20 (19.4) 24 (23.5) 27 (27.0) 27 (26.7) 30 (30.3) 23 (23.0) 31 (30.7) 31 (31.0) 34 (34.0) 43 (42.2) 32 (31.7) 
Pleasure of following your 
conscience 13 (13.0) 6 (5.8) 11 (10.8) 17 (17.0) 21 (20.8) 10 (10.1) 18 (18.0) 18 (17.8) 23 (23.0) 21 (21.0) 23 (22.5) 21 (20.8) 
Social esteem 22 (22.0) 16 (15.5) 15 (14.7) 13 (13.0) 14 (13.9) 21 (21.2) 19 (19.0) 18 (17.8) 15 (15.0) 16 (16.0) 18 (17.6) 23 (22.8) 
Fear of legal sanction 1 (1.0) 4 (3.9) 1 (1.0) 2 (2.0) 2 (2.0) 3 (3.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (2.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Fear of guilt 5 (5.0) 1 (1.0) 3 (2.9) 3 (3.0) 2 (2.0) 4 (4.0) 2 (2.0) 1 (1.0) 5 (5.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 2 (2.0) 
Fear of the social sanctions 
(ancestors, gods) 23 (23.0) 38 (36.9) 22 (21.6) 15 (15.0) 22 (21.8) 15 (15.2) 20 (20.0) 18 (17.8) 19 (19.0) 19 (19.0) 7 (6.9) 17 (16.8) 
Other (specify) 9 (9.0) 10 (9.7) 21 (20.6) 12 (12.0) 12 (11.9) 15 (15.2) 18 (18.0) 13 (12.9) 6 (6.0) 8 (8.0) 10 (9.8) 6 (5.9) 
Don't know 5 (5.0) 8 (7.8) 5 (4.9) 10 (10.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Q55: With regard to the customs and traditions of your community, what do you think motivates OTHERS most to follow the customary rules? 
Because it is the law and it 
must be respected 20 (20.0) 17 (16.5) 24 (23.5) 22 (22.0) 27 (26.7) 31 (31.3) 24 (24.0) 28 (27.7) 31 (31.0) 35 (35.0) 40 (39.2) 32 (31.7) 
Pleasure of following your 
conscience 13 (13.0) 5 (4.9) 13 (12.7) 16 (16.0) 12 (11.9) 7 (7.1) 14 (14.0) 15 (14.9) 18 (18.0) 16 (16.0) 20 (19.6) 23 (22.8) 
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  Faramana Koury Koloko Finkolo Tansila Boura 
  
Male  
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=103) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=101) 
Female 
(N=99) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(101) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=101) 
Social esteem 18 (18.0) 18 (17.5) 12 (11.8) 9 (9.0) 9 (8.9) 15 (15.2) 15 (15.0) 15 (14.9) 14 (14.0) 7 (7.0) 14 (13.7) 9 (8.9) 
Fear of legal sanction 0 (0.0) 2 (1.9) 4 (3.9) 5 (5.0) 2 (2.0) 2 (2.0) 1 (1.0) 3 (3.0) 2 (2.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Fear of guilt 2 (2.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 5 (5.0) 4 (4.0) 32 (32.0) 33 (32.7) 1 (1.0) 4 (4.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 
Fear of the social sanctions 
(ancestors, gods) 35 (35.0) 47 (45.6) 32 (31.4) 30 (30.0) 40 (39.6) 32 (32.3) 14 (14.0) 6 (5.9) 30 (30.0) 33 (33.0) 18 (17.6) 33 (32.7) 
Other (specify) 6 (6.0) 6 (5.8) 9 (8.8) 7 (7.0) 5 (5.0) 7 (7.1) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 3 (3.0) 3 (3.0) 9 (8.8) 4 (4.0) 
Don't know 6 (6.0) 8 (7.8) 7 (6.9) 11 (11.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
 
Table 8: Reasons for disobeying the formal law in Burkina Faso and Mali 
  Faramana Koury Koloko Finkolo Tansila Boura 
  
Male  
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=103) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=101) 
Female 
(N=99) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(101) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=101) 
Q29. Why would people here think it is acceptable to disobey the official law [of Mali /Burkina Faso]? 
Contradiction with religion/ 
customs (Yes) 29 (29.0) 37 (35.9) 34 (33.3) 26 (26.0) 26 (25.7) 28 (28.3) 28 (28.0) 33 (32.7) 24 (24.0) 26 (26.0) 21 (20.6) 26 (25.7) 
I disagree with the law (Yes) 20 (20.0) 21 (20.4) 31 (30.4) 31 (31.0) 29 (28.7) 32 (32.3) 25 (25.0) 36 (35.6) 28 (28.0) 34 (34.0) 26 (25.5) 30 (29.7) 
The authorities do not obey 
the law (Yes) 14 (14.0) 16 (15.5) 26 (25.5) 15 (15.0) 16 (15.8) 19 (19.2) 32 (32.0) 22 (21.8) 28 (28.0) 26 (26.0) 36 (35.3) 24 (23.8) 
Lack of sanctions when the 
law is not enforced (Yes) 13 (13.0) 21 (20.4) 4 (3.9) 4 (4.0) 13 (12.9) 12 (12.1) 9 (9.0) 14 (13.9) 18 (18.0) 17 (17.0) 17 (16.7) 20 (19.8) 
Other (specify) (Yes) 28 (28.0) 13 (12.6) 27 (26.5) 19 (19.0) 36 (35.6) 26 (26.3) 32 (32.0) 19 (18.8) 28 (28.0) 16 (16.0) 21 (20.6) 20 (19.8) 
Don't know (Yes) 15 (15.0) 22 (21.4) 4 (3.9) 21 (21.0) 2 (2.0) 3 (3.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 
Refused to respond (Yes) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0 0 (0.0 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Q30. Why would people here say that it is permissible to disobey [Mali / Burkina Faso] customary law? 
Contradiction with the religion 
(Yes) 44 (44.0) 44 (42.7) 49 (48.0) 43 (43.0) 49 (48.5) 47 (47.5) 40 (40.0) 50 (49.5) 60 (60.0) 64 (64.0) 61 (59.8) 61 (60.4) 
The law is outdated/retrograde 
(Yes) 26 (26.0) 27 (26.2) 18 (17.6) 19 (19.0) 27 (26.7) 25 (25.3) 24 (24.0) 20 (19.8) 15 (15.0) 26 (26.0) 25 (24.5) 22 (21.8) 
Contradiction with the official 
law (Yes) 8 (8.0) 3 (2.9) 3 (2.9) 5 (5.0) 7 (6.9) 6 (6.1) 4 (4.0) 4 (4.0) 13 (13.0) 10 (10.0) 9 (8.8) 7 (6.9) 
Too restrictive (Yes) 23 (23.0) 24 (23.3) 15 (14.7) 14 (14.0) 18 (17.8) 18 (18.2) 19 (19.0) 22 (21.8) 24 (24.0) 20 (20.0) 18 (17.6) 17 (16.8) 
The law is segregationist (Yes) 9 (9.0) 10 (9.7) 10 (9.8) 3 (3.0) 13 (12.9) 4 (4.0) 14 (14.0) 9 (8.9) 8 (8.0) 7 (7.0) 7 (6.9) 9 (8.9) 
Other (specify) (Yes) 7 (7.0) 10 (9.7) 22 (21.6) 16 (16.0) 17 (16.8) 17 (17.2) 26 (26.0) 22 (21.8) 11 (11.0) 14 (14.0) 16 (15.7) 15 (14.9) 
Don't know (Yes) 10 (10.0) 13 (12.6) 5 (4.9) 16 (16.0) 1 (1.0) 2 (2.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (2.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Refused to answer (Yes) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (2.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
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Table 9: Breaking formal law 
  Faramana Koury Koloko Finkolo Tansila Boura 
It is acceptable to break 
the formal law [of Burkina 
Faso/ Mali]; 
Male  
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=103) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=101) 
Female 
(N=99) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(101) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=101) 
Q31: If this law is clearly 
against one's morals and 
principles? 59 (59.0) 61 (59.2) 64 (62.7) 61 (61.0) 63 (62.4) 70 (70.7) 63 (62.4) 70 (70.7) 65 (65.0) 70 (70.0) 67 (65.7) 65 (64.4) 
Refused to answer                         
Q32: If one would find it too 
costly to obey this law? 46 (46.0) 43 (41.7) 39 (38.2) 52 (52.0)* 44 (43.6) 44 (44.4) 44 (43.6) 44 (44.4) 33 (33.0) 44 (44.0) 41 (40.2) 52 (51.5) 
Q33: If one knows that this 
law is not enforced? 57 (57.0) 58 (56.3) 65 (63.7) 57 (57.0) 59 (58.4) 60 (60.6) 59 (58.4) 60 (60.6) 55 (55.0) 63 (63.0) 62 (60.8) 69 (68.3) 
Q34: If one knows that 
most of the people he or 
she knows best do not 
follow this law? 36 (36.0) 46 (44.7) 31 (30.4) 41 (41.0)* 31 (30.7) 39 (39.4) 31 (30.7) 39 (39.4) 24 (24.0) 43 (43.0)* 36 (35.3) 41 (40.6) 
Q35: If one knows that 
most people he or she 
knows best approve of 
breaking this law? 39 (39.0) 48 (46.6) 31 (30.4) 38 (38.0)* 34 (33.7) 40 (40.4) 34 (33.7) 40 (40.4) 29 (29.0) 44 (44.0)* 38 (37.3) 44 (43.6) 
Q36: If one does not know 
this law? 64 (64.0) 67 (65.0) 65 (63.7) 68 (68.0) 68 (67.3) 73 (73.7) 68 (67.3) 73 (73.7) 63 (63.0) 76 (76.0)* 78 (76.5) 79 (78.2) 
Q37: If one thinks that this 
law was made without 
representing the interests 
of people like him or her? 59 (59.0) 56 (54.4) 56 (54.9) 64 (64.0) 48 (47.5) 60 (60.6) 48 (47.5) 60 (60.6) 46 (46.0) 54 (54.0) 54 (52.9) 57 (56.4) 
Q38: If one knows that this 
law is enforced unfairly? 66 (66.0) 71 (68.9) 66 (64.7) 65 (65.0) 67 (66.3) 70 (70.7) 67 (66.3) 70 (70.7) 62 (62.0) 72 (72.0) 76 (74.5) 78 (77.2) 
 
Table 10: Knowledge of FGM/C practise 
 Faramana Koury Koloko Finkolo Tansila Boura 
 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=103) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=101) 
Female 
(N=99) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(101) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=101) 
Q73:Are you familiar with 
Female genital 
mutilation/cutting? 71 (71.0) 52 (50.5)* 90 (88.2) 62 (62.0)* 80 (79.2) 74 (74.7) 87 (87.0) 75 (74.3)* 82 (82.0) 73 (73.0) 91 (89.2) 75 (74.3)* 
Q76. Do you think that 
people in your community 
practise female genital 
mutliation/cutting? 51 (51.0) 48 (46.6) 68 (66.7) 51 (51.0)* 63 (62.4) 52 (52.5) 80 (80.0) 71 (70.3) 59 (59.0) 49 (49.0) 82 (80.4) 59 (58.4)* 
Q77. How many girls girls in your community do you think have been cut? 
  All the girls 12 (12.0) 9 (8.7) 18 (17.6) 17 (17.0) 8 (7.9) 8 (8.1) 15 (15.0) 20 (19.8) 4 (4.0) 6 (6.0) 6 (5.9) 4 (4.0) 
  Most girls 17 (17.0) 12 (11.7) 19 (18.6) 16 (16.0) 15 (14.9) 17 (17.2) 21 (21.0) 20 (19.8) 18 (18.0) 19 (19.0) 16 (15.7) 18 (17.8) 
  Some girls 10 (10.0) 17 (16.5) 17 (16.7) 10 (10.0) 17 (16.8) 17 (17.2) 21 (21.0) 12 (11.9) 16 (16.0) 13 (13.0) 21 (20.6) 20 (19.8) 
  A few girls 22 (22.0) 13 (12.6) 18 (17.6) 10 (10.0) 29 (28.7) 21 (21.2) 24 (24.0) 25 (24.8) 32 (32.0) 23 (23.0) 45 (44.1) 19 (18.8)* 
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 Faramana Koury Koloko Finkolo Tansila Boura 
 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=103) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=101) 
Female 
(N=99) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(101) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=101) 
  No girl 21 (21.0) 32 (31.1) 17 (16.7) 25 (25.0) 26 (25.7) 32 (32.3) 15 (15.0) 21 (20.8) 25 (25.0) 35 (35.0) 12 (11.8) 35 (34.7) 
  Don't know 18 (18.0) 20 (19.4) 13 (12.7) 22 (22.0) 6 (5.9) 4 (4.0) 4 (4.0) 3 (3.0) 5 (5.0) 4 (4.0) 2 (2.0) 5 (5.0) 
 
Table 11: Continuation/discontinuation of FGM/C 
 
  Faramana Koury Koloko Finkolo Tansila Boura 
  
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=103) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=101) 
Female 
(N=99) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(101) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=101) 
Q84. Why do you think people in your community continue to practise female genital mutilation/cutting? 
Because everyone else does it 14 (23.3) 17 (28.8) 15 (20.3) 24 (36.4) 16 (23.5) 17 (30.4) 19 (23.5) 20 (26.3) 15 (24.2) 15 (29.4) 17 (20.7) 12 (20.0) 
Religious obligations 2 (3.3) 2 (3.4) 2 (2.7) 2 (3.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.8) 9 (11.1) 7 (9.2) 3 (4.8) 1 (2.0) 2 (2.4) 1 (1.7) 
Tradition 4 (6.7) 4 (6.8) 9 (12.2) 8 (12.1) 2 (2.9) 6 (10.7) 12 (14.8) 14 (18.4) 5 (8.1) 5 (9.8) 10 (12.2) 9 (15.0) 
Because there are few penalties for doing 
so 15 (25.0) 9 (15.3) 7 (9.5) 8 (12.1) 18 (26.5) 6 (10.7) 15 (18.5) 14 (18.4) 15 (24.2) 12 (23.5) 21 (25.6) 7 (11.7) 
Other 19 (31.7) 14 (23.7) 30 (40.5) 13 (19.7) 34 (50.0) 26 (46.4) 40 (49.4) 32 (42.1) 25 (40.3) 19 (37.3) 33 (40.2) 33 (55.0) 
Don't know 14 (23.3) 15 (25.4) 17 (23.0) 20 (30.3) 4 (5.9) 5 (8.9) 1 (1.2) 3 (3.9) 1 (1.6) 1 (2.0) 4 (4.9) 1 (1.7) 
Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Q87. If everyone in your community were to discontinue [female genital mutilation/cutting], would you want it to continue?   
  Yes 13 (13.0) 11 (10.7) 35 (34.3) 18 (18.0) 17 (16.8) 16 (16.2) 23 (23.0) 25 (24.8) 15 (15.0) 12 (12.0) 10 (9.8) 13 (12.9) 
  No 83 (83.0) 83 (80.6) 62 (60.8) 71 (71.0) 82 (81.2) 82 (82.8) 76 (76.0) 75 (74.3) 85 (85.0) 87 (87.0) 92 (90.2) 88 (87.1) 
  Don't know 3 (3.0) 9 (8.7) 5 (4.9) 11 (11.0) 2 (2.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
  Refused to answer 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Q90. In your opinion, when deciding whether to practise [female genital mutilation/cutting], how much consideration is given to whether or not others are doing it?  
  A lot of consideration 20 (20.0) 24 (23.3) 19 (18.6) 19 (19.0) 21 (20.8) 19 (19.2) 29 (29.0) 19 (18.8) 18 (18.0) 19 (19.0) 17 (16.7) 18 (17.8) 
  Some consideration 19 (19.0) 17 (16.5) 27 (26.5) 18 (18.0) 31 (30.7) 33 (33.3) 20 (20.0) 21 (20.8) 22 (22.0) 24 (24.0) 22 (21.6) 30 (29.7) 
  Not much consideration 13 (13.0) 18 (17.5) 13 (12.7) 9 (9.0) 14 (13.9) 17 (17.2) 12 (12.0) 18 (17.8) 25 (25.0) 18 (18.0) 24 (23.5) 16 (15.8) 
  No consideration 31 (31.0) 17 (16.5) 28 (27.5) 27 (27.0) 35 (34.7) 28 (28.3) 36 (36.0) 39 (38.6) 34 (34.0) 39 (39.0) 39 (38.2) 35 (34.7) 
  Don't know 17 (17.0) 27 (26.2) 15 (14.7) 27 (27.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (2.0) 3 (3.0) 4 (4.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (2.0) 
Q100. Do you believe that female genital mutilation/cutting should continue, or should it be stopped? 
  Continued 12 (12.0) 15 (14.6) 18 (17.6) 20 (20.0) 10 (9.9) 17 (17.2) 25 (25.0) 34 (33.7) 18 (18.0) 16 (16.0) 13 (12.7) 16 (15.8) 
  Stopped 86 (86.0) 80 (77.7) 81 (79.4) 68 (68.0) 91 (90.1) 82 (82.8) 75 (75.0) 66 (65.3) 81 (81.0) 83 (83.0) 89 (87.3) 84 (83.2) 
  Don't know 2 (2.0) 8 (7.8) 3 (2.9) 11 (11.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 
  Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
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Table 12: Social costs and benefits 
  Faramana Koury Koloko Finkolo Tansila Boura 
  
Male  
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=103) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=101) 
Female 
(N=99) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(101) 
Male 
(N=100) 
Female 
(N=100) 
Male 
(N=102) 
Female 
(N=101) 
Q93. Would your neighbours approve or disapprove if you cut your daughter? 
  Approve strongly 2 (2.0) 1 (1.0) 12 (11.8) 4 (4.0) 6 (5.9) 5 (5.1) 17 (17.0) 17 (16.8) 2 (2.0) 1 (1.0) 5 (4.9) 6 (5.9) 
  Approve 27 (27.0) 26 (25.2) 25 (24.5) 26 (26.0) 24 (23.8) 17 (17.2) 30 (30.0) 36 (35.6) 28 (28.0) 29 (29.0) 23 (22.5) 25 (24.8) 
  Disapprove 52 (52.0) 46 (44.7) 41 (40.2) 40 (40.0) 48 (47.5) 55 (55.6) 33 (33.0) 31 (30.7) 43 (43.0) 48 (48.0) 48 (47.1) 47 (46.5) 
  Disapprove greatly 13 (13.0) 16 (15.5) 15 (14.7) 12 (12.0) 20 (19.8) 17 (17.2) 20 (20.0) 15 (14.9) 26 (26.0) 20 (20.0) 25 (24.5) 22 (21.8) 
  Don't know 6 (6.0) 14 (13.6) 9 (8.8) 18 (18.0) 3 (3.0) 5 (5.1) 0 (0.0) 2 (2.0) 1 (1.0) 2 (2.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 
Q96. In your opinion, is life in the village more difficult or less difficult for uncut women? 
  Life is much more difficult 19 (19.0) 12 (11.7) 23 (22.5) 9 (9.0) 15 (14.9) 12 (12.1) 21 (21.0) 21 (20.8) 18 (18.0) 20 (20.0) 21 (20.6) 29 (28.7) 
  Life is somewhat more 
difficult 10 (10.0) 14 (13.6) 12 (11.8) 11 (11.0) 13 (12.9) 19 (19.2) 13 (13.0) 12 (11.9) 15 (15.0) 19 (19.0) 15 (14.7) 14 (13.9) 
  Life is neither more or less 
difficult 16 (16.0) 11 (10.7) 12 (11.8) 17 (17.0) 22 (21.8) 17 (17.2) 14 (14.0) 16 (15.8) 21 (21.0) 18 (18.0) 19 (18.6) 17 (16.8) 
  Life is somewhat less 
difficult 8 (8.0) 4 (3.9) 6 (5.9) 1 (1.0) 13 (12.9) 6 (6.1) 11 (11.0) 5 (5.0) 10 (10.0) 9 (9.0) 10 (9.8) 11 (10.9) 
  Life is much less difficult 29 (29.0) 31 (30.1) 36 (35.3) 36 (36.0) 35 (34.7) 39 (39.4) 39 (39.0) 42 (41.6) 35 (35.0) 34 (34.0) 36 (35.3) 28 (27.7) 
  Don't know 18 (18.0) 30 (29.1) 13 (12.7) 24 (24.0) 3 (3.0) 6 (6.1) 2 (2.0) 5 (5.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 2 (2.0) 
  Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (2.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Q81. What would you do if you found out a neighbour was going to practise female genital mutilation/cutting? 
Nothing 42 (42.0) 47 (45.6) 43 (42.2) 36 (36.0) 37 (36.6) 32 (32.3) 33 (33.0) 53 (52.5) 35 (35.0) 33 (33.0) 27 (26.5) 30 (29.7) 
Call the telephone hotline 0 (0.0) 2 (1.9) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 4 (4.0) 0 (0.0) 3 (3.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 2 (2.0) 
Notify the police/gendarme 6 (6.0) 12 (11.7) 10 (9.8) 7 (7.0) 11 (10.9) 19 (19.2) 1 (1.0) 3 (3.0) 19 (19.0) 12 (12.0) 15 (14.7) 7 (6.9) 
Notify a social worker 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 4 (4.0) 5 (5.0) 2 (2.0) 3 (3.0) 2 (2.0) 4 (4.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (2.0) 
Notify local authorities 10 (10.0) 5 (4.9) 14 (13.7) 12 (12.0) 9 (8.9) 9 (9.1) 9 (9.0) 6 (5.9) 6 (6.0) 3 (3.0) 11 (10.8) 8 (7.9) 
Notify a health worker 3 (3.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 3 (3.0) 1 (1.0) 2 (2.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 
Inform a local NGO 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Talk to a family member/a 
friend 14 (14.0) 20 (19.4) 11 (10.8) 21 (21.0) 20 (19.8) 21 (21.2) 25 (25.0) 23 (22.8) 29 (29.0) 36 (36.0) 25 (24.5) 34 (33.7) 
 Something else [What ?] 23 (23.0) 10 (9.7) 21 (20.6) 12 (12.0) 32 (31.7) 29 (29.3) 31 (31.0) 18 (17.8) 15 (15.0) 14 (14.0) 30 (29.4) 19 (18.8) 
Don't know 6 (6.0) 12 (11.7) 7 (6.9) 16 (16.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (2.0) 4 (4.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 
Refused to answer 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
  
 
